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I. INTRODUCTION 
A reassessment of United States’ constitutional constraints on 
state-level foreign policy is sorely needed.  State engagement in for-
eign policy was rarely significant until the 1960s.
1
  Since that time, 
state involvement has rapidly expanded in both sheer magnitude and 
the types of activities undertaken.
2
  The most prominent and proble-
matic among these state and local activities in the past fifty-plus years 
has been three waves of state and local sanction initiatives targeting 
countries ruled by regimes with repugnant human rights policies.  In 
the mid-1980s, over half of the states and at least 100 localities 
adopted sanctions legislation against South Africa, most often in the 
form of divestment requirements for state or city pension funds, pro-
curement restrictions applicable to companies active in South Africa, 
or both.
3
  In the late 1990s, many states and localities targeted Burma 
(officially known as the Union of Myanmar), a country ruled by an 
undemocratic military regime with a repugnant human rights record 
that has included the killing of as many as several thousand pro-
democracy demonstrators.  More recently, states and localities have 
targeted the Sudanese government for its participation in the geno-
cide in the Darfur region of the country.  Divestment requirements 
and procurement sanctions continue to be tools of choice for states 
and localities seeking to use their substantial market leverage to 
change the behavior of these foreign governments.  Unless halted 
through the faithful application of constitutional constraints by state 
and local officials, globalization and technological developments that 
increase access to and the exchange of information concerning con-
 
 1 See, e.g., Ivo D. Duchacek, Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors 
in International Relations, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF 
SUBNATIONAL UNITS 5, 5 (Hans Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990); Earl 
Fry, The United States of America, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE 
ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL UNITS 283, 283 (Hans Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 
1990). 
 2 See generally John M. Kline, Managing Intergovernmental Tensions: Shaping a State 
and Local Role in U.S Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 105, 
105 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993) (noting that not since the Republic’s earliest decades 
had states attempted to engage directly and actively in foreign affairs in order to ad-
vance individual policy positions). 
 3 Id. at 111. 
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ditions and policies in foreign countries will likely facilitate the trend 
of increased state and local involvement in foreign affairs.
4
 
Constraints on state-level foreign policy flow from the Suprema-
cy Clause (in the form of the preemption doctrine), the Foreign 
Commerce Clause (in the form of the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause), and the amalgam of clauses allocating foreign affairs powers 
to federal actors and denying them to the states (in the form of the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine).  In 1968, the Supreme Court in 
Zschernig v. Miller for the first time relied upon the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine to invalidate a state law in an as-applied challenge.
5
  
This doctrine prohibits certain state foreign policy actions even in in-
stances in which such state actions are not preempted by affirmative 
acts of the federal government (i.e., where the foreign policy powers 
of the federal government lie dormant or unutilized).  The dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine is rooted in an exclusive federal government 
foreign affairs power.
6
  By definition, if a power is exclusive to the 
federal government, then states are denied such power irrespective of 
whether the federal government has utilized its power.  The Court 
has declared the foreign relations power to be exclusive to the federal 
government since the early 1800s, and a multi-modal interpretation 
of the Constitution supports a significant degree of federal exclusivity 
over foreign affairs.
7
 
All three major waves of state and local sanction efforts—those 
involving South Africa in the 1980s, Burma in the 1990s, and Sudan 
in the 2000s—led to litigation challenging the constitutionality of the 
state and local legislation.  The litigation involved challenges to state 
and local laws under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, as well as 
preemption and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.  Additional 
 
 4 See Matthew Schaefer, The “Grey Areas” and “Yellow Zones” of Split Sovereignty Ex-
posed by Globalization: Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation and Intrusion to 
Escape an Era of Misguided “New Federalism,” 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 35 (1998). 
 5 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).  Some commentators have used slightly different la-
bels.  See, e.g., Kevin Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Lo-
cal Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469, 471 (1987) (referring to the “dormant 
foreign affairs power”); Johanna Medelson, Foreign Policy by Federalism: The Reagan 
Years, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 81, 89 (1989) (referring to a “dormant foreign 
affairs clause”).  I believe that use of the term “dormant foreign affairs clause” is in-
appropriate because the doctrine does not derive from a single clause nor does the 
Constitution grant a general foreign affairs power to the federal government in any 
single clause. 
 6 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436. 
 7 See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 550 (1840) (“From the very nature 
and organization of the general or national government, it is vested with the sole ju-
risdiction over all matters of a national character, and of external concern.”). 
SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2011  3:50 PM 
2011] REASSESSING CONSTRAINTS 205 
state measures outside of these major sanction initiatives have also 
been challenged in the courts since Zschernig.
8
  Lower federal and 
state courts, however, have struggled to apply Zschernig’s test, which 
asks whether a state action has “more than ‘some incidental or indi-
rect effect’” on foreign relations,
9
 given the test is not particularly 
well-suited for courts to independently analyze.  In the past decade, 
the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in two cases, Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council
10
 and American Insurance Association v. Garamen-
di,
11
 involving state level foreign policy sanctions, but the Court’s opi-
nions have not provided the clarity needed by lower courts, state ac-
tors, local actors, or federal actors.  These Supreme Court rulings 
followed closely on the heels of significant academic criticism of the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine—writings that challenged the or-
thodoxy of federal government exclusivity in foreign affairs.
12
 
In the first case, Crosby, the Court struck down a Massachusetts 
law that provided a negative ten percent procurement preference 
against companies active in Burma.
13
  In its opinion, the Court relied 
solely on “obstacles conflict”
14
 preemption and did not rule on two 
additional grounds that the First Circuit had relied upon to strike the 
law down: the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the dormant For-
eign Commerce Clause.  The choice to rely solely on preemption in-
correctly fueled speculation by some that the academic assault on 
Zschernig succeeded.
15
  Additionally, some incorrectly characterized 
the ruling as narrow and read it as only providing preemption of state 
 
 8 See infra Part VIII.E.2 (chart). 
 9 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)). 
 10 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 11 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 12 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 436 n.64 
(2d ed. 1996); Jack Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. 
REV. 1617, 1618–20 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1223, 1225 (1999) [hereinafter Spiro, Foreign Relations] (“The purpose of this 
essay is to present a coherent explanation of why the doctrine was once appropriate, 
even imperative, but fast becoming obsolete.”); Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigra-
tion in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA.  J. INT’L L. 121, 123 (1994) [hereinafter Spi-
ro, States and Immigration] (arguing for a lack of federal exclusivity over immigration 
matters since the foreign affairs underpinning of such exclusivity is no longer valid). 
 13 Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000). 
 14 Id. at 384–85. 
 15 Cf. Carlos Manual Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1261 
(2001) (arguing that “a declaration of victory by the critics of the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine would be premature” in response to the Court’s opinion in Crosby). 
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law where a federal sanctions law specifically targeted the same coun-
try as the state law or as only impacting procurement sanctions.
16
 
In the second case, Garamendi, the Court invalidated a California 
law requiring insurers operating in the state to disclose pre-
Holocaust-era insurance policies sold in Europe in order to continue 
operating in the state.
17
  But the Court provided a rather muddled 
analysis.  The majority approvingly cited Zschernig, breathing life back 
into the doctrine for those that incorrectly believed Crosby left it criti-
cally wounded.
18
  The Garamendi opinion, however, arguably mischa-
racterized Zschernig as a field preemption case
19
 and ultimately 
seemed to rely more on Crosby-styled obstacles conflict preemption as 
the grounds for its decision.
20
 
For their part, state and local governments read the opinions as 
continuing to allow state-level foreign policy sanctions (or at a mini-
mum used the doctrinal confusion as an opportunity to pass such 
measures) as evidenced by the recent enactment of laws targeting 
Sudan.  While a lower federal court partially invalidated Sudan-
sanctions legislation enacted by Illinois in 2007,
21
 a new issue was 
raised when Congress subsequently purported to authorize state and 
local divestment measures targeting Sudan in response to the litiga-
tion.
22
  The Congressional authorization occurred in spite of the Pres-
ident questioning the constitutionality of such authorization in his 
signing statement of the legislation.
23
  In sum, the academic criticism 
of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, the Supreme Court’s hesit-
ance to rely clearly upon it, and Congress’s purported attempt to au-
thorize state actions otherwise running afoul of the doctrine, have left 
 
 16 See Daniel M. Price, John P. Hannah & Marinn F. Carlson, Crosby v. NFTC and 
the Future of State and Local Sanctions, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 37, 40 (2001).  
The omission of [dormant foreign affairs doctrine and dormant For-
eign Commerce Clause] holdings, however, at least theoretically leaves 
open the possibility [state sanctions] could pass constitutional muster, 
provided no federal statute addressed the same issue.  This conceptual 
space is what advocates of local foreign policy initiatives may seek to 
exploit. 
Id.  The authors think this reading by state and local officials is incorrect. 
 17 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003). 
 18 Id. at 417–18. 
 19 Id. at 419. 
 20 Id. at 421. 
 21 NFTC v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 22 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 
Stat. 2516. 
 23 Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, 
43 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1645 (Dec. 31, 2007). 
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confusion and questions surrounding the doctrine.  Further, because 
states and localities continue primarily to utilize procurement restric-
tions and divestment requirements in major sanctions initiatives, the 
failure of the Supreme Court to rule on the availability of a market 
participant exception to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine in the 
face of conflicting lower court opinions has created further uncer-
tainty.  Thus, the lack of clarity for state, local and federal officials, 
lower courts, and businesses, first created by the Zschernig opinion, 
has arguably worsened considerably in the past decade. 
This reassessment of U.S. constitutional constraints on state level 
foreign policy will focus on (re)justifying, refining, and distinguishing 
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  The (re)justification for the 
doctrine is twofold.  First, all major policy considerations argue 
against state involvement in foreign affairs absent federal approval.  
Ultimately, even those policy goals that at first glance appear to sup-
port state involvement in foreign affairs do not require state involve-
ment in order to be achieved.  These policy arguments do not 
mandate a dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  As critics of the doctrine 
point out, the federal government can always preempt harmful state 
activities.
24
  Preemption by the federal government, however, is an 
imperfect device in eliminating state engagement in foreign affairs 
and gives less clear guidance to state and local actors.  Further, rely-
ing on preemption is arguably less intellectually honest given unclear 
congressional intent regarding preemption of state and local sanc-
tions measures in many instances.  Most importantly, the various 
modes of constitutional interpretation, although providing somewhat 
conflicting signals, nevertheless support an exclusive foreign affairs 
power in the federal government and its corollary, the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine. 
The refinement of the doctrine is necessary because both courts 
and scholars have struggled to establish a doctrinal test for analyzing 
state actions that pays fealty to the Court’s Zschernig opinion, suits the 
competence of courts, and allows for independent application by 
state and local officials.  In establishing the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine in the Zschernig case, the Supreme Court appeared to create 
a threshold-effects test asking whether the state action has “more 
than ‘some incidental or indirect effect’” on U.S. foreign relations or 
a foreign nation.
25
  The origins of the test, however, are somewhat ac-
 
 24 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1679. 
 25 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434 (1968) (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 
503, 517 (1947)).  
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cidental.
26
  Moreover, such a standard is not particularly well-suited 
for independent determinations by the courts, nor is it particularly 
well-suited for independent application by state and local officials.  
Many commentators analyzing the doctrine have failed to support 
their chosen standard of review and have strayed from any standard 
arguably articulated by the courts.  For instance, many commentators 
have mistakenly called for a balancing test relying on an analogy to 
the dormant Commerce Clause.
27
  But courts struggle enough to in-
dependently determine the effect a state law has on foreign affairs 
without being called upon to balance that effect against the achieve-
ment of a legitimate local purpose.  Fortunately, there is also lan-
guage in Zschernig that indicates that the Court was concerned with 
the purpose of the state action.
28
  Indeed, many lower courts have 
turned to purpose review as an additional test or sub-test in their ap-
plication of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
29
  Purpose review, 
while admittedly not unproblematic, is the most appropriate doctrin-
al test.  Specifically, the test for reviewing the legality of state actions 
should be phrased as follows: 
The dormant foreign affairs doctrine prohibits states from engag-
ing in foreign policy.  States engage in foreign policy when they 
take measures having a foreign-policy purpose.  A foreign-policy 
purpose is evident when the primary purpose
30
 of the state action is to 
change or criticize
31
 a policy of a foreign government, or governments. 
 
 26 See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 27 See, e.g., Glenn S. McRoberts, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Towards a Dormant 
Foreign Affairs Doctrine, 11 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 639, 652 (1989); John Nor-
ton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 306 (1965). 
 28 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437. 
 29 See discussion infra Parts III.D.3, VII.E. 
 30 See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 652 (initially examining state actions for such 
a primary purpose but then engaging in balancing analysis).  In the context of the 
dormant Commerce Clause, Don Regan has supported a motive-review standard that 
would only ask whether a protectionist purpose “substantially contributed” to enact-
ment of the state law.  See Don Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Mak-
ing Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH.  L.  REV. 1091, 1148–49 (1986).  
While I have no great concerns about adopting this lesser standard, I do not think 
the choice between these two standards will matter very often under the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine.  In other words, I think the choice between a “primary pur-
pose” and “purpose that substantially contributed” standard is probably more impor-
tant under the dormant Commerce Clause because state laws often mix a protection-
ist purpose with a legitimate local purpose.  I also think the standard can be higher 
under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine since the policing problems of state activ-
ities faced by the federal government are less significant.  See also discussion infra Part 
IV.D–E. 
 31 Some readers may wonder why state actions “supporting or encouraging” a 
foreign government’s behavior or policies are also not captured by the doctrinal 
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Such a test, it should be noted, will not prevent many activities 
states currently engage in that some broader definitions may define 
as foreign policy or foreign affairs.  In sum, the adoption of purpose 
review is not intended to be revolutionary, but rather, it is appro-
priately adapted to respond to a multi-modal interpretation of the 
Constitution.  Additionally, and importantly, no market participant 
exception should be available under the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine.  The justifications for the doctrine under the dormant Com-
merce Clause simply do not apply in the context of the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine. 
Third, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine must be distin-
guished from preemption analysis and the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause.  Commentators often use the term preemption or 
preempt in the context of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  This 
unduly confuses the two doctrines.  Preemption doctrine has always 
been understood to flow from the Supremacy Clause plus an affirma-
tive federal act.
32
  Similarly, the relationship between the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
is not well-understood.  A complete understanding of the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine requires distinguishing it from these other 
doctrines. 
It is important to realize that the tasks of justifying, refining, and 
distinguishing the dormant foreign affairs doctrine are not exogen-
ous to one another.  For instance, justifying the existence of the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine on policy grounds requires distinguish-
ing the doctrine from preemption.  As another example, refining the 
test under the doctrine to preclude balancing by courts requires dis-
tinguishing the doctrine from the dormant Commerce Clause.  It is 
for this reason that this Article cannot be neatly divided up into ad-
dressing these three undertakings of justification, refinement, and 
distinction in succession.  Although this Article follows this order as 
much as possible, some intermixing of these three undertakings is 
necessary. 
Throughout this Article it is also important to bear in mind that 
the relevant question is not whether pariah states or rogue govern-
ments deserve condemnation or sanctions, but rather, the question is 
 
tests.  But adding these to the doctrinal test is probably unnecessary for several rea-
sons.  First, it is my sense that states are relatively less engaged in this manner towards 
foreign governments.  Second, foreign governments will not take offense, and thus 
they will not retaliate or threaten retaliation against such actions.  Third, the Fra-
mer’s were particularly concerned with state actions that would affront foreign gov-
ernments and lead to potential retaliation.   
 32 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947). 
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which level of government is to decide upon the timing, manner, 
form, and degree of the condemnation and sanction.  The efficient 
working of democracy and government, the predictability needed by 
corporations and their workers in an interdependent world, and our 
nation’s ability to influence foreign nations all demand a clearer un-
derstanding of the Constitution’s limits on state and local govern-
ment engagement in foreign policy.  Indeed, a reassessment is neces-
sary from the point of view of state government officials, federal 
government officials, and the courts. 
First, there is evidence that some state legislators and governors 
have abandoned their role in constitutional interpretation, particu-
larly as it relates to constraints on their powers in foreign affairs.  One 
only need look towards the statements of Massachusetts state assem-
blyman Byron Rushing regarding Massachusetts’ Burma law in which 
he declared, “Our Constitution is older than the country’s.  We can 
do these things.”
33
  A serious effort to faithfully interpret the U.S. 
Constitution must be undertaken by all state officials, but unfortu-
nately it is not.  Self-imposed constraints by state officials are neces-
sary because state and lower federal courts rarely have cases pre-
sented to them.  The lack of cases results from collective action 
problems faced by businesses injured by state foreign policy, even 
though these collective action problems have been overcome more 
frequently in the past decade,
34
 and the political reluctance of the ex-
ecutive branch.  Second, the federal political branches need a clearer 
understanding of constitutional limits on state foreign policy so that 
they know whether addressing preemption of state legislation in fed-
eral foreign affairs legislation is necessary, and alternatively, whether 
and in what instances they can authorize state and local foreign poli-
cy sanctions measures.  Third, the Supreme Court could greatly assist 
federal, state, and local government officials and lower federal and 
state courts by confirming the continued existence of the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine.  More importantly, the Court should clarify 
the doctrinal test under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the 
distinctions between it and other doctrines.  Even without such Su-
preme Court clarification, lower courts in large numbers continue to 
apply the dormant foreign affairs doctrine (with a significant empha-
sis on purpose review), and thus state and local officials must rely on 
 
 33 A State’s Foreign Policy: The Mass that Roared, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 32. 
 34 See Richard Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 821, 831 (1989); Howard Fenton, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and 
Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 563, 590–91 (1993). 
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these lower court opinions to aid in the independent examination of 
their own actions. 
Part II of this Article examines the policy arguments both for 
and against state-level foreign policies.  These prudential arguments 
fall into five general categories: fairness/retaliation, efficien-
cy/expertise, democratization, effectiveness, and the new post-Cold 
War geopolitical environment.  The ends desired in allowing active 
state-level foreign policies can be achieved even in an environment in 
which states face severe restrictions on establishing their own foreign 
policies.  In short, state-level foreign policies are not sound as a pru-
dential matter. 
Part III engages in a multi-modal interpretation of the Constitu-
tion’s provisions on foreign affairs.  The text of the Constitution ex-
plicitly prohibits the states from engaging in foreign relations in cer-
tain ways.  The real question, however, is whether limits exist beyond 
these explicit textual prohibitions.  The multi-modal interpretation of 
the Constitution undertaken in this Part admits that there are con-
flicting indications in the text and drafting history of the Constitution 
but still finds plenty of support for the existence of a dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine. 
Part IV focuses on an analysis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
the Zschernig case.  This Part of the Article examines the three possi-
ble doctrinal tests under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine: thre-
shold effects, balancing, and purpose review.  This Article expresses a 
strong preference for purpose review because courts are best able to 
engage in this type of review independent of the views of the execu-
tive branch and foreign governments.  Purpose review will lead to 
more consistent results among lower courts, it better respects tradi-
tional areas of state regulation and federal political branch views on 
whether certain international obligations should be self-executing, 
and, most importantly, it provides the best guidance to state and local 
officials assessing the constitutionality of their own actions. 
Part V continues the discussion of the test that should be 
adopted under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine by examining a 
potential market participant exception to the doctrine.  A market-
participant exception should be rejected under the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine because justifications for the exception under the 
dormant Commerce Clause are inapplicable in the context of the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 
Part VI distinguishes the dormant foreign affairs doctrine from 
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.  In particular, the discussion 
reduces the additional prongs of analysis undertaken in dormant 
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Foreign Commerce Clause cases to their bare bones and draws les-
sons for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 
Part VII explores whether federal actors can authorize actions by 
the states that would otherwise run afoul of the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine.  It is well-established that Congress can authorize ac-
tions by the states that otherwise violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause, but authorizations of state actions otherwise violating the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine will often require approval by both 
Congress and the President.  But some actions, specifically those in 
areas of federal power that are not only exclusive but non-delegable, 
could never be authorized. 
Part VIII critically examines the Supreme Court’s rulings in Cros-
by and Garamendi that have created confusion and a lack of clarity.  It 
also looks at post-Garamendi lower court cases.  These cases reveal a 
degree of confusion regarding the doctrine among some lower courts 
but also indicate that a majority of lower courts continue to apply the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine (with heavy emphasis on purpose 
review). 
Part IX discusses the relative importance of courts vis-à-vis state 
officials in applying the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  The reality 
is that courts do not have the opportunity to constrain the states in 
many instances.  Many businesses are simply not anxious to risk a 
public backlash by challenging state-level foreign policy measures in 
court.
35
 While the National Foreign Trade Council, a coalition of over 
300 businesses engaged in international trade, has overcome the fear 
of being a plaintiff in a couple of instances, faithful application of 
constitutional constraints by state officials and representatives is ulti-
mately required.  Such faithfulness could be enhanced through Su-
preme Court clarification as lower courts’ opinions have jurisdiction-
al limits. 
Part X examines whether the Supreme Court’s own rules of 
judicial restraint would prevent the Court from providing further 
clarity in a future case.  A review of the cases suggests the Court could 
properly base a ruling on the dormant foreign affairs doctrine even 
when preemption grounds are also present. 
Part XI concludes that the Supreme Court’s reliance on, and 
clarification of, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-
review test would allow state and local officials to discharge their re-
sponsibilities to act in accordance with the U.S. Constitution. 
 
 35 See Fenton, supra note 34, at 590–91. 
SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2011  3:50 PM 
2011] REASSESSING CONSTRAINTS 213 
II. FUNCTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST  
STATE-LEVEL FOREIGN POLICY 
A. Retaliation and Unfairness 
The most readily apparent policy argument against states engag-
ing in foreign policy is found in The Federalist Papers.  It is a con-
cern related to fairness and retaliation.
36
  Is it fair to the forty-nine 
other states if a foreign nation crafts sanctions against the United 
States as a whole in response to one state’s foreign policy legislation? 
Clearly the answer is no.  Is it actually the case that retaliation will fall 
upon the United States as a whole rather than the state engaging in 
foreign affairs in such instances? Critics of the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine note that there are examples in recent trade disputes where 
retaliation has been targeted against a particular sub-national entity.  
Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that at least the important na-
tions of the world know the “difference between Washington and 
Sacramento.”
37
 In other words, foreign countries will not hold the rest 
of the United States responsible for the actions of California.  The ex-
istence of multi-jurisdictional enterprises, however, leads to possible 
avoidance of such targeted retaliation, subsequently making targeted 
retaliation less attractive to aggrieved states.
38
  Additionally, it is often 
tough to target sanctions against a particular sub-federal jurisdiction 
with no spill-over effects.
39
  Indeed, there are a host of strategic con-
siderations a foreign state will consider in deciding whether to target 
sanctions against the state enacting foreign policy legislation or to do 
so more broadly against the United States.  Moreover, even if sanc-
tions are targeted against a particular sub-federal jurisdiction, it is 
possible relations between the United States and the foreign nation 
will be spoiled on other matters or that the foreign nation will use the 
dispute as leverage in other negotiations.
40
  Retaliation occurs in sub-
tle as well as overt forms.  For example, with regard to these more 
subtle forms, is it fair to the other forty-nine states if a foreign nation 
is less forthcoming in some international negotiations (or, in coope-
rating on the war on terror) as a result of one state’s engagement of 
foreign policy? 
 
 36 See Moore, supra note 27, at 251.  
 37 Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 12, at 169. 
 38 See Matthew Schaefer, Federal States in the Broader World, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 37–
39 (2001); see also David Golove, The Implications of Crosby for Federal Exclusivity in For-
eign Affairs, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 152, 156–58 (2003). 
 39 See Schaefer, supra note 38, at 37–39; see also Golove, supra note 38, at 156–158. 
 40 See id. 
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Rebuttals that will flow to the arguments above are easy to im-
agine but ultimately are not compelling.  First, one may argue that re-
taliation against the United States as a whole or retaliation against a 
particular state are remote possibilities.  Foreign countries are simply 
not anxious to retaliate against the United States, even for interna-
tional law violations, due to the economic, political, and military 
power of the United States.
41
  For smaller foreign nations, such retali-
ation is almost surely to be ineffective.  Such an argument, however, 
presumes a narrow definition of retaliation.  Retaliation may come in 
subtle forms and be manifest in a souring of cooperation rather than 
explicit sanctions.  In other words, the power of the United States is a 
large, but still a limited and fungible commodity.  If some of that 
power is “spent” preventing retaliation that might otherwise occur in 
response to a state-level foreign policy, then less of that power is 
available to be utilized for the interests of the nation as a whole. 
Second, one can question the unfairness of retaliation against 
the nation as a whole in a situation in which a majority of states, say 
twenty-six, have enacted the foreign policy legislation (e.g., Massa-
chusetts-styled Burma laws) or, to take even a more extreme example, 
forty-nine states have enacted such legislation.  Is it unfair to the oth-
er twenty-four states that have not, or in the extreme example the 
single state that has not, enacted such legislation if retaliation falls 
upon the nation as a whole?  The answer is that it is still unfair, al-
though one might find the extreme situation somewhat less unfair.  It 
seems that if a majority of states could enact a particular type of sanc-
tions legislation against a particular foreign country, such legislation 
could be enacted at the federal level (or at least legislation authoriz-
ing the state legislation could be passed by Congress).  But history has 
shown that this need not always be the case.  In the mid-1980s, state 
sanctions against South Africa were widespread despite the inability 
of the federal government to initially enact comprehensive sanctions 
due to executive branch opposition.
42
  The real question in these hy-
potheticals should be whether it is unfair to the twenty-four states or 
the one state abstaining from foreign policy action when the federal 
government has not authorized action by the states?  It remains un-
fair because it circumvents the officials within the level of govern-
 
 41 See, e.g., William Davey, Dispute Settlement in the GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 51, 
103 (1987) (noting the lack of power behind sanctions imposed by smaller coun-
tries). 
 42 See Fenton, supra note 34, at 564. 
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ment that should be responsible for making such decisions,
43
 and it 
also circumvents the separation of power constraints in the Constitu-
tion for the making of U.S. foreign policy.  This statement, however, 
necessitates support from other modes of constitutional interpreta-
tion.  While currently focusing on the prudential mode of interpreta-
tion, the various modes that are utilized are clearly linked together in 
some respects.  For example, the whole question of unfairness can be 
considered in the procedural sense of notice.  If our other modes of 
constitutional interpretation, including text, structure, original in-
tent, and doctrinal, tend to support the conclusion that the Constitu-
tion allows states to enact such legislation and this was the compact 
created among the states or the people (a question, which I will not 
delve into), then one can argue there is no unfairness.  This is, how-
ever, not the case.  Part III of this Article will demonstrate that nearly 
all modes of constitutional interpretation ultimately support the con-
clusion that states are prohibited from engaging in foreign affairs.
44
  
Thus, even these “tougher” cases remain unfair to the abstaining 
states. 
B. Efficiency and Expertise 
State-level foreign policy arguments based on efficiency and ex-
pertise are similar to economic arguments concerning the division of 
labor.  In short, it may make more sense for one level of government 
to focus on certain matters and leave other levels of government to 
focus on entirely separate matters.  Indeed, two types of federalism 
are frequently distinguished: coordinate and cooperative.  Coordi-
nate federalism, similar to dual federalism, divides power between 
two levels of government by topic matter.
45
  Coordinate federalism 
consists of a static allocation of responsibility between the two levels 
of government.
46
  In contrast, cooperative federalism emphasizes 
concurrent jurisdiction and shared responsibility over all matters in 
the federal and sub-federal governments.
47
  As a simple matter of effi-
ciency, it seems as though some subject matters should be left to one 
level of government.  Specialization and expertise can be developed 
at that level of government.  Indeed, expertise in foreign policy clear-
ly resides much more in the federal government than in state gov-
 
 43 See Bilder, supra note 34, at 827 (noting state officials are not elected to con-
duct foreign policy). 
 44 See infra Part III. 
 45 See WILLIAM STEWART, CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM 55, 65–68 (1984). 
 46 Id. 
 47 See id. at 51–54. 
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ernments.  Federal government representatives have access to more 
complete and timely information and analysis, particularly that which 
is confidential.
48
  While this federal advantage over the states has been 
reduced somewhat by technological developments, an information 
and “institutional know-how” gap remains.
49
  This is not to say that 
states have no expertise at all in foreign affairs and that this expertise 
has not grown in recent years, particularly in trade matters such as 
export promotion.
50
  Proponents of regulatory competition may also 
offer a rebuttal to efficiency-based arguments, specifically that com-
petition between jurisdictions can create efficient results by creating 
the optimal regulatory environment.  Foreign policy, however, is a 
poor choice for regulatory competition between the states since a 
state-level experiment will be influenced by the foreign policy choices 
of other states, the federal government, and other nations.
51
  Because 
it will be impossible to eliminate the effects of these other influences 
through regression analysis, there will be no basis for judging the 
state experiment a success.
52
  Moreover, the costs of experimentation 
in foreign affairs are likely to fall upon other states as discussed 
above.
53
 
C. Democratization 
Proponents of state engagement of foreign policy most frequent-
ly rely on the argument that it “democratizes” foreign policy.  Instead 
of having foreign policy decided in secret by elite bureaucrats, the ar-
gument proceeds, state-level foreign policy increases citizen aware-
 
 48 See Bilder, supra note 34, at 828 (noting a contrary argument can be made that 
many issues do not require special expertise or information).  I, however, question 
Professor Bilder’s contrary argument.  States can gain access to human rights condi-
tions in various countries and know that such treatment is wrong or morally inde-
fensible; however, selecting a policy to change those conditions and the policies of 
governments in those countries is a more complex matter. 
 49 Cf. id. (“[S]tate and local governments lack the expertise, information and re-
sources . . . about complex international relations issues.”). 
 50 As an aside, by engaging in export and investment promotion activities, a state 
does not run afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine as will be discussed below.  
See infra Part VI. 
 51 See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Un-
derstanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 373 (1999); Schae-
fer, supra note 4, at 52.  But see John Kincaid, Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Politics 
and the Nation-State: Conflict and Cooperation, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 56 (Hans Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990) (arguing that pre-
venting competition in foreign affairs is anti-democratic) [hereinafter Kincaid, Con-
stituent]. 
 52 See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 373; Schaefer, supra note 4 at 52. 
 53 See infra Part II.A. 
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ness, access, and influence in the foreign policy process.
54
  This effect 
may be enhanced because citizens, it is argued, have greater access to 
local government structures vis-à-vis federal government structures.
55
 
Such an argument is problematic in several respects.  First, one 
might question whether foreign policy is truly made in secret any-
more.  In an information-technology era, only the most sensitive na-
tional security secrets typically escape the public’s eyes and ears, and 
even then only for a limited period of time.  Even if one believes that 
foreign policy is still too secretive, the “democratic” solution lies in an 
activist Congress.
56
 
Second, is it truly the case that state government involvement in 
foreign affairs will help democratize foreign policy?  State govern-
ment officials are unlikely to properly weigh the potential effects of 
their actions on other states in the nation.
57
  Does Massachusetts care 
if European retaliation (even subtle forms like interference with oth-
er negotiations) in response to the Burma law falls on other states?  
State government representatives are likely to weigh (or at least have 
greater competence to weigh) the costs and benefits to their state on-
ly, and this is why states are denied a priori certain powers in the Con-
stitution.
58
  Citizens in these other states have no say in the decision-
making process, although states may have an ultimate recourse in 
persuading the federal government to set aside other matters under 
consideration and preempt the state measure.  Additionally, state-
level foreign policy can lead to a lack of accountability.  Indeed, this 
is a frequent criticism of cooperative federalism in which federal and 
state governments simultaneously regulate in the same field.
59
  If the 
policy fails, citizens do not know who to hold responsible.
60
 
Third, one might also question as an empirical matter whether 
state foreign policies are the result of democracy at work or rather 
the result of the imperfections within the democratic system.  Indeed, 
polling data indicates that the general public does not believe that 
sub-national government involvement in foreign affairs is appropri-
 
 54 See Bilder, supra note 34, at 828–29; John Kincaid, Consumership Versus Citizen-
ship: Is There Wiggle Room for Local Regulation in the Global Economy?, in FOREIGN 
RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 27, 27–28 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993); Kincaid, Consti-
tuent, supra note 51, at 73. 
 55 See Bilder, supra note 34, at 828–29. 
 56 See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 372. 
 57 See id. at 372. 
 58 See id. at 372–74. 
 59 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1289 (2009). 
 60 Id. 
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ate.
61
  Therefore, many assume that foreign affairs issues are a federal 
government responsibility, and are less likely to pay attention to for-
eign affairs when voting in state elections.  Public choice theory may 
have a measure of descriptive force in the enactment of state and lo-
cal foreign policy sanctions.  Public choice theory posits that politi-
cians act in the interests of reelection and that concentrated interest 
groups will have great influence on politicians because of the smaller 
transaction costs of organizing (and hence contributing to reelection 
campaigns) vis-à-vis the general public.
62
  Although anecdotal, there is 
some support for the relevance of public choice theory in explaining 
the passage of the Massachusetts Burma law, which appears to have 
been passed in response to the calls of one particular lobbyist.
63
 
Lastly, because state governments may maintain First Amend-
ment rights and individual politicians certainly do,
64
 commentators 
argue that state engagement in foreign policy serves some of the 
same purposes as the First Amendment.
65
  But states need not engage 
in foreign policy to express their views on federal foreign policies.  
Other avenues for the expression of a state’s opposition to federal 
foreign policy or recommendations for future policies exist: state res-
olutions transmitted to the federal government, resolutions of state 
government organizations, and statements of individual politicians. 
D. Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of foreign policy is a difficult assessment to 
make.  Is U.S. foreign policy more effective with state involvement?  
Proponents of state involvement argue that state sanctions were criti-
cal to changing the apartheid policies of South Africa.  Significant 
 
 61 See Kline, supra note 2, at 114 n.19.  
 62 See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Du-
ty Cases, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 5, 18–21 (1996). 
 63 Robert S. Greenberger, States, Cities Increase Use of Trade Sanctions, Troubling 
Business Groups and U.S. Partners, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1998, at A20. 
 64 See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
1637, 1638 (2006). 
 65 Bilder, supra note 34, at 829 (arguing that some state foreign policy activities 
“implicate significant freedom of speech and petition values”); Andrea McCardle, In 
Defense of State and Local Government Anti-Apartheid Measures: Infusing Democratic Values 
into Foreign Policy Making, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 813, 840 (1989) (arguing that “state and 
local government measures intended specifically to communicate foreign policy posi-
tions to the national government and influence the direction of that policy, imple-
ment the expressive and associational interests of the citizenry and should be pre-
sumptively protected under the 1st Amendment”); Matthew Potterfield, State and 
Local Foreign Policy Initiatives & Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Fede-
ralism, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 33 (1999). 
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change in the policies of South Africa, however, did not occur until 
comprehensive federal sanctions were enacted and other nations in 
the international community joined in imposing sanctions.  At best, 
one can claim the states placed pressure on the first domino (i.e., the 
federal government), which in turn provided the pressure to knock 
down the other dominos (i.e., other nations) in the sanctions chain.  
Such pressure, however, could have come in other forms and 
through other means.  In fact, state engagement in foreign policy 
may deflect interest group pressure away from the federal govern-
ment and thus impede the pace at which comprehensive and effec-
tive federal and multilateral sanctions can be imposed.  This could 
allow foreign states to continue engaging in reprehensible behavior 
longer than they would otherwise.
66
 
Other arguments might also be put forth claiming positive bene-
fits for U.S. foreign policy through state involvement.  For example, 
one argument for state involvement is analogous to a “good cop/bad 
cop” situation.  The federal government plays “good cop” and follows 
a policy of “engagement” with a particular foreign nation, while the 
states play “bad cop” and pass sanction legislation.  The problem with 
such a scenario is that the “bad cop” may turn the foreign nation off 
from any talks with the federal government.  Second, one might also 
argue that state sanctions provide extra punch to federal foreign pol-
icy measures when both seek to accomplish the same goal.  The exis-
tence of state measures, however, interferes with the manner, form, 
and degree of federal sanctions and reduces flexibility to respond to 
changing conditions.  Unless it preempts all such action or if the 
Constitution prevents such action, the federal government cannot 
predict or depend upon what level of state sanctions will be in place 
at any one time.  If it takes federal action to control the level of state 
sanctions, then only one “cop” is involved.  If the policy adopted is to 
use less force as progress is made by the foreign country, it will be 
hard to achieve because both the state and federal government will 
need to act.  State legislatures may not be in session every year, they 
may have very short legislative sessions, and/or they may have other 
pressing business.  Moreover, state governments may make different 
judgments about when progress is achieved on the issue and refuse to 
scale back sanctions even though the federal government has done 
 
 66 See Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 12, at 173–74 (indicating that this is 
actually beneficial in the immigration context that poor immigration policies are on-
ly adopted in a few states rather than the nation as a whole because state involvement 
can act as a safety valve). 
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so.  Again, such problems can be avoided by preemptive federal ac-
tion, but at that point only one “cop” is working. 
Lastly, recent studies indicate that even unilateral sanctions by 
the United States as a whole are largely ineffective.
67
  If sanctions by 
the U.S. federal government are largely ineffective, sanctions by vari-
ous states are unlikely to achieve results.  It would be more effective if 
the federal government imposed sanctions and authorized state and 
local sanctions
68
 targeting the identical conduct in a manner that 
would allow the federal government to also enlist other countries in 
the sanction regime. 
E. Geopolitical Changes: End of the Cold War 
Some scholars suggest that Zschernig is a Cold War relic
69
 and that 
the end of the Cold War is grounds for eliminating the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine.
70
  In the view of these scholars, there is now 
room for state level foreign policies because there is no longer a dra-
conian penalty—complete destruction in response to a state-level for-
eign policy.  One can argue, however, that the risks of severe retalia-
tion in response to a state-level foreign policy are greater today than 
they were during the Cold War.
71
  Clearly, the Soviets were not going 
to respond to minor irritants like insults by state court judges, the ac-
tions at issue in Zschernig, with a draconian penalty such as nuclear 
war.
72
  Today, there are horizontal proliferation concerns, and the ra-
tionality of rogue state leaders differs from the ex-Soviet leaders un-
der a regime of Mutually Assured Destruction. In an era of asymme-
tric warfare, retaliation takes many forms, especially hard-to-detect 
forms, such as cyber warfare, the spreading of false rumors to injure 
financial markets and economies, or even low-cost measures used to 
jam or interfere with satellite communications.
73
  Thus, a dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine makes even more sense in a post-Cold War 
geopolitical environment than during the Cold War. 
 
 67 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 128 
(1994). 
 68 See discussion infra Part IX. 
 69 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1671. 
 70 See Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 12, at 1259; Spiro, States and Immigration, 
supra note 12, at 175. 
 71 Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1312; see Schaefer, supra note 4, at 35–37.  Vazquez 
does not say risks are greater today than during the Cold War; rather, he says that he 
“does not share Spiro’s belief that the stakes are significantly lower today.”  Vazquez, 
supra note 15, at 1312.  
 72 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 35–37. 
 73 See id. 
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III. JUSTIFYING THE EXISTENCE OF A DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
DOCTRINE THROUGH A MULTI-MODAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
If state and local sanctions are unwise as a policy matter, one ef-
fective legal constraint is the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, which 
recognizes the federal government’s foreign affairs powers as exclu-
sive.  Of course, critics of the doctrine assert that the federal govern-
ment can always preempt harmful or disruptive state laws (i.e., feder-
al government policing of harmful state and local foreign policies is 
sufficient).
74
  This debate raises the question of whether the foreign 
affairs powers of the federal government are indeed exclusive or ra-
ther only plenary but to some large degree, shared or concurrent.  A 
multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution, utilizing text, struc-
ture, Framer’s intent, and doctrinal modes of interpretation, despite 
some conflicting signals, still strongly suggests federal exclusivity. 
75
 
A. Constitutional Text & Structure 
The text of the Constitution does not contain the terms foreign 
affairs or foreign policy.  Nor does it grant a general foreign affairs 
power.  Instead, the Constitution assigns the federal government cer-
tain enumerated powers relating to foreign affairs.
76
  Additionally, the 
states are specifically prohibited under the Constitution from engag-
ing in some of these same activities by Article I, Section 10.
77
  Some 
scholars have criticized the existence of the dormant foreign affairs 
 
 74 Nick Robinson, Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentrali-
zation of Foreign Policy, 40 AKRON L. REV. 647 (2007); see also Goldsmith, supra note 12, 
at 1681–87.  But see Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 12, at 1253 (“[T]he politics of 
particular controversies will too often cut against disciplining a state . . . .”). 
 75 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (analyz-
ing forms of constitutional power). 
 76 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1619–20.  
The Constitution establishes plenary federal power by four means.  Ar-
ticle I, Section 10 bars states from performing certain foreign affairs 
functions, such as treaty-making.  Article I, Section 8 and Article II 
broadly authorize the federal political branches to conduct foreign re-
lations through the enactment of federal statutes, treaties, and execu-
tive agreements.  Article VI establishes that these federal enactments 
are supreme over state law.  And Article III extends the federal judicial 
power to cases involving these federal enactments and to other transna-
tional controversies.  Taken together, these provisions give the federal 
political branches comprehensive power to conduct foreign relations 
without interference or limitation by the states. 
Id.  
 77 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.   
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doctrine as not having a textual basis in the Constitution.
78
  The ar-
gument is two-fold.  First, the Constitution did not grant the federal 
government a general affairs power, but instead, it granted only a li-
mited number of enumerated powers to the federal government.
79
  
Second, the textualist critics of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine 
argue that there would be no need to prohibit a limited number of 
state activities in Article I, Section 10 if the federal government’s for-
eign affairs powers were exclusive.
80
 
However, no one seriously questions that the federal govern-
ment’s foreign affairs powers are plenary; thus, any alleged gaps in 
the textual allocations of powers to federal actors are not considered 
gaps in substance.  Instead, the textual gaps probably arose simply 
because the Framers wanted to divide foreign affairs powers between 
the executive and legislative branches, thus preventing the allocation 
of a general foreign affairs power to either and necessitating specific 
grants of power to each.
81
  This leaves, however, the question of why 
the Framers found it necessary to deny certain powers to the States in 
Article I, Section 10 if they understood the foreign affairs powers to 
be exclusive.  Critics of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine point out 
that Eighteenth Century drafting did not favor such repetition.
82
  Ar-
ticle I, Section 10 reads as follows: 
   No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confedera-
tion; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills 
of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in 
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or 
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of 
Nobility. 
   No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts 
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce 
of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, 
shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all 
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the 
Congress. 
   No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of 
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter in-
to any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a for-
 
 78 See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 342 (“[N]o one has clearly identified the part of 
the Constitution producing these results.”). 
 79 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1619. 
 80 See id. at 1642. 
 81 See id. at 1619. 
 82 See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 386–87. 
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eign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such 
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
83
 
It is well accepted, as shown below, that the Framers were con-
cerned with state intrusions in foreign affairs, and one way the Fra-
mer’s emphasized federal exclusivity was by granting a power to the 
federal government and denying it to the states. 
84
  If the allocation of 
powers to the federal government is plenary and many of the prohibi-
tions on the states exercising certain powers parallel those same fed-
eral powers, then this text and structure support at least a degree of 
federal exclusivity.  In other words, if the supposed gaps in federal 
powers do not prevent those powers from being plenary, then any al-
leged gaps in state denials of power should also not be read in such a 
narrow fashion so as to preclude federal exclusivity beyond particular 
prohibitions in Article I, Section 10.  Additionally, a close reading of 
Article I, Section 10 reveals the necessity of the second and third pa-
ragraphs since those paragraphs do not provide blanket bans on state 
actions but instead require Congressional authorizations prior to 
states taking certain actions.  They both begin with the words: “No 
state shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . .”85  Further, much of 
what is found in the first paragraph of Article I, Section 10 is not a 
denial of parallel powers allocated to the federal government—
although there are a few, such as the denial to states of the right to 
enter into a Treaty—but rather, this language places prohibitions on 
the states that are parallel to the prohibitions placed on the federal 
Congress.  In this light, it is difficult even as a textual matter to in-
terpret Article I, Section 10 as standing for the proposition that the 
federal government’s foreign affairs powers are not exclusive beyond 
the specific bans in Article I. 
Other textual based arguments against a dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine abound.  For example, some argue that since the Constitu-
tion allows the states to enter into compacts and agreements with for-
eign powers with the approval of Congress, it necessarily foresees 
states entering into negotiations with foreign nations; thus, states 
could engage in foreign affairs prior to the Congressional approval.
86
  
For instance, under such an argument, a state governor could enter 
into negotiations with Burma or the Sudan to conclude a human 
rights agreement.  Such a limited textual reading, however, ignores 
 
 83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). 
 84 See infra Part III.B. 
 85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added). 
 86 See, e.g., Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, 
86 FOREIGN POL’Y 158, 163 (1992).   
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and is contrary to the interpretation one would reach after engaging 
in other modes of constitutional interpretation.  There are strong in-
dications that the Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional a 
state’s entering into negotiations on a topic of that nature.
87
  Indeed, 
scholars have argued for a dormant Treaty Power preventing states 
from directly negotiating with a foreign country and even prohibiting 
state actions involving indirect negotiations, 
88
 such as passing a sanc-
tions law, which is viewed as a negotiating offer of “if you change your 
behavior, we will no longer sanction you.”  Such an argument was 
created to lodge much of what is currently found in the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine in a specific textual allocation of power to the 
federal government, namely the Treaty Clause.  One potential com-
plication with declaring the existence of a dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine, as mentioned above, is that no general foreign affairs power 
is granted to the federal government.
89
  One might argue that dor-
mant doctrines can only develop for specific clauses, hence the ar-
gument for a dormant Treaty Clause to replace much of what is cov-
ered by the more general dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
90
  But this 
type of argument overlooks the importance of structure and intent in 
constitutional interpretation.  The collection of grants of power to 
the federal government in the Constitution related to foreign affairs 
give the federal government authority to regulate on all matters of 
 
 87 See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) (“Nor has California entered the 
forbidden domain of negotiating with a foreign country.”) (citing U.S. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316–17 (1936)).  Additionally, while the Logan Act may 
preempt such negotiations, it is unlikely that anyone would want to proclaim that in 
the absence of the Logan Act a state could negotiate with a foreign power on any 
topic.  See 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2006).  It is true that states have entered into negotiations 
and even concluded agreements with other sub-federal jurisdictions without the con-
sent of Congress.  See Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 
1071 (2008) (analyzing state agreements with foreign countries in absence of Con-
gressional consent and the role of the Executive in such situations).  In fact, the 
Court has held that only those agreements infringing on the “just supremacy of the 
United States” require Congressional approval.  See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 
503, 519 (1893); see also United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 
452, 468–69 (1978).  But legally binding agreements clearly would need approval.  In 
any event, the Court has interpreted and must interpret the Compacts Clause by rely-
ing on other modes of interpretation beyond its text.  Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking 
the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 743–44 (2010). 
 88 See Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant 
Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1134 (2000).   
 89 See discussion supra Parts II.A.   
 90 Indeed, courts have occasionally referred to a dormant war power, derived on-
ly from those clauses dealing with war and military matters.  See, e.g., Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d. 954, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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foreign affairs.
91
  Again, there are no significant suggestions among 
scholars or courts that there is a gap in the foreign affairs powers of 
the federal government.  Interpretation of all of these powers indivi-
dually and collectively leads to the conclusion that the foreign affairs 
powers, at least to a significant degree, are exclusive to the federal 
government.  Federal exclusivity necessitates a dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine.  A dormant doctrine is the necessary partner of federal 
exclusivity.  If federal power over certain matters is exclusive, then 
state intrusions are prohibited even where the federal government 
has not spoken (i.e., the power lays dormant). 
Finally, one critic of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine has 
pointed out that the clause granting federal courts jurisdiction over 
“controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and for-
eign states, Citizens or Subjects” 
92
  necessarily assumes interaction be-
tween the states and foreign states.
93
  While it is likely that the main 
concern of the Founders was cases involving foreign citizens and not 
cases between a State and a foreign nation, the clause, nevertheless, 
was drafted in this particular manner and another formulation could 
have excluded the possibility altogether of a case involving a state and 
a foreign state.  To infer that this clause allows states to engage in 
foreign affairs, however, stands the purpose of the clause on its head.  
The jurisdictional clause does not mention what the nature of the in-
teraction between states and foreign states would entail.  Those issues 
are covered in other clauses and provided for in the structure of the 
Constitution. 
B. Original Understanding 
The clause that gives the federal courts jurisdiction over suits be-
tween an American  state and a foreign state is but another example 
of the structural framework apparent in the Constitution of keeping 
the actions of one state from endangering the nation as a whole.  Al-
exander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 80: 
   To judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal ju-
dicature it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are 
its proper objects. 
   It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the Judiciary au-
thority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions 
of cases: . . . 4th. to all those which involve the peace of the Con-
federacy . . . . 
 
 91 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1621. 
 92 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 93 See Shuman, supra note 86, at 163. 
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   The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the peace 
of the whole, ought not to be left at the disposal of a part.  The 
Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign Powers for the 
conduct of its members. . . . As the denial or perversion of justice 
by the sentences of courts, is with reason classed among the just 
causes of war, it will follow that the Federal Judiciary ought to 
have cognizance of all causes in which citizens of other countries 
are concerned. . . . So great a proportion of the controversies in 
which foreigners are parties involve, national questions, that it is 
by far most safe, and most expedient, to refer all those in which 
they are concerned to the national tribunals.
94
 
While state-level foreign policy was not the subject of robust de-
bate during the formation of the U.S. Constitution,
95
 this relative lack 
of attention was not the result of a lack of concern among the Fra-
mers about the potential ramifications of separate state-level foreign 
policies. Rather, it was clear to the Framers that foreign affairs, more 
so perhaps than any other power, needed to be an exclusive federal 
power.
96
  In Federalist No. 42, James Madison refers to a 
class of powers lodged in the General Government, consists of 
those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, [and 
other particular powers]. 
   This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of 
the Federal administration.  If we are to be one nation in any re-
spect, it clearly ought to be in respect of other nations.
97
 
One of the listed specific powers is the power to define and punish 
offenses against the law of nations.
98
  Madison noted that the Articles 
of Confederation “contain[ed] no provision for the case of offenses 
against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of 
any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign na-
tions.”
99
  There is no explicit prohibition in the Constitution, howev-
er, against states defining and punishing such offenses.  Nevertheless, 
it is clear that such a prohibition on state activity could be found by 
implication. 
 
 94 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 434–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 
1898). 
 95 See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 416. 
 96 See id. at 345. 
 97 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 231–32 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 98 Id. 
 99 See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 398 (2000) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madi-
son)). 
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The Framers envisioned instances in which a grant of power to 
the federal government, although not explicitly made exclusive, 
would necessarily have to operate as an exclusive power.
100
  Federalist 
No. 32 lays out the criteria for when exclusivity of federal power 
should be implied.
101
  Exclusivity would exist in three cases: 
[1] where the constitution in express terms granted an exclusive 
authority to the union; [2] where it granted, in one instance, an 
authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the states from 
exercising the like authority; and [3] where it granted an authori-
ty to the Union to which a similar authority in the States would be 
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.
102
 
Categories two and three are relevant to any discussion of the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine.  As discussed above, in the analysis of 
Article I, Section 10, a strong argument can be made that the Fra-
mers utilized category two to make at least some foreign relations 
powers exclusive to the federal government.
103
  Turning to category 
three, Hamilton uses as an example of this category the clause of the 
Constitution that declares that Congress “shall have the power to es-
tablish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United 
States.”
104
  Hamilton states that this must necessarily be exclusive be-
cause if each state had power to prescribe a distinct rule, there could 
not be a uniform rule.
105
  Thus, the question becomes whether an ex-
clusive federal power, and thus an implied prohibition on state activi-
ties in the area, can be found even in the absence of some strong lan-
guage such as “uniform.”  The general test elaborated for category 
three above indicates that this can indeed occur. 
Nevertheless, some scholars have found category three inapplic-
able to foreign affairs because most complaints over state actions in 
the field are based on “expedience and convenience” rather than the 
argument that such actions are “absolutely and totally contradictory 
and repugnant” to the exercise of federal authority.
106
  This is a judg-
ment call, however, and is likely true only if we examine the impact of 
the state actions rather than the purposes.  One could well find that 
state laws that impact foreign affairs without intending to do so would 
 
 100 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 
1898). 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. 
 103 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 170 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 105 Id.  
 106 See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 409–10. 
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not be absolutely repugnant to federal-foreign-affairs authority but 
that state actions with a foreign policy purpose (i.e., those seeking to 
change or criticize the behavior of a foreign government) are abso-
lutely repugnant to the federal authority. 
C. Doctrinal and Historical Arguments 
Those scholars opposing a dormant foreign affairs doctrine pre-
Crosby and pre-Garamendi pointed out that the first 181 years of our 
constitutional history did not contain such a doctrine and that the 
Supreme Court had never, prior to Garamendi, revisited the doctrine 
since its 1968 Zschernig opinion.
107
  The Court, however, hinted at 
such a doctrine well before Zschernig and implicitly supported such a 
doctrine with its recognition that foreign affairs was an “exclusive” 
federal domain in numerous opinions for well over a century before 
Zschernig.
108
  The origins of the Court’s view of exclusive federal for-
eign affairs powers dates back to an 1840s case in which Vermont 
sought to negotiate the extradition of a criminal back to Canada.
109
  
Additionally, in a little recognized case, the Court considered a claim 
 
 107 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1649; Ramsey, supra note 51, at 419. 
 108 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223 (1942) (“[C]omplete power over in-
ternational affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to 
any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states.”); see also id. at 244 
(“Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national 
government exclusively.”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1937) 
(“Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusive-
ly in the national government. . . . In respect of all international negotiations and 
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.”); 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604–05 (1893) (“[G]reat mass of lo-
cal matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to 
foreign countries, are one nation . . . for national purposes, embracing our relations 
with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.”); Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339, 354 (1879) (“[S]o to the common government which grew out of 
this prevailing necessity was granted exclusive jurisdiction over external affairs.”). 
 109 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 550–51 (1840).  
     From the very nature and organization of the general or national 
government, it is vested with the sole jurisdiction over all matters of a 
national character, and of external concern.  The states, by the adop-
tion of the existing Constitution, have become divested of all their na-
tional attributes, except such as relate purely to their internal concerns.  
They are not known to foreign governments as states . . . . In short, as 
to all such matters, we are one and indivisible; precisely the same as if 
we had no separate states, nor any authorities in the country except 
those of the Union. 
      . . . [T]hus is the whole subject of the foreign relations of the coun-
try placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the government of the 
Union. 
Id. 
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under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine ten years after Zschernig.
110
  
Thus, the Court implicitly admitted the continuing vitality of the doc-
trine, although in that case the court ultimately rejected the claim 
because the state measure had “insignificant international conse-
quences.”
111
  Scholars opposed to Zschernig also point to the 1941 case, 
Hines v. Davidowitz,
112
 in which the Supreme Court explored but ulti-
mately hedged on finding a dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
113
  Yet, 
the Court’s opinion in Hines is one of many that contains an indica-
tion that the foreign affairs powers of the federal government are ex-
clusive.  Moreover, the Court clearly indicated in the 1947 case of 
Clark v. Allen that a dormant foreign affairs doctrine was available to 
strike down a state law impinging too greatly on U.S. foreign rela-
tions.
114
  Additionally, the ready availability of the preemption doc-
trine in most cases involving a challenge to state laws in the foreign 
affairs realm, and the Supreme Court’s preference for relying on 
preemption grounds in its opinions, may readily explain why the Su-
preme Court generally finds it unnecessary to rely on the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine. 
There is an additional, and perhaps stronger, rebuttal to the ar-
gument as to why the dormant foreign affairs doctrine was not relied 
upon by the Supreme Court until 1968.  As discussed in the introduc-
tion, state involvement in foreign affairs has only existed to a signifi-
cant degree in the past five decades, or at the very least, it has been 
more prevalent in the past five decades and increased throughout 
this time period.
115
  There was no significant state involvement in for-
eign affairs prior to the second half of this century of the type that a 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine, involving purpose review as op-
posed to threshold effects or balancing tests, would capture.  While 
one can list numerous state measures throughout our nation’s history 
that caused diplomatic protests,
116
 most of these measures did not car-
ry the primary purpose of changing or criticizing foreign government 
policies.  State laws imposing a tax on the arrival of foreigners
117
 were 
 
 110 Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). 
 111 Id. at 180. 
 112 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 113 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Asso-
ciation v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
825, 855–56 (2004). 
 114 331 U.S. 503, 516–17 (1947). 
 115 See also Kline, supra note 2, at 106–07; Schaefer, supra note 38, at 37. 
 116 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1653–58. 
 117 See, e.g., Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 298 (1849). 
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not enacted with the primary purpose to change or criticize the poli-
cies of foreign governments.
118
  The prosecution of a British agent for 
murder in connection with the Caroline incident
119
 was not done with 
the primary purpose of changing or criticizing the policies of the 
British government.
120
  Several Southern States in the early to mid-
1800s adopted Negro Seamen Acts, which required imprisonment of 
black seamen upon arrival.
121
  While these acts caused “a persistent 
diplomatic embarrassment,” the changing of foreign government pol-
icies was not their primary purpose.
122
  Similarly, the primary purpose 
of Anti-Alien Acts passed by the states in the late 1800s and early 
1900s, at least those that did not single out aliens from particular na-
tions, was not intended to change foreign government policies.
123
  
State Buy-American Procurement Laws enacted in the 1930s
124
 simi-
larly did not have the primary purpose of changing foreign govern-
ment policies; rather, these laws were meant to protect in-state and 
U.S. industries.
125
  Thus, few, if any, historical examples pointed to by 
scholars are glaring examples of the absence of a dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine
126
 because such claims were not even made in these cas-
es.  They simply did not deal with state actions whose primary pur-
pose was to change or criticize the policies of foreign governments.  
The absence of dormant-foreign-affairs-doctrine-styled-claims in these 
early cases might simply indicate that federal “exclusive” powers over 
 
 118 See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 54 n.115 
(2005) (“measure aimed at deterring the indigent”). 
 119 See People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377, 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). 
 120 See Impunity of Agents in International Law, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Sep-
tember 22, 1993, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol5no2/html/v05i2a10p_0001.htm (indicating the United 
States ultimately viewed the Caroline incident as a public sovereign act and thus im-
mune but that New York State considered it an act of an individual for murder rather 
than an act of the British government and thus, rejected the habeas petition of the 
British agent). 
 121 See The Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102, 1103 (D. Mass. 1844). 
 122 Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1833, 1873–77 (1993) (sparked by fears of insurrection if black seamen were al-
lowed “to wander at liberty”). 
 123 See Nicholas Montario, The Issue of Mexican Immigration: Where Do We Go From 
Here?, 6 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 176–77 (2007) (stating that anti-alien fervor behind 
laws was due to job concerns not changing foreign government policies). 
 124 See James D. Southwick, Binding the States: A Survey of State Conformance with the 
Standards of the GATT Procurement Code, 13 U. PENN. J. INT’L BUS. L. 57, 71 (1991). 
 125 See id.; see also Lawrence Hughes, Buy North American: A Revision to FTA Buy 
America Requirements, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 207, 208 (1995) (asserting the purpose of the 
Buy America Acts was “to require the federal government to spend taxpayers’ dollars 
only on goods produced in the United States”). 
 126 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1653. 
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foreign affairs only prohibited state actions with a primary foreign 
policy purpose rather than actions having a direct and significant im-
pact on U.S. foreign relations.  Additionally, it might indicate that 
lawyers were comfortable with the strength of their other claims, 
preemption or otherwise. 
To be fair, there are examples of state laws enacted prior to the 
1960s that involved a primary purpose to change or criticize foreign 
government policies.  For example, states passed what are commonly 
referred to as “sense of the legislature” resolutions on foreign affairs 
issues as early as the turn of the Nineteenth Century.
127
  These types 
of resolutions, however, are not necessarily captured by the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose standard of review, as will be 
discussed below.
128
  Additionally, the states enacted reciprocity sta-
tutes addressing inheritance matters in the 1940s that only allowed an 
alien to inherit property in a state if the alien’s home nation allowed 
U.S. citizens to inherit property.
129
  Such statutes arguably have as one 
of their purposes the changing of foreign government policies.
130
  Su-
preme Court precedent, however, has upheld such statutes, at least 
with respect to facial challenges,
131
 and a purpose-review test can be 
respectful of prior precedent in this regard.  For instance, it can be 
plausibly argued that such statutes do not seek to change foreign 
government policy but have as their primary purpose reciprocity (or 
equal treatment) in and of itself.  Thus, one need not draw the infe-
rence that the doctrine is of questionable validity because these state 
actions causing diplomatic controversy occurred throughout our na-
tion’s history without plaintiffs challenging such actions under a 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 
Instead, one might reasonably conclude that this history simply 
suggests that the scope of the doctrine is limited to those actions that 
have a foreign policy purpose.  Indeed, under this reading of history 
and law, it is unsurprising that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine 
was not formally relied upon until the 1960s.  Significant state actions 
with a foreign policy purpose began around this time.  For instance, 
 
 127 See QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 264–65 
(1922). 
 128 See infra Part IV.  
 129 See generally Note, Reciprocal Inheritance Statutes and Federal Powers, 56 YALE L.J. 
150 (1946) (describing 1940s state statutes regarding non-resident property acquisi-
tion and the subsequent court challenges). 
 130 See Moore, supra note 27, at 309 (noting an additional purpose of state statute’s 
of this type during this time frame may have been to keep property out of enemy 
hands during World War II). 
 131 See infra Part IV.B. 
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in 1963, Florida enacted a law that prohibited the issuance of fishing 
licenses for fishing in the territorial waters of the state to any vessel 
owned by a foreign state, or national thereof, which subscribed to 
communism.
132
  Other states enacted statutes discriminating against 
goods from communist countries around this time.
133
 
IV. DOCTRINAL TEST UNDER THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
DOCTRINE: MAKE IT PURPOSE REVIEW 
While the existence of a dormant foreign affairs doctrine is well-
founded in modes of constitutional interpretation, “scholars and 
judges have continued to puzzle over [Zschernig’s] reasoning and 
scope, and, in particular, over precisely where and how the courts 
should draw the line between constitutionally permissible and prohi-
bited state and local action.”
134
  While the starting point in any ex-
amination of the test to be adopted under the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine is the Zschernig case, that case can only be understood (or at 
least is best understood) in the context of Clark v. Allen,
135
 a 1947 U.S. 
Supreme Court case analyzing a similar state statute twenty-one years 
prior to Zschernig, and Hines v. Davidowitz,
136
 a 1941 case in which the 
Supreme Court flirted with establishing a dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine rationale.
137
  Zschernig borrowed its most often cited test from 
the Clark opinion and approvingly cited to Hines.
138
 
A. Hines v. Davidowitz 
In the foreign affairs field, at least as broadly defined since it 
might also be considered to fall in the immigration field, the most 
well-known pre-Crosby preemption case is Hines v Davidowitz.
139
  Hines 
involved a challenge to Pennsylvania’s Alien Registration Act.
140
  The 
 
 132 Enforcement of the Florida statute by state authorities against Cuban fisher-
man created a significant international incident.  Cuba raised the issue at the United 
Nations and cut off the water supply to the U.S. military base at Guantánamo Bay.  See 
Moore, supra note 27, at 312–14 (discussing the statute, enforcement of statute, and 
international repercussions of enforcement). 
 133 See, e.g., Gustavo Otalvora, Note, From Stalin to Bin Laden: Comparing Yesteryear’s 
Anti-Communist Statutes with the Public Employer Provision of the Ohio Patriot Act, 2010 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1303, 1318–20 (2010). 
 134 Bilder, supra note 34, at 825–26. 
 135 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
 136 312 U.S. 52 (1912). 
 137 See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 649. 
 138 Zschernig, 398 U.S. at 432–33. 
 139 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 140 Id. at 59. 
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Court in Hines came close to grounding its opinion in a dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine, although the Court’s holding is ultimately based 
on preemption analysis. 
It is important to ask what we should make of the Court’s “flirta-
tion” with the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
141
  At various points in 
its opinion, the Court indicated that foreign affairs powers were ex-
clusive to the federal government.
142
  For instance, it stated that “our 
system of government is such that the interests of the cities, counties 
and states, no less than the interests of the people of the whole na-
tion, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting 
foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference.”
143
  In 
other portions of its opinion, the Court merely refers to the “suprema-
cy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, includ-
ing power over immigration, naturalization and deportation.”
144
  The 
Court also stated: 
Any concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the nar-
rowest limits . . . . [O]ur conclusion is that appellee is correct in 
his contention that the power to restrict, limit, regulate, and regis-
ter aliens as a distinct group is not an equal and continuously ex-
isting concurrent power of the state and nation, but that whatever 
power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law.
145
 
Even this statement indicates a large measure of exclusivity in foreign 
relations.  Later in its opinion, the Court again hedged on whether a 
dormant limitation was at issue: “And whether or not registration of 
aliens is of such a nature that the Constitution permits only of one 
uniform national system, it cannot be denied that the Congress might 
validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable.”
146
 
Ultimately, the failure of the Court to adopt a dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine rationale does not damage the support for such a 
doctrine in this article because the law at issue in Hines would not run 
afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine when employing pur-
pose review.  Additionally, Hines might be best thought of as an im-
migration case rather than a foreign affairs related case. 
 
 141 See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 649 (“However, even in Hines, the Court dis-
cussed at length the federal foreign affairs powers and flirted with the dormant for-
eign affairs analysis.”).  
 142 Hines, 312 U.S. at 63. 
 143 Id.  
 144 Id. at 62 (emphasis added). 
 145 Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 146 Id. at 73. 
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B. Clark v. Allen 
In Clark v. Allen,
147
 the California statute at issue provided that a 
non-resident alien could inherit real or personal property within Cali-
fornia “under the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens 
of the United States” only if U.S. citizens enjoyed a reciprocal right to 
inherit such property as residents and citizens of the alien’s country 
of inhabitance.
148
  In enacting the statute, the California Legislature 
stated: 
Because the foreign governments guilty of [confiscating inherit-
ances of U.S. citizens] constitute[d] a direct threat to the Gov-
ernment of the United States, it [was] immediately necessary that 
the property and money of citizens dying in [the United States] 
should remain in the [United States] and not be sent to such for-
eign countries to be used for the purposes of waging a war that 
eventually may be directed against the Government of the United 
States.
149
 
The federal Trading with the Enemy Act would have prevented the 
proceeds of any inheritance going to countries with which the United 
States was at war.
150
  The district court struck down the California law 
on two separate grounds: the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and 
“occupation of the field” preemption by the Trading with the Enemy 
Act.
151
  In the portion of its opinion dealing with the exclusive federal 
power over foreign relations, the district court seemed to hinge its 
decision on the purpose of the statute—in other words, the goal 
sought to be achieved by the statute.
152
  The court noted the “ex-
pressed design was to fix a policy of international relations.”
153
  The 
district court did not examine any actual effects of the statute on for-
eign countries or U.S. foreign policy.  Rather, it noted that “if the li-
mitation of the powers of the state were not sustained in principle, 
evils now incapable of definition, would result from state entry into 
the Federal field.”
154
 
 
 147 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
 148 Law of July 1, 1941, CAL. PROB. CODE, §§ 259, 259.1, 259.2, invalidated by Clark, 
331 U.S. at 517. 
 149 Id. at § 259.2 (as reprinted in Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. 850, 853 (N.D. Cal. 
1943)). 
 150 See 50 U.S.C. § 616 (2006). 
 151 Crowley, 52 F. Supp. at 854. 
 152 Id. at 853. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 855. 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.
155
  The 
respondents seemed to argue for a dormant “war powers” doctrine 
rather than a more general dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
156
  Spe-
cifically, the respondents argued that the Constitution had granted 
the federal government the right to capture enemy property and that 
the California statute interfered with this exclusive power.
157
  The 
Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the respondents’ argument as illogi-
cal.
158
  If the California statute were valid in denying the property 
rights through inheritance, then the property was not enemy proper-
ty but property of California.
159
  The Ninth Circuit also worried that 
the war powers of the federal government could affect “almost every 
field of private right on the basis of necessity.”
160
 
If this great reservoir of Federal power is ipso facto a denial of any 
power to the States in that reservoir, whether or not a war is being 
waged or such powers are being exercised, then the power of the 
states is thrown into the utmost uncertainty and confusion.
161
 
Such a statement certainly calls into question the existence of a 
broader dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  It is not necessarily the 
case, however, that dormant prohibitions on the states are completely 
co-extensive with federal powers to affirmatively act.  Dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence clearly speaks to this point.
162
  Additional-
ly, the cases that the Ninth Circuit cited in support of its statement 
that the federal government under its war powers could affect “al-
most every field of private right on the basis of necessity” have since 
been discredited.
163
 
The Supreme Court partially overturned the Ninth Circuit’s de-
cision.
164
  The Supreme Court found that the California statute was 
preempted with respect to real property by the Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Consular Rights between Germany and the United 
 
 155 Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653, 663 (9th Cir. 1946). 
 156 Id. at 659. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 660. 
 161 Allen, 156 F.2d at 660. 
 162 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422–23 (1946);  Richard A. 
Paschal, Congressional Power to Change Constitutional Law: Three Lacunae, 77 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1053, 1124 (2009). 
 163 Allen, 156 F.2d at 660.  For instance, the Allen court cited Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which has generally been discredited by commentators.  
Id.  
 164 Clark v. Arizona, 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
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States.
165
  With respect to personal property, the California statute was 
valid because it was not an unconstitutional intrusion by the state into 
the field of foreign affairs.
166
 After noting that the state measure was 
not preempted and did not violate a specific provision of the Consti-
tution, the Court stated: “What California has done will have some 
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.  But that is true of 
many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line.”
167
  
Thus, Clark indicates that there is a “forbidden line” preventing a 
state’s intrusion into foreign affairs.  It also suggests that this line 
might be drawn by determining whether the state law only has an “in-
cidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.”
168
  While the Court 
spent little time in its opinion justifying or considering this test, it un-
fortunately has assumed great importance in later cases.  Because the 
Court gave such short treatment to its dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine analysis, one would hope the statement would not forever forec-
lose the adoption of other, or at least additional, tests by the Court.  
Admittedly, the Clark Court had an opportunity to adopt a purpose-
review standard.  Petitioners argued that reciprocity statutes were “in 
substance invitations to foreign countries to trade inheritance rights 
abroad for inheritance rights in these states” and thus infringed the 
federal government’s sole negotiating authority.
169
  Indeed, this ar-
gument seems most akin to a dormant Treaty Clause argument.
170
  
Most of the petitioners’ argument, however, focused on the effect of 
such statutes on foreign relations, rather than the purposes of the 
law.
171
  Respondents’ argument also focused primarily on the effects 
test and laid out the test that Justice Douglas ultimately incorporated 
into his opinion.
172
  Specifically, the respondents argued that it would 
be a novel and startling proposition to rule that a state statute “is 
invalid merely because that state action has some incidental or indi-
rect effect in foreign countries.”
173
 
 
 165 Id. at 517. 
 166 Id. at 516–18. 
 167 Id. at 517. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Brief of Petitioner at 70, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626). 
 170 See Swaine, supra note 88, at 1138. 
 171 Brief for the Petitioner at 72–73, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626).  
 172 Brief for Respondents at 63–64, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626). 
 173 Id. at 59. 
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C. Zschernig v. Miller 
Zschernig v. Miller came before the Supreme Court twenty-one 
years after Clark v. Allen.
174
  Zschernig, like Clark, dealt with an inherit-
ance reciprocity statute.
175
  The Oregon statute at issue also contained 
two additional criteria beyond reciprocity in order for a non-resident 
alien to inherit real or personal property: (1) “the right of U.S. citi-
zens to receive payment here in the United States of funds from es-
tates in the foreign country;” and (2) “the right of non-resident aliens 
to receive proceeds of Oregon estates ‘without confiscation.’”
176
  The 
statute was not challenged on its face, although these two additional 
criteria may have made the statute distinguishable from the one in 
Clark, particularly if the Court had adopted a purpose-review test.
177
  
Instead, the statute was challenged as applied.
178
  The Court stated 
that the statute at issue in Clark involved the state probate courts in 
“no more than a routine reading of foreign laws.”
179
  The Court, how-
ever, found in the application of the Oregon statute and in the “reci-
procity area under inheritance statutes” generally, that: 
the probate courts of various States have launched inquiries into 
the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign na-
tions—whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights, 
whether the so-called “rights” are merely dispensations turning 
upon the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the 
representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives 
of foreign nations is credible or made in good faith, whether 
there is in the actual administration in the particular foreign sys-
tem of law any element of confiscation.
180
 
The Court struck down the Oregon statute as applied, finding that it 
had “more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect in foreign coun-
tries.’”
181
  Before turning to the Court’s elaboration of a doctrinal test, 
it is important to realize that the Court’s opinion, authored by Justice 
Douglas, was grounded in dormant foreign affairs doctrine, rather 
than preemption analysis: 
 
 174 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 175 Id. at 430. 
 176 ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957). 
 177 The reason for this is that only communist countries would subject proceeds to 
confiscation (although other countries may have subjected proceeds to high taxes).  
Thus, the statute can be viewed as seeking to change communist governments’ beha-
vior with respect to treatment of the proceeds.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 178 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430. 
 179 Id. at 433. 
 180 Id. at 432–33. 
 181 Id. at 434 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)). 
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[W]e conclude that the history and operation of this Oregon sta-
tute make clear that [the statute] is an intrusion by the State into 
the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the 
President and the Congress. . . . The several States, of course, have 
traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates.  
But those regulations must give way if they impair the effective 
exercise of the Nation’s foreign policy. . . . Where those laws con-
flict with a treaty, they must bow to the superior federal policy. . . . 
Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a State’s policy may disturb for-
eign relations.
182
 
The Court did not find the Oregon statute preempted by treaty or by 
legislation but nonetheless invalidated it for disturbing foreign rela-
tions.
183
 
With regard to the doctrinal test elaborated by the Court for the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine, one can discern numerous possible 
tests from Justice Douglas’s Zschernig opinion, beyond the “more than 
some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.”
184
  These tests 
include: 
1. Does the state action have a “great potential for disruption” 
of U.S. foreign relations or “embarrassment” to the United 
States or a foreign country?
185
 
2. Does the state action “affect[] international relations in a 
persistent and subtle way”?
186
 
3. Does the state action have a “direct impact upon foreign re-
lations” and might it “adversely affect the power of the cen-
tral government to deal with [foreign affairs] problems”?
187
 
4. Does the state action “impair the effective exercise of the Na-
tion’s foreign policy”?
188
 
5. Does the state action threaten to create an international con-
troversy or retaliation?
189
 
 
 182 Id. at 432, 440, 441. 
 183 Id. at 441. 
 184 Clark, 331 U.S. at 517; see also Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433 (explaining how the 
California statute at issue in Clark would have only “some incidental or indirect effect 
in foreign countries”).  
 185 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435. 
 186 Id. at 440. 
 187 Id. at 441. 
 188 Id. at 440. 
 189 Id. at 441 (“Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a State’s policy may disturb foreign 
relations. . . . Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest 
moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to 
another’s subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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Each of these tests laid out in Justice Douglas’s opinion appears 
to focus on the impact or effects of a particular state action, rather 
than the purpose of the state law.  The Court’s opinion, however, also 
gives some credence to the establishment of a purpose-based test.  
Justice Douglas stated that “[a]s one reads the Oregon decisions, it 
seems that foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the 
‘cold war,’ and the like are the real desiderata”
190
 and that the Cali-
fornia decisions “radiate some of the attitudes of the ‘cold war,’ 
where the search is for the ‘democracy quotient’ of a foreign re-
gime.”
191
  These statements indicate the Court’s concern that the sta-
tutes as applied served a foreign policy purpose.  Importantly, the 
Court specifically pointed out that although the district court in Clark 
had found the statute at issue unconstitutional based upon its pur-
pose, that unconstitutional purpose was not argued before it in 
Clark.
192
  As discussed above, this is largely true; the briefs in Clark fo-
cused almost exclusively on effects rather than purpose, and to the 
extent that purpose was argued, the argument focused on implied 
negotiations with foreign countries or something more akin to a 
dormant Treaty Clause.
193
  The Court noted that in Clark the statute 
was only challenged on its face and at that time it had “no reason to 
suspect that the California statute in Clark was to be applied as any-
thing other than a general reciprocity provision requiring just match-
ing of laws.”
194
  Additionally, Justice Douglas stated: “The Oregon law 
does, indeed, illustrate the dangers which are involved if each State, 
speaking through its probate courts, is permitted to establish its own 
foreign policy.”
195
  Thus, it is possible to read Zschernig as striking 
down the statute as applied for a foreign policy purpose as well. 
The fact that one finds at least some support for purpose review 
is not a surprise when one examines the parties’ arguments in Zscher-
nig, as well as a little known dissent by Justice Douglas, the author of 
both Zschernig and Clark, in the intervening period.  The heirs of the 
estate at issue in Zschernig argued threshold effects, relying on Clark v. 
Allen.
196
  The State of Oregon’s brief found the threshold-effects test 
comfortable terrain upon which to defend the state law, arguing that 
the heirs could only speculate as to such effects and that the U.S. So-
 
 190 Id. at 437. 
 191 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435. 
 192 Id. at 433, n.5. 
 193 See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
 194 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433, n.5. 
 195 Id. at 441. 
 196 Brief for Appellants at 58–62, Zschernig v. Miller 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (No 21). 
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licitor General had confirmed the State Department’s view that such 
statutes did not interfere with foreign relations.
197
  Only in their reply 
brief did the heirs finally argue for a purpose-based standard of re-
view, arguing that the purpose of the law was the same as the purpose 
of the California law at issue in Clark, namely to prevent funds from 
going to unfriendly nations (and thus, by denying such funds, seek-
ing to change the behavior of those nations)—the same purpose the 
district court in Clark had relied upon in invalidating California’s re-
ciprocity statute.
198
  Oregon’s additional statutory conditions, includ-
ing proving that proceeds of an estate would not be subject to confis-
cation, would only have provided further proof of this legislative 
purpose.
199
  The heirs’ reply brief also pointed to Justice Douglas’s 
dissent to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, on the basis of a 
lack of a federal question, in the 1962 case of Ioannou v. New York.
200
 
Ioannou concerned a New York State Court of Appeals ruling 
upholding the application of a New York law calling for the escheat 
to the state of any estate in which the assignee would not have the 
benefit or use of the proceeds.
201
  The statute was applied to prevent a 
Czech beneficiary of an estate from giving her interest as a gift to her 
niece in London.
202
  In dissent, Justice Douglas indicated that a for-
eign policy purpose would be enough to invalidate the New York sta-
tute and its application to the Czech heir: 
   The issue is of importance to our foreign relations and I think 
this Court should decide whether, under existing federal policy 
and practice, the New York statute should be given effect. . . . We 
should note jurisdiction and ask the Solicitor General to file a 
brief. 
   . . . If New York’s purpose is to preclude unfriendly foreign 
governments from obtaining funds that will assist their efforts 
hostile to this Nation’s interests[,] . . . the complete prohibition of 
assignments made in those countries may have some basis in rea-
son.  But, if this is the purpose behind the statute, it seemingly is 
an attempt to regulate foreign affairs.
203
 
 
 197 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434. 
 198 Brief in response to Brief of Appellee State Land Board of Oregon, and Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3–6, Zschernig v. Miller 389 U.S. 429 
(1968) (No 21). 
 199 Id. at 5–6. 
 200 Id. at 3.  Ioannou is located at 371 U.S. 30 (1964). 
 201 Ioannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 30 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 202 Id. at 34. 
 203 Id. at 32–34 (citations omitted). 
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To be fair, Douglas’s dissent in Ioannou also laid out several addi-
tional effects-based tests that were later utilized in his Zschernig opi-
nion: “The present restraints are not as gross an intrusion in the fed-
eral domain as those others would be.  Yet they affect international 
relations in a persistent and subtle way.”
204
  Nonetheless, there is little 
doubt that Douglas’s opinion in Zschernig can be read to at least sup-
port purpose review as an additional test. 
Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Zschernig, joined by Jus-
tice Brennan, also displays a clear reliance on dormant foreign affairs 
power doctrine rather than preemption analysis.
205
  Additionally, the 
opinion lends support to purpose review because it places emphasis 
on the evaluation and disapproval of foreign government policies.
206
  
Indeed, Justice Stewart and Justice Brennan would have struck down 
the Oregon statute on its face, rather than only as applied: 
All three [conditions in the Oregon statute] launch the State 
upon a prohibited voyage into a domain of exclusively federal 
competence.  Any realistic attempt to apply any of the three crite-
ria would necessarily involve the Oregon courts in an evaluation, 
either expressed or implied, of the administration of foreign law, 
the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and the policies of 
foreign governments.  Of course, state courts must routinely con-
strue foreign law in the resolution of controversies properly be-
fore them, but here the courts of Oregon are thrust into these in-
quiries only because the Oregon Legislature has framed its 
inheritance laws to the prejudice of nations whose policies it disapproves, 
and thus has trespassed upon an area where the Constitution con-
templates that only the National Government shall operate.  For 
local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for nation-
al purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are 
but one people, one nation, one power.  Our system of govern-
ment is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no 
less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, impera-
tively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign re-
lations be left entirely free from local interference.
207
 
Thus, Justice Stewart’s concurrence makes clear that the realm 
of foreign affairs is exclusively federal, and the Justices subscribing to 
Justice Stewart’s opinion read Hines as well as earlier cases to establish 
this federal exclusivity. 
 
 204 Id. at 32. 
 205 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 206 Id. at 443. 
 207 Id. at 442–43 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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Not all of the justices agreed with the use of this doctrine.  Jus-
tice Harlan’s concurrence expressed concern over the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine grounds relied upon by the other six Justices.
208
  
Although he concurred in the result, he would only have struck down 
the statute for its conflict with the treaty between Germany and the 
United States.
209
 
D. Assessing the Possible Doctrinal Tests 
1. Threshold-Effects Test 
As discussed above, the threshold-effects test draws significant 
support from the language of Zschernig.
210
  The Court, however, bor-
rowed the “more than incidental and indirect effects” test from sug-
gestions in Clark, and Clark’s purported adoption of the test was 
somewhat accidental, given the arguments the parties made before 
the Court.
211
  Yet there are much stronger reasons for rejecting this 
test than the fact that it has its origins in Clark. 
First, a threshold-effects test does not suit courts particularly 
well.
212
  Are courts particularly adept at assessing the impact a state 
measure will have on a foreign country or on U.S. foreign policy?  
Certainly, a court can hear evidence on the impact in a foreign coun-
try.  As to the impact on U.S. foreign policy, it seems that courts are 
less adept at making such determinations than the federal govern-
ment.
213
  The courts, however, have feared that deferring to executive 
branch views in amicus briefs would leave the fate of litigants solely in 
the hands of the executive branch and injure the independence of 
the judiciary.
214
  There are historical examples in the foreign relations 
arena that warrant skepticism of the executive branch’s ability to in-
dependently apply a legal test—in this instance, a threshold-effects 
test—in a consistent and apolitical fashion.  For example, one reason 
that immunity decisions regarding foreign governments were taken 
 
 208 Id. at 457–58. 
 209 Id. at 449. 
 210 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 211 See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
 212 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1699–1702; Swaine, supra note 88, at 1151–53. 
 213 This is true for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the executive 
branch is in constant communication with foreign governments, through U.S. Em-
bassies abroad, and has a continuous flow of intelligence information, some of which 
would not be accessible to a court. 
 214 See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(suggesting resolution of fundamental constitutional issues cannot depend on “shift-
ing winds” of the executive branch). 
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out of the hands of the executive branch and placed in the hands of 
the courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was the in-
consistent results that occurred when courts essentially entrusted the 
executive branch with application of the restrictive theory of immuni-
ty.
215
 
Courts could also seek guidance in the amicus briefs of foreign 
governments that claim damaging effects on relations with the Unit-
ed States as a result of a state measure, or rely on evidence of actual 
retaliatory measures by foreign governments, or even rely on cases 
brought against the U.S. government in international tribunals, such 
as the World Trade Organization (WTO).  But this would place the 
resolution of the constitutional issue in the hands of foreign govern-
ments, a far more unacceptable result than leaving it in the hands of 
the executive branch.
216
 
Even if courts resist suggestions in amicus briefs, it is likely that 
inconsistent results will arise among lower courts considering similar 
measures.
217
  For example, in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commis-
sioners, a California state court struck down the California “Buy Amer-
ica” Act as having more than some incidental or indirect effect on 
U.S. foreign relations under Zschernig.
218
  Conversely, in KSB Technical 
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court upheld a similar New Jersey statute, finding that 
the statute did not have more than some incidental or indirect ef-
fect.
219
  The KSB Technical Sales court did note that the New Jersey sta-
tute had exceptions if domestic materials would unreasonably raise 
costs or their purchase was otherwise impracticable.
220
 
Second, there is a potential problem with equity between the 
states.  If the test adopted is concerned with effect on a foreign coun-
try or foreign affairs, then a measure by Wyoming, North Dakota, or 
New Hampshire is more likely to be upheld, because it is less likely to 
have an effect on a foreign nation or U.S. foreign relations, than a 
 
 215 See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIAL 74-77 (3rd ed. 2009). 
 216 See Swaine, supra note 88, at 1153 (expressing concern over giving foreign gov-
ernments a “heckler’s veto”). 
 217 Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 229 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969), with Trojan Techs. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913–14 (3d 
Cir. 1990), and K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 
381 A.2d 774, 784 (N.J. 1977). 
 218 Bethlehem Steel Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d at 229. 
 219 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977). 
 220 Id. at 784. 
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measure undertaken by California, New York, or Massachusetts.
221
  
This seems rather unfair and indeed almost ironic.  Wyoming might 
be able to enact a law sanctioning Burma’s government while Cali-
fornia, a much larger economic actor in the world, may be denied 
the ability to do so. 
Third, and somewhat related, the question arises whether the 
impact of each state’s measure should be examined individually or in 
the aggregate.  If a court only examines the impact of each state’s 
measure individually, a situation would exist where, for example, 
twenty states have enacted measures that are together creating an 
enormous interference with U.S. foreign policy but no single meas-
ure has a “more than indirect effect.”
222
  Additionally, the potential 
inequities between large and small states would need to be addressed.  
It seems that a court must aggregate the incidence of all state practic-
es.  Indeed, there is some support in Zschernig for cumulating the to-
tal incidence of a particular action taken by several states.
223
  A court, 
however, would also need to go further.  It would need to assess a 
particular state’s foreign policy measure based on the assumption 
that all fifty states enacted similar measures, whether or not other 
states actually have such measures in place at the time of the chal-
lenge.  Otherwise, the validity of a state’s measure will depend on 
how many other similar state measures are in place at time of the liti-
gation.  For example, if a particular state enacts a Burma law similar 
to Massachusetts and it is challenged in court under a threshold-
effects test, then a court unconcerned with accumulation could find 
the statute does not create sufficient effects on Burma or U.S. foreign 
policy to invalidate it.  If in the next six to twelve months, twenty or 
thirty other states enact such measures, then a new challenge to that 
state’s Burma statute leads to a different result.  Ultimately, however, 
 
 221 See, e.g., Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 12, at 158 n.146 (discussing 
how immigration measures by those states with large alien populations are more sub-
ject to invalidation under a foreign affairs rationale because measures by those states 
are more likely to cause foreign policy effects). 
 222 See Peter J. Spiro, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the 
Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 825 (1986) [hereinafter Spiro, State 
and Local] (indicating that this would have been the case if state sanctions against 
South Africa were analyzed in such a fashion in the 1980s). 
 223 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 438 n.8 (1968); see also NFTC v. Natsios, 
181 F.3d 38, 53–54 (1st Cir. 1999); Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitu-
tionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT’L L. J. 443, 458 (1998) 
(“[C]onsideration should also be given to the cumulative effect that a multiplicity of 
such laws would have on the ability of the federal government to conduct a coherent 
foreign policy.”). 
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even hypothetical accumulation fails to cure the significant problems 
with a threshold-effects test. 
Fourth, a threshold-effects test provides little useful guidance to 
state officials.  State officials, much like courts, will be hard-pressed to 
assess the potential impact of their actions on foreign governments or 
U.S. foreign relations, let alone assess the impact of their measure in 
combination with other states, real or hypothetical.  Moreover, they 
will face political pressures to conclude that their actions only cause 
an “indirect effect” on U.S. foreign relations. 
Finally, a threshold-effects test is potentially more threatening to 
state regulation in traditional areas,
224
 such as criminal law, and po-
tentially less respectful of federal government views on whether cer-
tain international obligations (i.e., treaty obligations) should be self-
executing than a purpose-based test.  There is, of course, some irony 
here given that respect for traditional areas of state regulation, such 
as testamentary disposition, was one of the reasons that a threshold-
effects test was argued for by state entities in their briefs before the 
Supreme Court in the Clark and Zschernig cases.225  Part of the prob-
lem is that many additional areas of regulation have become of inter-
est to foreign nations in their relationship with the United States in 
the post-WWII era.
226
  For example, imposition of the death penalty 
by U.S. states leads to constant diplomatic protests by other nations,
227
 
and thus one could envision an argument that such statutes have 
more than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign rela-
tions.  But one could hardly make the argument that the primary 
purpose of death penalty statutes is to change or criticize the beha-
vior or policy of a foreign government, and thus such laws are not at 
risk under a purpose-based test. 
Similarly, state court unwillingness to implement a World Court 
ruling requiring “review and reconsideration” by state judicial bodies 
of convictions and sentences of foreign nationals not read their con-
sular notification rights at the time of arrest, as required by the Vien-
na Convention on Consular Relations, has arguably caused more 
than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign relations—as 
evidenced by the World Court cases and diplomatic protests against 
 
 224 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1711. 
 225 See Brief for the Respondent at 56–57, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 
626); Brief of Appellee State Land Board of Oregon at 7–11, Zschernig v. Miller, 390 
U.S. 974 (1968) (No. 21).  
 226 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1671. 
 227 See, e.g., Arizona Executes German Killer Pleas for Clemency Unheeded as State Uses Gas 
Chamber, KAN. CITY STAR, March 4, 1999, at A3. 
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such failures.
228
  The Supreme Court, however, in a 2008 case, Medel-
lin v. Texas, found that World Court rulings are non-self-executing 
(thus not a part of domestic law), and accordingly, they do not bind 
state courts nor do they preempt state procedural default doctrine 
rules.
229
  The Medellin Court even found Presidential attempts to im-
plement the World Court rulings by memorandum invalid given Se-
nate intent that such rulings be non-self-executing.
230
  If one made a 
Zschernig-based argument using a threshold-effects test, such state 
court activity could be ruled unconstitutional given the number of in-
ternational disputes and diplomatic protests concerning the applica-
tion of state procedural default doctrines in such circumstances.  This 
would lead to a result contrary to that which the legislative branch 
desired. 
2. Balancing 
Several scholars, analogizing the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine to the dormant Commerce Clause, have proposed a balancing 
test that would weigh the impact that a state’s measure has on foreign 
relations (or a foreign country) against the state’s interest in the 
measure.
231
  There is, of course, a question whether the balancing that 
occurs under the dormant Commerce Clause is mere window dress-
ing for purpose-review.
232
  Indeed, other scholars surmised shortly af-
ter Zschernig that balancing is what courts would ultimately lean to-
ward.
233
  But such a proposal has many flaws both as a descriptive 
matter of what courts are doing and as a practical matter of what 
courts should be doing under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  
The Zschernig opinion lends no support to a balancing test.  Moreo-
ver, a lower court proposed a balancing test on only one occasion, 
and in that case the court never actually engaged in balancing be-
cause it found no effect on foreign affairs.
234
  Thus, courts have almost 
 
 228 See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31) (finding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear claim 
against the United States and that Mexican nationals in U.S. Custody were entitled to 
review of their convictions); see also supra note 227. 
 229 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008). 
 230 Id. at 530. 
 231 See Lewis, supra note 5, at 501; see also McRoberts, supra note 27, at 651 (apply-
ing balancing test after first asking whether primary purpose was to influence foreign 
government conduct). 
 232 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1217. 
 233 See Henkin, supra note 12, at 164 (questioning also the need for the doctrine 
altogether). 
 234 See State v. Bundrat, 546 P.2d 530, 542 (Ala. 1976). 
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uniformly rejected the adoption of a balancing test.  The rejection of 
balancing by courts is appropriate since such a doctrinal test leads to 
even greater problems than a threshold-effects test. 
First, the Court, Justice Scalia in particular, has criticized balanc-
ing in the dormant Commerce Clause context, primarily because it 
can lead to uncertain results.
235
  If one wonders about a court’s ability 
to discern the appropriate line in a threshold-effects test, then one 
can be truly skeptical of a court’s ability to balance the effect of a 
state action on U.S. foreign policy or a foreign country with the right 
of states to regulate matters of traditional state concern (e.g., inherit-
ance or achievement of a legitimate local purpose).  The question 
whether courts have the competence to properly balance becomes 
even greater when one considers that in numerous cases the con-
straint will be interpreted by state legislators themselves.  Balancing, 
like a threshold-effects test, simply does not give state legislators suffi-
cient guidance regarding their conduct. 
Second, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part V of this Ar-
ticle, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is analogous only to the ex-
tra “one voice” prong of analysis under the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause, as opposed to the facial discrimination and balancing 
tests that occur prior to the “one voice” prong.
236
  In Japan Line, Ltd. v. 
Los Angeles County, the Supreme Court identified two additional 
prongs of analysis to undertake when a state tax affects foreign com-
merce as opposed to interstate commerce.
237
  First, the Court needs to 
consider whether the state tax creates a risk of multiple taxation.
238
  
Second, the Court queries whether the state tax interferes with an 
area where federal uniformity is essential.
239
  Some, including the 
Court itself, have termed this second prong the “speak with one 
voice” test since the prong is often paraphrased as a question of 
whether the state tax prevents the federal government from speaking 
 
 235 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 203 (1990) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (claiming that balancing the importance of the state interest against the de-
gree of impairment to commerce is “weighing the imponderable”); see also Tyler Pipe 
Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that balancing leads to unpredictable results). 
 236 See infra Part V. 
 237 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979). 
 238 Id.  
 239 Id. at 448. 
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with one voice.
240
  The dormant foreign affairs doctrine has been de-
scribed in terms similar to this second prong in Japan Line.
241
 
While differences and similarities between the extra prongs of 
analysis under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine will be explored further below,
242
 the 
crucial point here is that the Court has utilized these additional 
prongs after finding a state tax would satisfy the test for the dormant 
interstate Commerce Clause.  Thus, the extra tests are separate from 
the normal test for interstate commerce and apparently are applied 
after any balancing has taken place.
243
  Accordingly, the Court has at 
least implicitly rejected any sort of balancing under the second prong 
of the Japan Line test.  Therefore, support for balancing under the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine is further weakened. 
3. Purpose Review 
Purpose review is the best available means of assessing state ac-
tions under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
244
  Under purpose 
 
 240 See, e.g., id. at 449.  See also Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 
U.S. 159, 186 (1983). 
 241 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1637. 
 242 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 243 The Japan Line tests to date have only been applied by the Supreme Court to 
state taxes and not state regulations, and the interstate Commerce Clause tests for 
taxes do not involve balancing.  But lower courts have applied the Japan Line addi-
tional tests even to regulations after engaging in facial discrimination and balancing 
tests.  See Piazza’s Seafood World, L.L.C. v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 750 (5th Cir. 2006); 
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 57 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 244 Support for purpose review can be gleaned from the articles of several scholars 
and practitioners, although these articles combine purpose review with other addi-
tional tests criticized in this Article or view purpose review as a second best option to 
eliminating the doctrine altogether.  Professor Fenton places the greatest emphasis 
on purpose review of any commentator; however, he also places continued reliance 
on asking whether the state action prevents the federal government from “speaking 
with one voice,” a test which this Article criticizes.  See Fenton, supra note 34, at 571.  
Professor Goldsmith criticizes the existence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine; 
however, he admits that purpose review is most appropriate if the doctrine is to exist.  
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 652. Similarly, McRoberts would initially review state 
laws for a primary foreign policy purpose but would secondarily examine state laws 
lacking such a purpose under a balancing test.  See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 652.  
Professor Moore appears to argue for a purpose-based test that would invalidate state 
laws having a foreign policy purpose but would also engage in a balancing test weigh-
ing a state law’s effect on international relations with a legitimate local purpose, 
aruging at various points for a purpose test, balancing test or a combination of the 
two.  See Moore, supra note 27, at 289, 306, 311, 321. Daniel M. Price and John P. 
Hannah argue that a primary purpose to “singl[e] out individual foreign regimes for 
condemnation; and . . . coerce changes in their domestic policies” places a state law 
“well within Zschernig’s zone of constitutional impermissibility.”  Price & Hannah, 
supra note 223, at 460.  But at other times in their article, they seem to apply an ef-
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review, courts would ask if the primary purpose of the state law is to 
change or criticize the policy of a foreign government or govern-
ments.  This may strike some readers as strange at first glance—even 
after reading concerns raised about a threshold-effects test and ba-
lancing—because of one of the central policy justifications for ex-
cluding states from foreign policy, and a concern that the Framers 
focused upon, was that state foreign policy measures could have an 
effect on a foreign country, or U.S. foreign policy towards that coun-
try, and this could lead to retaliation that might befall the country as 
a whole.  This seems to indicate that it is indeed the effects of the 
state measure that should be the preeminent concern under the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  But courts cannot gauge well the 
effects of a state action on the achievement of U.S foreign policy 
goals and the potential for retaliation.
245
  The best independent indi-
cator of a state measure’s effect that does not require a court to rely 
on judgments of the executive branch or, more disturbingly, foreign 
governments, is its purpose.  Simply put, purpose is not entirely de-
tached from effect.  Purposes are important, at least in part, because 
of the likely effects.  A foreign country is much less likely to cooperate 
with the United States or be more likely to institute retaliatory meas-
ures against state actions that have as their explicit purpose criticism 
of that foreign country’s policies or the desire to change those poli-
cies. 
Other questions or concerns regarding purpose review have 
been raised, particularly in the context of the dormant Commerce 
Clause.  First, there is the worry of mixed purposes of a state measure 
or that different legislators may have different motives for approving 
a measure.  For instance, the Massachusetts Burma law may have 
been passed by some legislators to change human rights policies in 
Burma and by others to increase their chances for reelection because 
it was a popular measure that polls seemed to support.  This last mo-
tivation is irrelevant.  Many legislators may have the ultimate goal of 
being reelected, but this is not the relevant motive or purpose.
246
  The 
relevant purpose is the goal that the legislation is designed to accom-
plish.
247
  Having eliminated the motive of increasing chances of ree-
lection, one would now have to decide whether the primary purpose 
 
fects test.  Id. at 463 (“Therefore, a reviewing court should consider [state laws for] 
their potential cumulative impact on the federal government’s ability to conduct a 
coherent foreign policy[,]” including by examining foreign diplomatic protests). 
 245 See discussion infra Part VII. 
 246 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1149, n.98. 
 247 See id. at 1142–51. 
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of the Burma law was to change or criticize the behavior of the Bur-
mese government. 
The next concern raised with regard to purpose or motive re-
view in the context of the dormant Commerce Clause is the problem 
of “laundered legislative history” to disguise the legislature’s true 
purpose.
248
  This is less likely to happen in foreign affairs legislation 
than in protectionist legislation, and it is surprising how many times 
even a protectionist motive is revealed in the development of legisla-
tion.
249
  In the context of protectionism, legislators are sometimes an-
xious to reveal their purpose in order to obtain the maximum politi-
cal rewards for favoring domestic industry.
250
  Legislators, in general, 
will be similarly anxious to reveal their foreign policy purpose.
251
  In-
deed, the Massachusetts Burma law’s sponsor, state Rep. Byron Rush-
ing, stated upon introduction of the bill: 
The Commonwealth has a history of assisting fledgling, democrat-
ic movements throughout the world.  Burma calls on our support 
now.  The new South Africa demonstrates that economic pressure 
can be effective in moving governments away from oppression.  
Continued pressure from Massachusetts is necessary to vigorously 
combat well-documented repression and intolerance in Burma.
252
 
Assuming, however, that legislators attempt to hide their purpose, 
they are unlikely to be successful, even if legislators launder the legis-
lative history.  A foreign policy purpose is more likely to be evident 
from the face of the statute than a protectionist purpose.  Often such 
legislation singles out a particular foreign country.
253
  Indeed, lower 
courts applying a purpose-based test have highlighted the singling 
out of a particular foreign nation as a key determinant of the state ac-
tion’s purpose.
254
  Some scholars have even declared that singling out 
a foreign nation should be the sole test for reviewing state actions 
 
 248 See id. at 1239. 
 249 See, e.g., Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty, Influence, Realpolitik, and the World Trade 
Organization, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 341, 350 (2002) (discussing the 
WTO Reformulate Gasoline case that “involved a ‘smoking gun’ in that an EPA offi-
cial testifying before Congress admitted that they wanted to give domestic refiners a 
break”).  
 250 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1156.   
 251 See Spiro, State and Local, supra note 222, at 822. 
 252 See Price & Hannah, supra note 223, at 462. 
 253 See, e.g., Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1367–68 (D.N.M. 1980) 
(singling out Iran); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 
(III. 1986) (singling out South Africa). 
 254 See, e.g., Tayyari, 495 F. Supp. at 1371; see also Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, 503 
N.E.2d at 307 (striking down state tax law that discriminated against South African 
currency on state constitutional grounds for having a foreign affairs purpose). 
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under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
255
  But using singling out 
as the lone test may not be wise if a state targets, for example, a large 
group of countries that maintain a particular policy such that singling 
out loses meaning (e.g., one that targets all foreign nations placed on 
a list by the U.S. Trade Representative as providing insufficient intel-
lectual property protection or all foreign nations lacking a free trade 
agreement with the United States).  Additionally, one has to be care-
ful that a singling-out test does not give blanket immunity to general-
ly applicable or facially neutral laws (non-foreign affairs related laws) 
that may be used in a particular case or applied in a manner that has 
a primary foreign policy purpose.
256
  Nevertheless, singling out will be 
present in many cases, and therefore, even without legislative history, 
the foreign policy purpose of a law can often be determined by refer-
ence to its text and structure.  For example, one might compare a 
generally applicable state tort law being applied in a manner that 
causes foreign policy effects to a specific cause of action or an exten-
sion of an applicable statute of limitations that apply only with respect 
to actions arising from certain historical occurrences such as WWII 
forced labor or the “Armenian genocide.”  The former type of law is 
more likely to survive purpose review while the latter type of provision 
is more likely to be found to have a foreign policy purpose—a prima-
ry motive of changing or criticizing the behavior of certain countries. 
 Legislators may also attempt to disguise their purpose as pro-
tecting the moral or psychological health of their constituents from 
the damage that would be caused by procuring from (or investing in) 
companies active in a country with a poor human rights record.  But 
courts have not accepted such arguments in the context of extraterri-
torial legislation and are unlikely to do so in the context of dormant 
 
 255 See Vasquez, supra note 15, at 1262. 
 256 For an example of a court checking to ensure a generally applicable statute is 
not in fact being used to target a particular country, see North American Salt Co. v. 
Ohio Department of Transportation, 701 N.E.2d 454, 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).  The 
court found that the Ohio law and regulations 
do not provide Ohio officials with an opportunity to treat foreign na-
tions differently based upon the ideological bent of a nation’s govern-
ment, or based upon any other factor.  Rather, the provisions apply 
equally to all foreign nations.  Nor is there any evidence in the record 
that suggests that these provisions have been selectively applied to 
goods mined or produced in Canada. As a result, we are unable to find 
that [the Ohio laws and regulations] have any more than an indirect or 
incidental effect upon the nation’s foreign affairs. 
Id.  For those familiar with subsidy rules in the WTO system, one might wish to ana-
logize to the concept of de facto specificity (e.g., where a subsidy is generally availa-
ble under neutral criteria but only given to or utilized by selected companies or in-
dustries).   
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foreign affairs doctrine decisions.
257
  Admittedly, there will be close 
calls, and states may make a significant attempt to hide purpose.  For 
example, one could envision a divestment statute that calls upon 
fund administrators to divest from any excessively risky investments.  
The fund administrator determines that companies active in a partic-
ular foreign country with a terrible record on human rights are par-
ticularly risky investments since they might become subject to con-
sumer boycotts.  Alternatively, those companies’ assets could be 
viewed as particularly subject to political risk because, for example, 
the regime may grow weary of a foreign presence.  If the fund admin-
istrator only divests from companies active in that particular foreign 
country, we may have a situation where it must be determined if the 
divestment statute as applied runs afoul of the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine with purpose review.  It is, however, very likely that the 
fund administrator will have a series of risk calculations and projec-
tions exclusively based on the financial impact of various investments 
and thus be able to demonstrate alternative support for such a deci-
sion.  The argument is not that there will never be close calls under a 
purpose-based test but rather that close calls are likely to be less fre-
quent than under the other tests. 
Other concerns expressed with respect to purpose review in the 
context of the dormant Commerce Clause are also likely to be less 
prevalent with regard to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  For 
example, it is hard to imagine a particular piece of legislation being 
kept in place for a foreign policy purpose, although not originally 
enacted for such a purpose, in the context of the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine.  Similarly, it seems that judges should be less timid 
about concluding that state legislators have enacted legislation (or 
state executive branch officials have taken certain actions) for a for-
eign policy purpose than a protectionist purpose.
258
  A court finding 
that a state has acted with a foreign policy purpose is less directly of-
fensive to other states in the nation than a finding that the state acted 
with a protectionist purpose. 
Purpose review also fits the competence of judges better than 
the other two tests in the context of foreign affairs.  It is hard to argue 
 
 257 See Spiro, supra note 222, at 834 (claiming that recognition of a state’s moral 
interest as legitimate in the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause context would be 
unprecedented).  The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, did accept such an in-
terest in its review of the City of Baltimore’s divestment statute in the mid-1980s.  See 
Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d. 720, 746 (Md. 
1989). 
 258 See Regan, supra note 34, at 1215 (suggesting that courts are reluctant to find a 
protectionist purpose). 
SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2011  3:50 PM 
2011] REASSESSING CONSTRAINTS 253 
that U.S. judges are somehow less adept at fleshing out legislative 
purpose vis-à-vis their counterparts in other nations.  In both Austral-
ia and Canada, judges undertake the task of characterizing a particu-
lar law as one either dealing with foreign affairs or one dealing with a 
matter of state or provincial concern.
259
  A central consideration in 
the characterization is the purpose of the law or, in other words, the 
object the law seeks to achieve.
260
  This is normal, everyday fare for 
Australian and Canadian judges.  U.S. judges are no less able to flesh 
out purpose and do so in many contexts outside the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine.
261
  Additionally, a purpose-based test is also likely to 
achieve more consistent results among lower court judges and pro-
vide the best guidance to state government officials.
262
 
An examination of lower federal court and state court decisions 
in the post-Zschernig (1968) and pre-Crosby (2001) era reveals a signif-
icant number of lower courts paying fealty to the threshold-effects 
test but prominently adding purpose review as a sub-factor or an in-
dependent test as well.  In Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, the 
federal district court for New Mexico considered a challenge to a 
university board of regent’s ban on Iranian students enrolling during 
the Iranian Hostages Crises.
263
  The court struck down the board of 
regent’s measure, in part relying on the ban’s purpose: “[The Board 
of] Regents’ motion is directed at one nation, Iran.  Their purpose 
was to make a political statement about the hostage situation in Iran 
and retaliate against Iranian nationals here.”
264
  In Springfield Rare Coin 
Galleries v. Johnson, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a dormant 
foreign affairs challenge to an Illinois law excluding the South Afri-
can Krugerand from a tax exemption given to currency from every 
other country.
265
  In striking down the law, the court stated: “[I]n 
both purpose and effect, the exclusion shares important attributes 
with the various measures struck down in Zschernig [and post-Zschernig 
lower court cases]. . . . In this case we hold only that disapproval of 
the political and social policies of a foreign nation does not provide a 
 
 259 See PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 15-7 to 15-10 (5th ed. 2007); 
KEVEN BOOKER, ARTHUR GLASS & ROBERT WATT, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION 50 (1994). 
 260 See HOGG, supra note 259, at 15-7 to 15-10; see BOOKER, supra note 259, at 50. 
 261 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1145. 
 262 On this latter point, see Regan, supra note 30, at 1146–47 (arguing that motive 
review provides the best guidance to state legislators in the context of the dormant 
Commerce Clause). 
 263 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (D.N.M. 1980). 
 264 Id. at 1379–80. 
 265 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill. 1986). 
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valid basis for a tax classification by this state.”
266
  In National Foreign 
Trade Council v. Natsios, the First Circuit invalidated a Massachusetts 
statute that provided a negative ten percent preference in state pro-
curements against companies active in Burma.
267
  The court paid feal-
ty to the threshold-effects test finding that “Zschernig stands for the 
principle that there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact 
on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed.”
268
  But the first 
factor the court pointed to in finding the law had more than some 
incidental or indirect effect on foreign affairs was that the “design 
and intent of the law [was] to affect the affairs of a foreign coun-
try.”
269
 
E. Is Purpose Review Too Weak, Too Strong or Just (About) Right (i.e. 
Is Purpose Review Revolutionary in Its Consequences)? 
One major concern with adopting purpose review to assess state 
actions under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is that it will cap-
ture too many state actions.  In short, there is some concern that 
purpose review is too harsh, particularly with respect to non-binding 
resolutions.  But purpose review allows state actions that affect for-
eign policy or foreign countries to escape condemnation provided 
that the actions do not have a foreign policy purpose.  Thus, some 
might alternatively argue that this makes purpose review too weak for 
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  In responding to arguments 
that purpose review is either a too aggressive or too lenient test under 
the doctrine, one must begin by again recognizing and acknowledg-
ing that purpose is linked to a certain extent with effects.  Effects may 
be a small part of the evidence assessed in searching for purpose.  
Nonetheless, the text and structure of enactments will probably be 
sufficient in most cases to assess purpose, particularly the singling out 
a particular country or group of countries in the legislation or action.  
As already mentioned, legislation passed with the purpose of chang-
ing or criticizing the policies of a foreign government is more likely 
to have effects on U.S. foreign policy or foreign countries than some 
measure whose primary purpose is not to change or criticize a foreign 
government’s behavior.
270
  In most cases where a foreign policy pur-
pose is found, effects on U.S. foreign policy or the foreign country 
will also be found. 
 
 266 Id. 
 267 181 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 268 Id. at 52. 
 269 Id. at 53. 
 270 See discussion supra Part IV.D.3. 
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But what about cases in which purpose is present but substantial 
effects are not, or a case where substantial effects are present but 
purpose is not?  As to the latter, which I would consider a rarer state 
of affairs than the former, federal government preemption is always 
available.  Since it is rare, the “overburdened policing” concern is not 
as significant.  Additionally, the failure of the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine to capture state actions in this category is not troublesome 
because a state legislature is not likely to have any notice or reasona-
ble means of assessing such effects in advance.  As to the former cate-
gory, where purpose is present but effects are not, a measure that is 
essentially ineffectual will be involved, such as a non-binding resolu-
tion. 
To further explore this problem, it is appropriate to contrast the 
Massachusetts Burma law imposing a negative ten percent preference 
in the procurement bidding process against companies active in 
Burma with the following hypothetical non-binding resolution passed 
by the Massachusetts legislature: 
Be it resolved: 
   The state of Massachusetts deplores the human rights situation 
in Burma.  It believes sanctions should be imposed on the 
SLORC. 
   This resolution shall be transmitted to U.S. representatives and 
senators serving the state of Massachusetts by the Governor. 
Under a threshold-effects test, a procurement sanctions law is 
more likely to be invalidated than a non-binding resolution.  Under 
purpose review, it appears at first glance that both types of laws will be 
held unconstitutional.  It is important to remember, however, that 
the primary purpose behind the law must be a foreign policy pur-
pose; that is, a primary purpose to change or criticize the behavior or 
a policy of a foreign nation. 
It could be argued that the primary purpose behind the resolu-
tion is to voice the opinion of the Massachusetts State Legislature to 
the federal government.  Perhaps this is drawing too fine of a line, 
particularly given that state laws sanctioning companies active (in 
trade or investment terms) with a rogue foreign country ultimately 
are designed to change or criticize the targeted government’s beha-
vior.  One could certainly argue that the ultimate purpose is to 
change the policy of the Burmese government although the interme-
diate purpose is somewhat different— namely, to have the federal 
government enact a stronger policy towards Burma.  Similarly, state 
and local actions such as naming a street after a famous dissident in a 
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foreign country,
271
 or establishing sister state or sister city relation-
ships,
272
 or even sending humanitarian aid
273
 would all be upheld un-
der a purpose-based test since one could likely successfully argue that 
the primary purpose of such laws is not to change or criticize the poli-
cies or behavior of a foreign government.  Street naming ordinances 
recognize efforts of courageous individuals, sister city/state relation-
ships primarily are intended to enhance cultural and economic ties 
of private actors in the sister communities,
274
 and sending aid is hu-
manitarian in nature with the purpose to alleviate suffering.  If one is 
dissatisfied with making these types of distinctions among purposes 
or believes that deciding upon a primary purpose is simply too close 
to call, then one could consider limiting the test in four other possi-
ble ways. 
First, a dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based 
test can be respectful of historical practice.  For example, there is sig-
nificant historical support for allowing “sense of” resolutions since 
such resolutions date at least as far back as the turn of the Nineteenth 
Century.
275
  Thus, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a pur-
 
 271 See Opusunju v. Guliani, 669 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). 
Petitioners have made no reasonable showing that the naming of the 
street corner will have more than ‘some incidental or indirect effect,’ if 
any, on foreign affairs, that would intrude unconstitutionally on the 
exclusive federal powers of the United States . . . . The name ‘Kudirat 
Abiola Corner’ honors and commemorates a slain Nigerian woman 
whose husband, a dissident, is jailed in Nigeria.  This cannot reasonably 
be deemed to be New York City ‘establish[ing] its own foreign policy,’ 
as petitioners argue. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 272 See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 34, at 822 (noting that over 830 cities and municipal 
governments have established sister-city relationships with over 1,270 cities in 90 
countries). 
 273 In the 1980s, Burlington, Vermont sent 560 tons of humanitarian goods, in-
cluding medicine, to its sister city in Nicaragua.  See Michael Shuman, Dateline Main-
street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN POL’Y 154, 161 (1986-1987). 
 274 See, e.g., Fry, supra note 1, at 286; see also Kline, supra note 2, at 113 (noting that 
in the 1980s, political objectives emerged in sister-city relationships established be-
tween U.S. cities and communities in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Palestine). 
 275 For a brief description of similar “sense of” resolutions at the federal level, see 
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: “SENSE OF” RESOLUTIONS AND 
PROVISIONS (April 20, 2007), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98-
825.pdf.   
A “sense of” resolution is not legally binding because it is not presented 
to the President for his signature.  Even if a “sense of” provision is in-
corporated into a bill that becomes law, such provisions merely express 
the opinion of Congress or the relevant chamber.  They have no formal 
effect on public policy and are not considered law. 
Id. at 1.  For examples of modern resolutions, see Robinson, supra note 74, at 707–09. 
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pose-based test need not interfere with the transmission of views from 
state governments to the federal government via non-binding resolu-
tion.
276
  Although individual politicians could transmit such views, 
there may be benefits to allowing formal transmission.
277
  It is, howev-
er, important to keep in mind that there are some state constitutional 
and statutory restrictions on transmitting state or local views on for-
eign policy via referendum.
278
  As another example, a dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test, particularly one that 
accounts for historical practice, need not threaten even the vast ma-
jority of state and local government agreements with foreign govern-
ments (national or sub-national), some 340 of them over the past fifty 
years.
279
  Agreements between states and foreign governments, either 
national or sub-national, creating detailed regulatory regimes to force 
a change in foreign country practices by legally binding agreement 
would be the most prominent agreements threatened by a purpose-
based test.  Agreements meeting these criteria, however, are rare, and 
Congress can use its power to grant approval to save them from the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine should it so desire.
280
  Most of the 
agreements between states and foreign or foreign sub-national gov-
ernments simply create cooperation similar to a services contract 
 
 276 Indeed, such resolutions are unlikely to be challenged in the courts anyway.  
See Judith Resnick, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and For-
eign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 77–78 
(2007).  
While hortatory resolutions calling for federal legislation are unlikely 
to be challenged or, if challenged, are likely to be protected by the 
First Amendment, implementation efforts that impose obligations 
would not be so shielded.  But the courts cannot reach the question 
without a challenger, and it is a pattern in the case law that most chal-
lenges arise because a local action affects the commercial interests of a 
person or an entity, in some instances of a network of entities. 
Id. 
 277 See Duchacek, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that sub-federal lobbying of federal 
governments has always been consistent with both democratic and federal theory and 
practice). 
 278 See, e.g., Brant v. Beermann, 350 N.W.2d 18 (Neb. 1984) (finding that an advi-
sory vote placed should not be placed on the election ballot because it was merely an 
expression of public opinion); Fossella v. Dinkins, 485 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1985) (af-
firming a decision to strike a referendum from a ballot, in part, because it was an in-
direct way to influence public opinion which is against state policy).   
 279 For an overview of these agreements, see Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Com-
pact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741 (2010).  Professor Hollis appears to prefer using a 
reinvigorated Compact Clause to exert greater control over these state agreements 
and activities than controlling them through a dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  Id. 
at 769. 
 280 See discussion infra Part VII. 
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(e.g., bridge building projects or fire fighting plans
281
), announce a 
common position with information sharing or studies as a follow-up 
(and therefore involve no criticism or change in behavior unless ne-
gotiated for prior to reaching the common position), or establish an 
ongoing relationship (similar to sister city/sister state arrangements, 
to advance trade, investment, and tourism opportunities).
282
  Few of 
these types of agreements would appear to involve a primary purpose 
of the state to change or criticize the behavior of a foreign govern-
ment, either national or sub-national.  They are also unlikely to 
create more than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign 
relations.  Again, even if one finds these distinctions among purposes 
too difficult or arbitrary, as with non-binding resolutions, the long 
history of these (mostly) non-legally binding agreements can be res-
pected when applying the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  The 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test could, of 
course, remain a doctrinal tool used to ensure states do not become 
overzealous in using these agreements in a manner deviating from 
historical practice, although more robust regulation under the Com-
pact Clause may be preferable in any event.
283
 
A second way to possibly protect non-binding resolutions from a 
purpose-based test would be to only capture state measures that em-
ploy traditional tools of foreign policy.  Trade and investment sanc-
tions legislation would clearly meet this “traditional tools” test.  The 
question is whether non-binding resolutions would be caught within 
a “traditional tools” test.  Diplomatic notes transmitted to a foreign 
government or the support of non-binding resolutions within inter-
national organizations might be considered “traditional tools” of for-
eign policy.  But internal resolutions of a federal agency, or congres-
sional committee, or a political party’s platform are not tools of 
foreign policy, and state resolutions are more analogous to such reso-
lutions.  Of course, state agreements with foreign governments, al-
though mostly representing political commitments at best, would still 
 
 281 Agreements on bridge building and fire fighting cooperation have garnered 
congressional approval.  See Hollis, supra note 279, at 742 nn.10–12. 
 282 See id. at 755–56, 768–69 (listing the major types/categories of agreements and 
noting such agreements are most commonly political commitments without legal ef-
fect or institutions). 
 283 See id. at 805 (admitting that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine “remains” a 
control device “on the table” but preferring more robust regulation by federal actors 
under the Compact Clause).  It may well be that a reinvigorated Compact Clause is 
the best way to treat state agreements with foreign governments (both national and 
sub-national) given that we typically think that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine 
applies to activities beyond those express limitation on the states in Article I, Section 
10 of the Constitution. 
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be captured under a “traditional tools” test.  Moreover, problems with 
a “traditional tools” test could arise because tools can change over 
time, and lower courts struggled with the “traditional governmental 
functions” test that was used in the context of limits on the scope of 
the federal government’s Commerce Clause powers in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.
284
 
A third possibility to try to limit difficult determinations con-
cerning a state action’s purpose through additional filters might be to 
seek to limit only those state foreign policy measures having legal ef-
fect.  This limitation, however, may be overly broad or too narrow 
depending on how the force of law is defined.  For instance, the hy-
pothetical non-binding resolution above directs the governor to 
transmit the message to the state’s representatives in Congress.  It is 
unclear whether this law binds the Governor and thus has legal force.  
But if this provision were excluded, then there would be no legal ef-
fect present, and the issue could be easily avoided.  This limiting fac-
tor would also be an alternative or additional way to ensure that the 
vast majority of state agreements with foreign governments, either na-
tional or sub-national, are not implicated by the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine. 
Fourth, and finally, in employing a purpose-based test, courts 
can be respectful of prior court precedent and rulings concerning 
particular state laws.  For example, as discussed earlier, pure reciproc-
ity requirements have been upheld in a variety of contexts and one 
could always argue the purpose of such reciprocity requirements is 
just that—reciprocity—rather than an attempt to change or criticize 
the behavior of the foreign government in failing to allow U.S. na-
tionals to inherit property or engage in certain professions in the for-
eign country.  At least three of these four refinements or additional 
filters (historical practice, legal effect, and respect for precedent) 
seem quite workable should courts struggle in close cases in deter-
mining a state action’s primary purpose. 
 
 284 See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849–52 (1976) (“We hold that 
insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States’ free-
dom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, 
they are not within the authority granted Congress.”), overruled by San Antonio Me-
tro. Auth. v. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (“We therefore now reject, as un-
sound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal 
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental 
function is ‘integral’ or ‘traditional.’  Any such rule leads to inconsistent results.”). 
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V. A MARKET-PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO THE DORMANT FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS DOCTRINE? 
The Supreme Court has recognized a market-participant excep-
tion to dormant Commerce Clause restraints on states.
285
  Specifically, 
when a state acts as a market participant, rather than a market regula-
tor, it is exempted from the constraints of the doctrine.
286
  The excep-
tion primarily creates carve-outs for state purchases of goods and ser-
vices.
287
  In the past several years, the Roberts’ Court has created an 
additional “state self-promotion” exception that allows states to favor 
an in-state public entity above both in-state and out-of-state private 
entities, and three justices have indicated a willingness to expand the 
market-participant exception to cases where state regulation is ac-
companied by state market participation.
288
 
The Court has never formally decided whether the market-
participant exception applies to the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause much less the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  The Court, 
however, has strongly hinted,
289
 and several lower courts have held,
290
 
 
 285 See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206–10 
(1983) (“Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a state, 
in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market.”); Reeves, 
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980) (“Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting 
as proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal con-
straints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause.”); Hughes v. Alexan-
dria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807–10 (1976) (“Nothing in the Commerce Clause 
prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, form participating in the 
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”). 
 286 See Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 439. 
 287 I will not address a separate exception under the dormant Commerce Clause 
for direct payment subsidies in this Article.  Certain direct subsidies, however, will 
not survive dormant Commerce Clause challenge.  See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. 
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994) (holding that a direct payment subsidy to in-state 
milk producers was invalid because it was funded through tax on all retail milk sold, 
rather than general treasury funds). 
 288 See Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers May Take Us: The Future of the State-
Self-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541, 541 
(2009) [hereinafter Coenen, United Haulers] (arguing that this new exception may 
have significant consequences and application in various factual contexts); Dan T. 
Coenen, The Supreme Court’s Municipal Bond Decision and the Market-Participant Excep-
tion to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1179, 1185 (2009) [hereinafter 
Coenen, Municipal Bond Decision] (arguing against any such expansion of the market-
participant exception for fear it will undermine the purposes of dormant Commerce 
Clause). 
 289 See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (involving 
a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause challenge where the Court still examined the 
state’s claim that it was a market participant not a market regulator, implying the ex-
ception would be available under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause).  Four 
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that the exception should exist under the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause.  Such a holding is in fact necessary if courts are serious 
about preserving the exception under the dormant interstate Com-
merce Clause.  If the exception were not recognized in foreign com-
merce cases, its existence would risk obliteration.  This is true be-
cause in a global economy most state actions affect both interstate 
and foreign commerce.  A state does not have to specifically target or 
discriminate against foreign commerce in order to be subject to 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause constraints.  Indeed, in South-
Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Court subjected a 
state measure that de facto required in-state processing of raw logs 
sold by the state to heightened scrutiny under the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause because ten percent of the raw logs subject to the 
de facto in-state processing requirement were bound for export.
291
 
Thus, this Article presumes that the market-participant excep-
tion does exist for the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.  Al-
though, as will be explored later, such an exception should only ap-
ply to the facial discrimination and balancing tests of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, and not the additional “one voice” prong.
292
  An 
analysis of the reasons for the market-participant exception in the 
dormant Commerce Clause context indicates that such an exception 
should not exist for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, in spite of a 
 
years earlier, the Court expressly declined to rule on the issue.  See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 
439 n.9. 
 290  Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d. 720, 750–
752 (Md. 1989) (holding that conditions enforced by the city did not “have a sub-
stantial regulatory effect outside of the market in which it is participating”); Carll v. 
S.C. Jobs-Econ. Dev. Auth., 327 S.E.2d 331, 337 (S.C. 1985) (holding that “[t]he 
Commerce Clause does not prohibit implementation of any portion of this Act be-
cause South Carolina is a market participant and is entitled to establish guidelines 
for its participation regardless of the effect on interstate or foreign commerce”);  
K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774, 787 (N.J. 
1977) (upholding state “Buy American Act” under market-participant exception and 
claiming it would be ironic to hold that as a state became less parochial vis-à-vis a 
“buy New Jersey” act that a state law becomes invalid under the dormant Commerce 
Clause).  Most commentators have argued that the exception should not apply in the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause context.  See McArdle, supra note 65, at 831; 
Mendelson, supra note 5, at 89.  As discussed below, I would find the exception does 
apply but not to the second additional prong of analysis that occurs under the dor-
mant Foreign Commerce Clause.  See infra Part V.  In essence, it is really the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine, and thus should be subsumed within the doctrine. 
 291 467 U.S. 82, 99–100 (1984). 
 292 See infra Part VI.B. 
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split among lower courts on this issue.
293
  Prior to proceeding to that 
analysis, two additional points regarding the Supreme Court’s dor-
mant Commerce Clause and market-participant exception jurispru-
dence must be explained.  First, it logically follows that if the justifica-
tions for the current (narrow) market-participant exception are not 
supported within the context of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, 
neither would any expanded version of such exception be supported.  
Additionally, it logically follows that the new “state self-promotion” 
exception should not apply in the context of the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine.  The state self-promotion exception is based on a “pri-
vate-gains-centered notion of state protectionism,” namely that the 
anti-protectionism norm of the dormant Commerce Clause allows a 
state to favor public in-state entities as long as it is not discriminating 
among private entities from inside and outside the state.
294
  The dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine is not concerned with protectionism so 
the new effort under the state self-promotion exception to limit the 
conception of protectionism has no relevance in the context of the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 
A. Textual 
The market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce 
Clause has a textual basis that is inferred from the grant of power to 
Congress to “regulate” interstate and foreign commerce.
295
  While this 
grant acts as a limit on state power even when Congress has not spo-
ken, the actual text of the clause suggests it is regulatory activities ra-
ther than non-regulatory activities that are exclusive to Congress.
296
  
No such textual basis exists for establishing a market-participant ex-
ception to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
297
  This is because the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine is implied not from a particular 
clause granting the federal government power to “regulate” foreign 
 
 293 See Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d. at 748–49 (Md. 1989); See also 
Price & Hannah, supra note 223, at 42 (concluding that the market-participant ex-
ception would not be available under a foreign affairs challenge). 
 294 See Coenen, United Haulers, supra note 288, at 545. 
 295 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Daniel T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-
Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L.REV. 395, 436–37 
(1989) [hereinafter Coenen, Untangling]. 
 296 Id. 
 297 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1639 (stating that “in contrast to treaties, cus-
tomary international law is not mentioned in either the Supremacy Clause or Article 
III”). 
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affairs but rather an amalgam of clauses and the structure of the Con-
stitution relating to foreign affairs.
298
 
B. Analogy to a Private Actor in the Market 
The market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce 
Clause also draws support from analogizing a state participating in 
the market to a private actor in the market.
299
  Private actors can pick 
and choose to and from whom to buy and sell their goods and servic-
es.  A private company could choose to buy inputs from only in-state 
suppliers, or sell its products to only in-state buyers.  States, it is ar-
gued, should be treated in an “evenhanded” fashion and subject to 
no greater restraints than private actors.
300
 
Private actors will be driven by profit maximization in choosing 
buyers and sellers.  It is possible that a private company might choose 
to buy from a “higher-priced” in-state supplier rather than a “lower-
priced” out-of-state supplier as a profit-maximizing strategy.  For ex-
ample, utilizing in-state suppliers may allow for more long-term relia-
bility in terms of a source of supply or may lead to a higher tax base 
in the community and thus lower tax rates.  It is questionable whether 
states act on a profit-maximizing rationale; however, one can analog-
ize to a state’s in-state procurement preference (or a subsidy to attract 
investment) on a revenue-maximization basis.  Although a state will 
pay more for the “higher-cost” in-state goods, the extra employment 
created may increase the tax base and leave the state treasury better 
off as a whole. 
The merits of such an argument are considerably weakened un-
der the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, however, because the anal-
ogy between state and private actors clearly breaks down with regard 
to participation in foreign affairs.  Nonetheless, those sympathetic to 
state participation in foreign policy often point to the foreign policy 
influence of large U.S.-based multinational corporations.  Since U.S.-
based multinational corporations can suffer a reduction in profits to 
ensure human rights or labor standards are met in foreign countries, 
why shouldn’t states be allowed to restrict their purchasing on similar 
foreign policy considerations? 
First, it is not as likely that states can justify such actions as reve-
nue-enhancing measures and thus the analogy to private actors seems 
to wear thin.  Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of corporations are 
 
 298 See id. at 1642. 
 299 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).  
 300 Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 421. 
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charged with maximizing profits and traditionally needed to justify 
measures meant to encourage human rights in foreign countries in 
such terms.
301
  Naturally, they do not make such explanations public 
because to do so would negate the positive public relations image 
sought by taking such steps.  Second, and much more importantly, 
states are in fact far different from private actors, since the Constitu-
tion limits governmental power, not private conduct.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court stated—in discussing a state procurement law sanc-
tioning labor law violators—that “government occupies a unique po-
sition of power in our society, and its conduct, regardless of form, is 
rightly subject to special restraints” and “in our system States simply 
are different from private parties and have a different role to play.”
302
  
Foreign nations are far more likely to be offended by government as 
opposed to private actions.  Indeed, international law holds federal 
states responsible for violations of international rules by their sub-
federal governments
303
 but not for actions taken by private parties un-
less the government, through acts or omissions, was somehow con-
nected to the private conduct.
304
  Thus, the chances for retaliation 
and unfairness are greater with governmental action.  Additionally, 
the federal government employs traditional foreign policy tools like 
procurement restrictions.
305
  To exempt state spending and state pur-
chasing decisions from the purview of the doctrine would be to ex-
empt traditional tools of foreign policy from the limits of the doc-
trine. 
C. Allowing Particular Projects to Go Forward 
Another reason for the market-participant exception to the 
dormant Commerce Clause is to allow states and localities to meet 
particular local needs.  Without the exception, some have argued that 
 
 301 See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, available at 
http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf.  Stakeholder models of corpo-
rate governance, questioning this traditional (narrow) duty of corporate chiefs, have 
recently been revived.  For a discussion, see, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corpo-
rate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and 
Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 369-72 (2006). . 
 302 Wis. Dep’t. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 
290 (1986). 
 303 See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, 
Chap. II, Art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) available at  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N07/590/90/PDF/N0759090. 
pdf?OpenElement. 
 304 See G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 303, Art. 8–9. 
 305 See WRIGHT, supra note 127, at 302–03. 
SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2011  3:50 PM 
2011] REASSESSING CONSTRAINTS 265 
certain projects may not be undertaken at all.
306
  In short, if, for ex-
ample, a state could not require a certain percentage of workers on a 
project to be local residents, then the project, like the building of a 
road, would not go forward.  This argument, to the extent it has valid-
ity, is certainly weaker in the context of state foreign affairs legisla-
tion.  If a state cannot refuse to buy from a particular rogue foreign 
country or companies active in that rogue country, it is unlikely to 
decrease the chances of a project going forward. 
D. Reduced Risk to Constitutional Values 
In the context of the dormant Commerce Clause, it is argued 
that when a state acts as a market participant and favors its own resi-
dents, there is less risk of harm to the unified market intended to be 
constitutionally established.
307
  This is so because other states will see 
favoritism to in-state residents by another state as less hostile when 
done through a procurement preference rather than through a tax 
or regulation.
308
  The argument continues that because other states 
will find such actions less hostile they are less likely to retaliate.
309
  It is 
not necessary here to debate and resolve whether this is indeed an 
accurate assessment of how other states will view such actions in the 
dormant interstate Commerce Clause context.  It does not appear, 
however, that a state acting as a market participant in foreign affairs 
will lessen the risk to the constitutional values at issue under the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  First, the offense or hostility en-
gendered in a foreign nation is not likely to be any less because a 
state acts as a market participant.
310
  This is all the more so because 
procurement sanctions are, as previously mentioned, traditional tools 
of foreign policy.
311
  Second, the injury to foreign policy is not les-
sened because such enactments will change the U.S. federal govern-
ment’s chosen manner or degree of pressure or support.
312
 
The other argument as to why a reduced risk to Commerce 
Clause values exists when a state acts as market participant relates to 
the inherent costliness of such measures.
313
  Protectionist procure-
ment preferences are relatively expensive and have a direct link to 
 
 306 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1194. 
 307 See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 430–35. 
 308 See id. at 434; Regan, supra note 30, at 1194. 
 309 See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 434; Regan, supra note 30, at 1194. 
 310 See Spiro, supra note 222, at 846. 
 311 See WRIGHT, supra note 127 at 302–03. 
 312 See Spiro, supra note 222, at 845–46 
 313 See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 434; Regan supra note 30, at 1194. 
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the state treasury.
314
  Procurement sanctions for foreign-policy pur-
poses will, however, likely be significantly less expensive than pro-
curement preferences for protectionist purposes.
315
  The reason is 
simple: a procurement preference targeted at suppliers from a par-
ticular nation, or even suppliers active in a particular foreign nation, 
will exclude less low-cost bidders than a preference that discriminates 
against all foreign bidders, as in the case of state “Buy-American” leg-
islation. 
E. “Sowing and Reaping” or Investment Capture 
Others have suggested a “sow and reap” rationale to justify the 
market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
316
  
Put in other terms, it is argued that in-state residents should be able 
to capture the benefits of their investments (i.e., programs created 
through their tax payments) to the exclusion of out-of-state persons, 
at least in some instances.
317
  The argument is that if a state’s residents 
have invested in a particular enterprise, then they should be able to 
reap the rewards.
318
  For example, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the citizens 
of South Dakota, through their tax payments, invested in the creation 
of a cement plant.
319
  Thus, the citizens should be able to choose to 
reap the rewards, namely be “first in line” to purchase cement from 
the plant during times of shortage.  The “sow and reap” rationale in-
volves a distinction made between investors (i.e., residents) and non-
investors (i.e., non-residents) in a particular enterprise.  Using the 
“sow and reap” rationale for a distinction between buyers or sellers of 
goods and services based on a foreign-policy purpose makes little 
sense.  Moreover, some foreign policy legislation prevents those who 
have “sowed” from “reaping.”  For instance, Massachusetts Burma law 
denied procurement opportunities to Massachusetts firms active in 
Burma.
320
 
 
 314 See id. 
 315 See Regan supra note 30, at 1193–95. 
 316 See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 421–26. 
 317 See Norman R. Williams, Taking Care of Ourselves: State Citizenship, the Market, and 
the State, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 469 (2008). 
 318 See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 423; Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizen-
ship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 523 (1981). 
 319 447 U.S. 429, 430 (1980). 
 320 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000). 
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F. The Inapplicability of the Market-Participant Exception in 
Numerous Cases 
Even if the market-participant exception were theoretically avail-
able under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, it is unlikely that 
many state foreign policy actions would fit within its confines.  In 
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, Alaska only sold 
timber from state lands to those buyers willing to agree by contract to 
process the timber in-state.
321
  Alaska claimed that as a seller and as a 
market participant, it could choose to whom to sell, and thus, the 
measure was valid under dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
322
  The 
Court, however, invalidated the provision, holding that the market-
participant exception only allows a state “to impose burdens on 
commerce within the market in which it is a participant.”
323
  The mar-
ket-participant exception did not allow the state to “impose condi-
tions . . . that have a substantial regulatory effect outside . . . [the] 
market.”
324
  Alaska, the Court found, was “attempting to govern the 
private, separate economic relationships of its trading partners.”
325
  
Thus, for example, it is likely that the Massachusetts Burma law would 
not fit within the market-participant exception’s confines because 
even if the exception were theoretically available under the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine, Massachusetts was seeking to control the re-
lations and transactions of those companies from whom they consi-
dered purchasing.
326
  Indeed, in South-Central Timber, the Court noted, 
referring to a previous case, that a state could not impose a residency 
requirement with respect to the work force of all projects (both pub-
lic and private) of a contractor doing business with a state.
327
  It might 
be possible, however, for Massachusetts to reject buying Burmese-
made goods under the market-participant exception since the state 
would not be imposing restrictions outside of the particular transac-
tion involved.  Additionally, divestment statutes may fall within the 
exception; the state has a continuing relationship with those compa-
nies in which its pension fund invests, and once it divests and no 
longer has a relationship, it no longer cares whether the company is 
 
 321 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
 322 Id. at 95. 
 323 Id. at 97. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. at 99. 
 326 See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 63 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 327 South Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 97–98, n.10. 
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active in the targeted country.
328
  Thus, rejection of the market-
participant exception under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is 
still relevant to some possible state-foreign-policy measures. 
VI. FURTHER DISTINGUISHING THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
DOCTRINE FROM THE DORMANT FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE 
As discussed briefly in Part V, scholars are split as to what type of 
analysis courts are or should be undertaking in the dormant Com-
merce Clause context.
329
  The language of courts’ opinions seems to 
indicate that courts are balancing the effect of the state measure on 
commerce with the achievement of a legitimate local purpose.
330
  
There is an exception for facially discriminatory measures which are 
virtually per se illegal,
331
 although even in such cases a particularly 
high showing of the need for the discrimination to achieve an impor-
tant legitimate local purpose might save the law.
332
  In the course of 
the analysis, courts ask whether the state could achieve its legitimate 
objective through a less trade-restrictive means.
333
  This question indi-
cates that courts may actually be attempting to flesh-out a protection-
ist motive.  If a state can achieve its purported objective by a less 
trade-restrictive means, then the state probably has a different or ad-
ditional motive, namely protectionism.  Those scholars supporting 
purpose review believe that courts are striking down state actions that 
have a primary purpose of protectionism or, in certain cases, isolating 
out-of-state interests, even though not competitors.
334
  How might the 
Massachusetts Burma law fare under the dormant Commerce Clause 
with a balancing or purpose-review test?  The Massachusetts Burma 
law would survive purpose-review scrutiny because the purpose of the 
 
 328 Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d. 720, 750–52 
(Md. 1989). 
 329 See supra Part V. 
 330 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute 
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects 
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.”). 
 331 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“Where 
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, [there exists] a virtual-
ly per se rule of invalidity. . . .”). 
 332 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 148-50 (1986) (upholding a state law banning 
the import of live baitfish, and noting that “Maine’s fisheries are unique and un-
usually fragile.”). 
 333 See, e.g., id. at 146. 
 334 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1143. 
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law is not protectionism and it does not isolate out-of-state interests.
335
  
Indeed, the law applies to both Massachusetts companies active in 
Burma and non-Massachusetts companies.
336
  Under a balancing anal-
ysis, however, the law may very well be invalidated.  While the extent 
of the law’s effects on commerce may be debated, the objective the 
law seeks to achieve is not a legitimate one for the state.
337
  But even 
under a balancing analysis, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is 
not superfluous because a portion of the law may be protected by the 
market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.  
Specifically, Massachusetts could refuse to purchase Burmese-made 
goods.  The discussion above has ignored the additional analysis that 
Supreme Court jurisprudence requires for state actions affecting for-
eign commerce.  Yet, this is the most important part of the compari-
son between the two constraints because the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine is most analogous to one of the additional inquiries the 
court undertakes when state action affects foreign commerce, as op-
posed to simply interstate commerce.
338
 
As described earlier, when foreign commerce is implicated by a 
state measure, the Supreme Court has launched two additional inqui-
ries.
339
  First, in tax-related measures, the Court has asked whether the 
state action risks multiple taxation.
340
  Second, the Court queries 
whether the state action interferes with federal uniformity in an area 
where federal uniformity is essential.
341
  This second additional prong 
of analysis is paraphrased by the Court as a question of whether the 
state prevented the federal government from “speaking with one 
voice.”
342
  If any part of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is ana-
logous to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, it is this second prong 
of the additional tests under the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause.
343
  Indeed, several lower courts have acknowledged the simi-
larity between the two inquiries and even transferred results from one 
 
 335 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367–68 (2000) (de-
scribing the Massachusetts law). 
 336 Id. at 366. 
 337 See id. at 370;  see also supra Part IV.D.2. 
 338 Compare Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), with Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. 
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); see supra Part IV.C. and infra Part VI.A. 
 339 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451; see also supra notes 237–41 and accompanying text. 
 340 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451. 
 341 Id. 
 342 Id. 
 343 See, e.g., Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 221, at 164; Goldsmith, supra 
note 12, at 1637. 
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context to the other.
344
  But, of course, the states can never prevent 
the federal government from “speaking with one voice.”
345
  The prob-
lem with leaving the control of state-level foreign policy to federal 
preemption is that the states can prevent the federal government 
from speaking with “no voice” or a “quiet voice,” or more generally, 
change the voice that the federal government would otherwise 
choose.  If the federal government, for example, chooses quiet dip-
lomacy to address a situation, then a state enactment sanctioning the 
foreign government, if not challenged under a dormant doctrine, 
leads the federal government into a Hobbesian choice: say nothing 
about the state law and thus risk undermining its preferred strategy 
of quiet diplomacy, or preempt the state law and thus risk sending a 
message that the foreign government’s behavior is not so objectiona-
ble.  Therefore, the “one voice” paraphrase is inappropriate.  So what 
really lies beneath this second prong, and what are its implications 
for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine?  An examination of the line 
of Supreme Court dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases is neces-
sary to answer these questions. 
A. Examining the Line of Supreme Court Dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause Cases 
The 1979 case, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,346 was the 
first Supreme Court case that enunciated the additional prongs of the 
analysis when a state measure implicates foreign commerce.  Japan 
Line involved a challenge to a California tax on cargo containers that 
would have disturbed an almost-uniform international custom.
347
  The 
custom almost assuredly did not rise to the level of a customary inter-
national law rule, perhaps due to a lack of opinio juris.
348
  The Court 
believed retaliation would be the inevitable result of allowing the Cal-
ifornia tax.
349
  Moreover, the nation as a whole would feel such retalia-
tion.
350
  Additionally, “if other States follow[ed] California’s exam-
 
 344 See Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d. 903, 912–13 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(keeping the two doctrines separate in its opinion but using a similar analysis for 
each); Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 752 
(Md. 1989) (“[T]he concerns which underlie the Foreign Commerce Clause are 
closely related to concerns underlying the limits on a state’s authority to affect for-
eign policy.”). 
 345 See discussion infra Part VIII.A. 
 346 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
 347 See id. at 452–53. 
 348 See id. at 438. 
 349 Id. at 453. 
 350 Id. 
SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2011  3:50 PM 
2011] REASSESSING CONSTRAINTS 271 
ple, . . . foreign-owned containers w[ould] be subjected to various 
degrees of multiple taxation, depending on which American ports 
they enter.”
351
  The Court believed this “would make ‘speaking with 
one voice’ impossible.”
352
 
In the 1983 case, Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax 
Board, a domestic corporation with foreign subsidiaries challenged 
California’s system of unitary taxation.
353
  California’s unitary taxation 
scheme had led to actual multiple-taxation as in Japan Line.
354
  None-
theless, the Court, in a 6-3 ruling, found that the taxation scheme did 
not violate the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.
355
  Based on prior 
rulings, the Court explicitly found that the tax satisfied the tests ap-
plied to interstate commerce.
356
  After this initial finding, the Court 
proceeded to examine the two additional prongs of analysis laid out 
in Japan Line.
357
  With respect to the second prong of Japan Line, the 
Court iterated the two formulations of the tests: (1) whether the state 
action “may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal un-
iformity is essential;” and (2) whether it “prevents the Federal Gov-
ernment from ‘speaking with one voice’ in international trade.”
358
  
The Court held that “a state tax at variance with federal policy will vi-
olate the ‘one voice’ standard if it either implicates foreign policy is-
sues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear 
federal directive.”
359
  It noted that the latter half of this test is essen-
tially a preemption analysis.
360
  The Court then found that “[t]he most 
obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax is the threat it might 
pose of offending . . . foreign trading partners and lead[ing] them to 
retaliate against the Nation as a whole.”
361
  The Court acknowledged 
that it had little competence in determining when a foreign nation 
 
 351 Id. 
 352 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 
276, 285 (1976)). 
 353 463 U.S. 159, 163 (1983). 
 354 Id. at 187 (“[T]he tax imposed here, like the tax imposed in Japan Line, has re-
sulted in actual double taxation.”). 
 355 Id. at 197. 
 356 Id. at 169−84. 
 357 Id. at 185 (“Given that [unitary business here] is international, however, we 
must subject this case to the additional scrutiny required by the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.”); see also id. at 185−97 (outlining the Court’s examination of the additional 
prongs). 
 358 Id. at 193 (citations omitted). 
 359 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194. 
 360 Id. (“The second of these considerations is, of course, essentially a species of 
pre-emption analysis.”). 
 361 Id.  
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would be offended by particular acts and “even less competence in 
deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the so-
vereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as 
they please.”
362
  Nevertheless, the Court attempted to “develop objec-
tive standards that reflect very general observations about the impera-
tives of international trade and international relations.”
363
  Ultimately, 
the Court did not develop general objective considerations for de-
termining the risks of retaliation and instead identified “three distinct 
factors . . . [which] weigh[ed] strongly against the conclusion that the 
tax imposed by California might justifiably lead to significant foreign 
retaliation.”
364
  First, the Court noted that the tax at issue did not 
create an automatic asymmetry.
365
  Second, the tax was imposed not 
on a foreign entity but rather a domestic entity.
366
  Third, foreign na-
tions would have less of an interest in the tax burden of domestic 
corporations than corporations based in their particular nations.
367
  
Further, foreign nations would realize the domestic entity was ame-
nable to be taxed in California and the amount of the tax it paid was 
more a function of the tax rate than its allocation method.
368
  While 
the Court did note that a state tax might have foreign policy implica-
tions other than the threat of retaliation,
369
 it did not discuss any oth-
er potential implications and instead observed that unlike in Japan 
Line, the executive branch had decided not to file an amicus brief in 
opposition to the state tax.
370
  The Court made clear that the lack of a 
submission was not dispositive, but it did “suggest that the foreign 
policy of the United States—whose nuances . . . are much more the 
province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this court—is 
not seriously threatened by California’s unitary taxation scheme.”
371
 
There are several important conclusions to draw from these first 
two Supreme Court cases addressing the second additional prong of 
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.  First, the Court appears to 
establish a threshold-effects test under prong two of Japan Line that is 
 
 362 Id. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Id. at 194. 
 365 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194–95. 
 366 Id. at 195. 
 367 Id.  
 368 Id. 
 369 Id.  
 370 Id. at 195. 
 371 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196. 
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arguably similar to the test established in Zschernig.
372
  Second, despite 
establishing such a standard, the Court admitted that it was ill-suited 
to perform an analysis of the standard, and, in fact, was unable to de-
velop any objective criteria other than the “automatic asymmetry” 
standard that can be applied to the limited field of state taxes.
373
  
Third, while the Court preserves its independence in making judg-
ments on constitutional questions, as a result of its lack of compe-
tence, the Court is predisposed to give weight to the views of the ex-
ecutive branch expressed in amicus briefs.
374
  In short, the Court’s 
ability to analyze prong two of Japan Line suffers from many of the 
same difficulties that led to this article’s conclusion rejecting a thre-
shold-effects test for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  These 
concerns are heightened in subsequent cases. 
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue followed Con-
tainer Corp. in the line of Supreme Court dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause cases.
375
  Wardair involved a challenge by a Canadian 
airline company to a Florida state tax on the sale of aviation fuel with-
in Florida.
376
  The tax at issue applied even if the air carrier used the 
fuel to fly outside the state.
377
  The Canadian charter airline challeng-
ing the tax conceded that the tax met the all the dormant interstate 
Commerce Clause tests.
378
  The airline also conceded that the state 
tax did not violate prong one of Japan Line because there was no risk 
of multiple taxation since the tax was imposed on a discrete transac-
tion occurring within Florida.
379
  Instead, the airline’s claim relied ex-
clusively on prong two of Japan Line and argued that the tax threat-
 
 372 See supra notes 358–59 and accompanying text.  
 373 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.  
The most obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax is the threat 
it might pose of offending our foreign trading partners and leading 
them to retaliate against the nation as a whole.  In considering this is-
sue, however, we are faced with a distinct problem.  This Court has lit-
tle competence in determining precisely when foreign nations will be 
offended by particular acts, and even less competence in deciding how 
to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of 
the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453. 
 374 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196. 
 375 477 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 376 Id. at 3. 
 377 Id. at 4. 
 378 Id. at 8 (“[I]t is not disputed that if this case did not involve foreign commerce, 
the Florida tax on the sale of aviation fuel would not contravene the Commerce 
Clause.”). 
 379 Id. at 9. 
SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2011  3:50 PM 
274 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:201 
ened the ability of the federal government to “speak with one 
voice.”
380
  The airline argued that “a Resolution . . . [of] an interna-
tional organization of which the United States is a member . . . [and] 
more 70 bilateral agreements, including the U.S.-Canadian Agree-
ment,” established a federal policy of reciprocal-tax exemption for 
aviation fuel.
381
  Disagreeing with the airline, the Court first noted 
that the multilateral convention and the bilateral treaties did not 
prohibit the taxation of the sale of fuel by political subdivisions.
382
  
The resolution was more broadly worded than the treaties and it 
sought to prohibit sales taxes by “any taxing authority within a [na-
tion].”
383
  The Court determined, however, that since the United 
States never formally agreed to the resolution, neither approving it as 
a treaty nor implementing the resolution through legislation, it was 
“untenable to assert . . . that th[e] resolution represents a policy of 
the United States, as opposed to a policy of an organization of which 
the United States is one of many members.”
384
  Finding the resolution 
inapplicable, the Court thus found through negative implication in 
the conventions that the “United States has at least acquiesced in 
state taxation of fuel used by foreign carriers in international tra-
vel.”
385
  Indeed, the Court stated that “the facts presented by this case 
show that the Federal Government has affirmatively decided to per-
mit the States to impose these sales taxes on aviation fuel.”
386
  The 
Court continued: 
Accordingly, there is no need for us to consider, and nothing in 
this opinion should be understood to address, whether, in the ab-
sence of these international agreements, the Foreign Commerce 
Clause would invalidate Florida’s tax. 
   . . . [Nothing in Japan Line’s prong two] suggest[s] . . . that the 
Foreign Commerce Clause insists that the Federal Government 
speak with any particular voice.
387
 
Justice Blackmun argued in dissent that the negative implication 
relied upon by the Court was not enough to remove a state tax or 
regulation from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.
388
  Previous cas-
 
 380 Id. 
 381 Wardair, 477 U.S. at 10. 
 382 Id.  
 383 Id. at 11. 
 384 Id.  
 385 Id. at 12. 
 386 Id.  
 387 Wardair, 477 U.S. at 12–13. 
 388 Id. at 18−19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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es required that the intent of the federal government to permit state 
activity “must be unmistakably clear.”
389
  Thus, Wardair signals a dif-
ference between the dormant interstate Commerce Clause and the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause’s additional prongs.  In the for-
mer, the approval of the federal government must be unmistakably 
clear; by contrast, inferred acquiescence in the latter is enough to 
remove a state measure from scrutiny.  But this inferred acquiescence 
is only relevant once it has been determined that the state measure 
satisfies the tests under the dormant interstate Commerce Clause. 
Once these tests are satisfied, acquiescence is enough because the 
need for uniformity becomes the sole, or key, consideration.  The 
Court cannot demand uniformity between a state’s actions and for-
eign nation’s actions where the federal government has considered 
the need for uniformity and failed to require it or adopted instru-
ments in which it could have preempted state action and failed to do 
so.  It is important to emphasize the strength of the negative implica-
tion in Wardair, which involved over seventy conventions—including 
one between Canada and the United States—that did not prohibit 
the state taxation in spite of an awareness that such taxes were being 
imposed. 
Justice Blackmun also stated in his dissent that “Florida’s actions 
may also hamper the United States’ position in negotiations designed 
to achieve the federal policy of reciprocity because the Nation cannot 
speak with ‘one voice.’”
390
  This argument lacks merit, however, be-
cause the federal government can always speak with “one voice” 
through legislation or treaty.  Further, maintenance of the state taxes 
might create desirable “negotiating leverage” for the U.S. federal 
government.  Therefore, one might argue that the Court need not 
even find implied acquiescence through numerous instances of fed-
eral failure to preempt despite addressing a particular matter (e.g., a 
tax on the sale of airline fuel) in treaties in order to uphold a state 
law under the “one voice” prong of analysis with a threshold-effects 
test. 
The next in the line of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases 
is Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance, 
which involved a statute that discriminated on its face against foreign 
commerce.
391
  Facially discriminatory state measures are virtually per 
 
 389 Id. 
 390 Id. at 20. 
 391 505 U.S. 71, 82 (1992). 
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se illegal.
392
  Finding facial discrimination, the Court did not proceed 
to examine the additional prongs from Japan Line.
393
  The Court did 
note, however, that because the statute discriminated against foreign 
commerce it was unnecessary to find that the purpose was to benefit 
local corporations.
394
  In other words, the singling out or discrimina-
tion prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause is not only singling 
out or discriminating against out-of-state interests but also singling 
out or discriminating against non-U.S. interests. 
In the 1993 case, Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, 
the Supreme Court sustained a Tennessee sales tax on the lease of 
containers owned by a domestic corporation used in international 
shipping.
395
  The lower court found, and the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed, that the tax at issue satisfied the four-part test for taxes merely 
affecting interstate commerce.
396
  Interestingly, the Court added that 
meeting the four-part test for interstate commerce “has relevance to 
our conclusion that the state tax meets those inquiries unique to the 
Foreign Commerce Clause” because it confirmed a legitimate state 
interest and the absence of an attempt to interfere with foreign 
commerce.
397
  As to the additional prongs of Foreign Commerce 
Clause analysis, the Court found, for several reasons, that the analysis 
and holding in Container Corp. controlled.
398
  First, there was no risk of 
multiple-taxation because the tax was upon a discrete transaction 
within the state and, in any event, gave a credit against its own tax for 
a tax paid in another jurisdiction.
399
  Additionally, regarding Japan 
Line prong two, the Court found that the Tennessee tax did not 
create foreign policy problems because the federal government had 
acted on numerous occasions on the subject of taxing cargo contain-
ers, and the state tax at issue was not prohibited in any of the pre-
vious international conventions or federal legislation.
400
  Finally, the 
Court noted that the U.S. amicus brief defended the Tennessee tax.
401
 
 
 392 See id. at 81 (“Absent a compelling justification, however, a State may not ad-
vance its legitimate goals by means that facially discriminate against foreign com-
merce.”). 
 393 Id. at 79. 
 394 Id.  
 395 507 U.S. 60, 63 (1993). 
 396 Id. at 73. 
 397 Id. at 73–74.  
 398 Id. at 74. 
 399 Id.  
 400 Id. at 75. 
 401 Itel, 507 U.S. at 75−76. 
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Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment, criticized the two considerations the Court relied upon under 
prong two of Japan Line.
402
  As to the implied acquiescence from the 
conventions, Justice Scalia stated this was indistinguishable from Ja-
pan Line.
403
  Indeed, one might argue the Court moved away from im-
posing uniformity requirements on the states, at least where the polit-
ical branches considered imposing uniformity and declined.  As to 
the government-filed amicus brief, Justice Scalia admitted it distin-
guished the case from Japan Line.
404
  He complained, however, that 
reliance on the amicus brief made the constitutionality of the law 
turn on the position of the executive branch despite the fact that the 
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate foreign com-
merce.
405
  Ultimately, the Court was responsive to Justice Scalia’s criti-
cism in the subsequent case, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax 
Board.
406
 
Barclays is the last significant dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
case that the Supreme Court decided.  In Barclays, the Court once 
again examined the constitutionality of California’s unitary taxing 
scheme, this time as applied to domestic corporations with foreign 
parents and to foreign corporations with either foreign parents or 
subsidiaries.
407
  For a variety of reasons, the Court upheld application 
of the California tax as applied to such entities.
408
  First, although the 
risk of multiple taxation increased, multiple taxation was not an in-
evitable result, and the alternative arms-length method of allocating 
income would not eliminate the risk.
409
  The Court also noted that in-
ternational practice, which was uniform with respect to the arms-
length method of allocation, did not have such force to “dictate” a 
dormant Commerce Clause holding.
410
  As in Container Corp., Wardair, 
and Itel, the Court only turned to prong two of Japan Line after find-
ing the challenged state action was otherwise constitutional.
411
  The 
Court found that with respect to Japan Line’s prong two, “Congress 
may more passively indicate that certain state practices do not ‘impair 
 
 402 Id. at 81 (J. Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 403 Id.  
 404 Id. at 80–81. 
 405 Id.  
 406 512 U.S. 298 (1994). 
 407 Id. at 301. 
 408 Id. at 303. 
 409 Id. at 318−20. 
 410 Id. at 320. 
 411 Id.  
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federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.’”
412
  
Stated differently, Congress need not convey its intent “with the un-
mistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that . . . falls 
short under [interstate Commerce Clause] inspection.”
413
  The Court 
found by negative inference that Congress had indicated its willing-
ness to tolerate state unitary taxation.
414
  The Court reached this con-
clusion after noting Congress’s failure to preempt state unitary taxa-
tion despite considering such a step in several bills, as well as the 
exemption of sub-federal governments from tax treaties requiring the 
arms-length method despite congressional awareness that foreign 
governments were greatly displeased with state unitary taxation sys-
tems.
415
  The Court refused to consider arguments of likely retalia-
tion, finding these were directed to the wrong forum.
416
  Indeed, ac-
tual retaliation had already occurred prior to the case reaching the 
Court.
417
  The Court, following Justice Scalia’s suggestions in Itel, also 
rejected executive branch statements that the taxation interfered with 
foreign affairs because Congress was the preeminent speaker in regu-
lating foreign commerce.
418
 
B. The Status of Japan Line Prong Two and Its Implications for the 
Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine 
What does the rest of this line of dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause cases tell us about Japan Line’s prong two, and what are the 
implications for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine?  To begin, the 
Court will only consider prong two of Japan Line after concluding the 
state law passes the test for interstate commerce.
419
  Additionally, a 
state law that facially discriminates against foreign commerce will be 
virtually per se illegal without ever reaching prong two of Japan Line 
as was seen in Kraft.
420
  As to prong one, multiple taxation is not 
 
 412 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los An-
geles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)). 
 413 Id. 
 414 Id. at 324−28. 
 415 Id. 
 416 Id. at 328. 
 417 Id. at 337 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing a brief for Government of United Kingdom as establishing that “[a]t 
least one country has already enacted retaliatory legislation”). 
 418 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329−30. 
 419 See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 83 
(1992). 
 420 Id. at 79. 
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enough to violate this prong.
421
  The multiple-taxation must be an 
“inevitable result.”
422
  In other words, multiple-taxation must result 
from the application of the state tax in all instances.
423
  Additionally, 
even if multiple-taxation is an inevitable result, it must be the case 
that the alternatives would not eliminate the risk.
424
  Thus, it will be 
very rare that a state tax is invalidated under prong one.  As to prong 
two of Japan Line, it is less clear what remains.  If a court is truly look-
ing for purposes under the dormant Commerce Clause, it is looking 
for a protectionist or a singling out purpose and it will have made a 
finding on this prior to reaching prong two of Japan Line.  So what is 
the Court actually looking for under prong two?  The Court appears 
to be examining whether the state action has an effect on U.S. for-
eign relations or foreign policy.
425
  The central effect the Court at-
tempts to assess is the risk of retaliation by foreign trading partners.
426
  
The Court, however, admits it is not competent to ascertain this 
risk.
427
  It is also clear that the Court is not balancing this risk against a 
state’s interest in a legitimate local purpose.
428
  A certain threshold 
level of risk or, more generally, effect on U.S. foreign relations is what 
the Court tried to ascertain in its early cases.
429
 
 
 421 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 438 (1979). 
 422 Id. at 447.  
 423 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329-30. 
 424 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447–48.  
 425 See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 455 (1979) (stat-
ing that “California may not tell this Nation or Japan how to run their foreign poli-
cies”); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (con-
cluding that “a state tax at variance with federal policy will violate the ‘one voice’ 
standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal 
Government or violates a clear federal directive”). 
 426 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450–51.  
 427 See, e.g., Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.  
This Court has little competence in determining precisely when a for-
eign nations will be offended by particular acts, and even less compe-
tence in deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against 
the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax 
as they please. 
Id.; see also Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 505 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1993). 
But given the strong indications from Congress that Tennessee’s me-
thod of taxation is allowable, and with due regard for the fact that the 
nuances of foreign policy ‘are much more the province of the Execu-
tive Branch and Congress than of the Court,’ we find no reason to dis-
agree with the United States’ submission. 
Id. (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196).  
 428 See id.  
 429 See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986); Con-
tainer Corp., 463 U.S. at 194; Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446. 
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In these early cases, such as Japan Line and Container Corporation, 
the Court purportedly sought to establish objective criteria and rely 
upon views of the executive branch to support its conclusions, al-
though declaring that such views were not dispositive.
430
  Unfortunate-
ly, the court failed at its attempt to establish objective criteria.  The 
only objective criteria the Court developed was whether the state tax 
created an automatic asymmetry or inevitable multiple taxation.
431
  
This criteria, however, is identical to prong one of Japan Line.
432
  The 
Court in its latest case, Barclays, also decided that executive branch 
views were irrelevant, at least when the congressional posture, based 
on a strong negative inference, was to the contrary.
433
  Thus, in ex-
amining a state measure under the dormant Commerce Clause, the 
Court will likely find that the measure has an insignificant effect on 
U.S. foreign relations or foreign policy if it finds congressional ac-
quiescence as a result of a failure to preempt after congressional con-
sideration of the state measures.  The cases described above, includ-
ing Wardair, Itel, and Barclays, all suggest that it is only where 
Congress, while aware of the state measures, has repeatedly focused 
its attention on a policy matter and yet, declined to preempt the state 
measures, that an inference of approval will be made.
434
  In the ab-
sence of implied approval, what will a court do now that it apparently 
has eschewed reliance on executive branch views under prong two of 
Japan Line?  For instance, how would the Court handle a case like Bar-
clays minus the implied acquiescence from the legislation and treaties 
that failed to preempt the state laws?  The Court could look for evi-
dence of a uniform international practice or custom.  But this would 
seem to elevate such practice or custom to the state of customary in-
ternational law without proof of opinio juris or a sense of legal obliga-
tion.  Moreover, the Court seemed to indicate in Barclays that an in-
ternational practice that is not incorporated into federal legislation 
or treaty applying to the states would not dictate a dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause decision, although such uniformity may remain 
peripherally important to prong one.
435
  The Court could also look 
for evidence of foreign dissatisfaction through diplomatic protests, 
amicus briefs, or actual retaliation.  It would seem, however, rather 
strange that the Court would reject executive branch views deferring 
 
 430 See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194; see also supra Part VI.A.  
 431 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194–95; Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453. 
 432 Compare Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194–95, with Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.  
 433 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329. 
 434 See, e.g., Itel Containers, 507 U.S. at 70–71. 
 435 See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 328–29. 
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to Congress’s special role in foreign commerce only to place particu-
lar weight in the views and protests of foreign nations.  Indeed, the 
Court ignored an instance of actual retaliation by the United King-
dom in Barclays.
436
  Reliance on retaliation measures to determine the 
validity of state measures challenged under the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine would have the perverse effect of encouraging foreign 
retaliation because foreign nations would know that retaliation could 
achieve results in U.S. courts.  Additionally, the success of a challenge 
would hinge on the timing of a suit.  A challenge might fail prior to 
foreign retaliation and succeed if filed after some form of foreign re-
taliation occurred. 
Ultimately, it appears that the Court is gradually moving towards 
giving up the entire exercise of engaging in analysis under prong two 
of Japan Line.  Lower courts applying Japan Line also seem to simply 
be avoiding an examination of the risk of retaliation.
437
  State statutes 
seeking to either protect in-state producers from out-of-state produc-
ers or to protect in-state and out-of-state producers from foreign pro-
ducers are caught prior to prong two of Japan Line.
438
  Instead of ask-
ing whether a state measure prevents the federal government from 
speaking with one voice, which can never be the case, or attempting 
to assess the effects on U.S. foreign policy, which it can never do 
competently and independently, the Court could continue to give 
heightened scrutiny to measures affecting foreign commerce by simp-
ly being extra careful in searching for a protectionist, or isolationist, 
purpose vis-à-vis foreign states in cases involving foreign commerce.  
If courts are not engaging in purpose review but are in fact balancing, 
then courts could give extra weight to the effects on foreign com-
merce in balancing those effects against the state’s legitimate local 
purpose. 
What does this understanding of Japan Line prong two tell us 
about the dormant foreign affairs doctrine?  All of the above leads, 
once again, to the conclusion that the threshold-effects test is a tough 
task that courts are not particularly competent at undertaking.  The 
trouble the Supreme Court has encountered in Japan Line prong two 
analysis indicates that purpose review is in fact the most appropriate 
standard under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  One could ar-
gue, however, that courts could give greater weight to amicus briefs in 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine cases because Congress’s special role 
 
 436 See id. at 312. 
 437 See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 402 S.E.2d 666, 667 (S.C. 1991); NCR 
Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 438 N.W.2d 86, 95 (Minn. 1989). 
 438 See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452 (1979). 
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in regulating foreign commerce is not at issue.  In the field of foreign 
affairs generally, the President and Congress share powers, whereas 
in the foreign commerce area Congress has control.
439
  But if courts 
are searching for purpose rather than effects, the executive branch 
has no greater, or perhaps lesser, competence in assessing the pur-
pose behind a particular state action, and thus, the courts should not 
give any particular weight to executive branch amicus briefs.  The 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine should only capture those state 
measures enacted with a foreign policy purpose.  If a state measure 
has an effect on foreign relations despite not having a foreign policy 
purpose, the federal political branches may always preempt the state 
measure. 
Could prong two of Japan Line still be saved if the Court turned 
to purpose review under that prong?  If the Court did so, it would be 
looking for one of two purposes: either a protectionist purpose or the 
purpose of changing or criticizing the trade, tax, or other policy of a 
foreign government.  The Court, however, will already have searched 
for a protectionist or singling out purpose prior to reaching Japan 
Line’s prong two, at least if those scholars promoting purpose review 
under the dormant Commerce Clause are correct.
440
  If the Court in-
stead searches for whether the purpose of the state law is to change 
the trade, tax, or other policy of a foreign government, then Japan 
Line prong two becomes repetitive of, or a subset of,  the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine.  Thus, if the Court readdressed the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine and clarified that purpose review is the ap-
propriate standard under that doctrine, the Court could additionally 
dispense with Japan Line prong two—which it appears only to give lip-
service to as time has passed
441
—and relieve itself of the complications 
it has faced in applying it.  Accordingly, the market-participant excep-
tion would apply to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, thus re-
duced to facial discrimination and balancing tests, and not apply to 
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, which would subsume the old 
prong two of Japan Line. 
 
 439 Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 440 See Japan Line, 441 U.S at 452; see also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and 
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 
(1986) (arguing that the Court should be concerned with “preventing purposeful 
protectionism”).  
 441 See supra Part VI.A. 
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VII. CAN FEDERAL ACTORS (AND IF SO WHICH ONES) AUTHORIZE STATE 
ACTIONS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE RUN AFOUL OF THE DORMANT 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE? 
The last distinction to draw between the dormant Commerce 
Clause generally, and Japan Line prong two specifically, on the one 
hand and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine on the other is wheth-
er federal actors can authorize state actions that otherwise run afoul 
of these doctrines.  It is well-established that Congress can authorize 
actions that would otherwise run afoul of the dormant Commerce 
Clause, but the Supreme Court has never addressed whether  federal 
actors, or which federal actors, can authorize state action that violate 
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.  The Court has stated that con-
gressional intent to permit state activity that would otherwise run 
afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause “must be ‘unmistakably 
clear.’”
442
  Yet, it appears with prong two of Japan Line that the unmis-
takably clear intent can come from a particularly strong negative in-
ference rather than affirmative authorization.
443
  As seen in Wardair, 
Itel, and Barclays, with respect to Japan Line’s prong two, the courts 
have been willing to infer authorization for the state taxes at issue 
when the federal government has failed to preempt those state taxes 
on numerous occasions despite an awareness of them.
444
  In essence, 
the Court has refused to declare that uniformity is essential in an area 
when the federal government has considered the state actions on 
numerous occasions—and not been prevented from doing so be-
cause of a busy legislative calendar, more pressing priorities, and the 
like—and declined to preempt.  Again, if the state action runs against 
the central value sought to be protected by the Commerce Clause 
(e.g., protectionism, broadly defined as either protecting purely local 
industry or even the broader U.S. industry), it will not be necessary to 
examine it under these additional prongs.  It is only where state ac-
tions clear this first hurdle that the additional consideration of un-
iformity comes into play. 
 
 442 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 408 (1994) (holding 
that “Congress must be ‘unmistakably clear’ before we will conclude that it intended 
to permit state regulation which would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause”) (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) 
(plurality opinion)).  
 443 See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452 (explaining how the need for federal uniformity 
is no less paramount in ascertaining the negative implications of Congress’s power to 
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” under the Commerce Clause). 
 444 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324–25 (1994); Itel 
Container Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75 (1993); Wairdair Can., Inc. v. 
Fla. Dep’t of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).  
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It is important to keep in mind that the bar for permission by 
negative inference is incredibly high, given that Wardair involved in-
ferences from seventy agreements failing to preempt, and that Bar-
clays involved numerous, specific attempts over a period longer than a 
decade in which Congress turned its attention to preemption but ul-
timately declined to do so.
445
  Should Congress’s failure to preempt, 
even when it actively considered doing so, be given the same cre-
dence under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine as Japan Line’s 
prong two?  Or should we demand unmistakably clear and explicit 
authorization as with the dormant Commerce Clause generally?  Ei-
ther way, it is apparent, given Wardair and Barclays, that a simple fail-
ure in one federal sanctions enactment to preempt prior state sanc-
tions legislation against the same country should not be sufficient.  
Moreover, several arguments caution against such an approach and 
indicate that the Court should require the federal government to be 
either explicit in its authorization or at a minimum require an ex-
tremely high bar for negative implication authorization.
446
  If the 
Court truly moves to a pure purpose-based test for the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine, then one might argue that explicit authoriza-
tion should be required, thus eliminating any possibility for a high-
bar negative inference authorization.  The reason for this is that if ef-
fects are the standard, the federal political branches are in the best 
position to assess the effects of a state action on foreign relations, and 
if the political branches have turned their attention to possible 
preemption of a state law multiple times and rejected doing so, then 
the Court might understandably wish to infer authorization in such 
instances.  If purpose review is the standard, however, a court is in a 
better position than the political branches to assess the purpose.  In 
this instance, the federal political branches’ failure to preempt means 
little in terms of inferring authorization, since they may very well be 
rejecting preemption because they believe the state action to already 
be barred due to its illicit purpose.  Hence, the Court could, and in-
deed should, require the same unmistakably clear level of authoriza-
tion to permit a state to take action otherwise running afoul of the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine as that which it requires under the 
dormant interstate Commerce Clause. 
The next question is what federal body should give the states 
permission to take actions otherwise running afoul of the dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine—Congress, the President or both?  The an-
swer to this question depends on whether the state action is intruding 
 
 445 See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 324–27; Wairdair, 477 U.S. at 10–12. 
 446 See supra Part IV.D. 
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on a largely presidential area of foreign relations (e.g., power to rec-
ognize foreign governments and new nations), a largely congression-
al area of foreign relations (e.g., foreign commerce), or a shared 
area.  The Supreme Court has established a framework for analyzing 
if a presidential action in foreign affairs is constitutional.
447
  The 
framework was first enunciated by Justice Jackson in a concurring 
opinion in the Steel Seizure case and was subsequently adopted by the 
entire Court in the Iranian Hostages case.
448
  Specifically, where the 
President acts with the express or implied approval of Congress, his 
power is at a maximum, and his action will only be invalidated where 
the federal government as a whole lacks the requisite power (e.g., a 
Bill of Rights violation).
449
  Where the President acts with the express 
or implied disapproval of Congress, his power is at its “lowest ebb,” 
and his action can only be upheld by disabling the Congress.
450
  
Where the President acts in the face of congressional silence or ac-
quiescence, he can only rely on his own constitutional powers, but 
congressional inertia can, as a practical matter, invite presidential ac-
tion in the area.
451
 
The analytical framework in the Jackson concurrence can be 
useful for analyzing authorizations or permissions of state actions that 
would otherwise violate the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
452
  
Where the President and Congress both authorized the state activity, 
the authorization would be considered valid except where it violated 
an explicit constitutional prohibition (e.g. an Article I, Section 10 
prohibition that does not allow for the possibility of congressional 
approval or a Bill of Rights provision) or if the power was an exclusive 
but non-delegable power of one of the federal political branches, a 
topic discussed shortly below.
453
  The Barclays case makes clear that 
congressional authorization is the key in matters core to the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.
454
  Thus, if Congress attempted to approve state 
actions that would run afoul of the dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause, and the President vetoed the legislation, but Congress over-
 
 447 See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 
(1952). 
 448 Id. at 637–39 (Jackson, J., concurring); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 
668–69 (1981). 
 449 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 450 Id. 
 451 Id. 
 452 Cf. Sapna Desai, Note, Genocide Funding: The Constitutionality of State Divestment 
Statutes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 669, 701–02 (2009). 
 453 See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 454 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. at 336. 
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rode the veto to pass the law, it would seemingly be unproblematic 
that the President did not agree in the authorization.  Additionally, if 
Congress overcomes a Presidential veto to passes an authorization of 
any of the actions specifically listed in Article I, Section 10, Clauses 2 
and 3, the authorization would certainly be sufficient to authorize the 
state action.  In matters touching upon core Presidential powers, 
however, such as the recognition of a foreign state or foreign gov-
ernment, or diplomatic approaches or outreach to particular coun-
tries in times of crisis, presidential permission would be necessary.  
Moreover, in the vast shared area, approval by both Congress and the 
President would be necessary.  Thus, in a shared area, even if Con-
gress was able to override a presidential veto, this might well be insuf-
ficient because the President would not have joined in the authoriza-
tion.  Indeed, for simplicity’s sake, one might wish to eschew utilizing 
the Jackson concurrence analysis and create a fixed rule that under 
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine authorizations must come from 
both the President and the Congress.  Perhaps as a middle road, a 
presumption could be created in this regard. 
State procurement sanctions and divestment requirements seem 
to fall most closely in the foreign commerce realm, but because they 
target specific nations and seek changes in the non-commerce related 
behavior or policies of a foreign nation, they also implicate the Presi-
dent’s communication and diplomatic powers with foreign govern-
ments.  Thus, state sanctions legislation that would otherwise run 
afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine must receive permission 
from both the Congress and the President under this framework.  
This could happen through congressional legislation authorizing 
state procurement sanctions or divestment requirements signed by 
the President and perhaps further buttressed by a presidential sign-
ing statement supporting state measures of this kind.  In practice, 
Congress has only attempted once to explicitly authorize or permit 
state divestment requirements targeting a particular foreign country.  
A federal district court struck down an Illinois banking and divest-
ment sanctions law targeting the Sudan in 2007.
455
  Congress re-
sponded within months by authorizing the state divestment sanctions 
in a federal act that ratcheted up sanctions against Sudan.
456
  The 
President signed the bill into law, but in a signing statement, he ques-
 
 455 NFTC v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 456 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 
Stat. 2516. 
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tioned the constitutionality of the congressional authorization.
457
  
Should the authorization be considered as coming from both 
branches since the President signed the legislation?  Or should the 
President’s signing statement objecting to the authorization be given 
weight?  Recently, many have debated whether and what level of 
weight can be given to presidential signing statements in determining 
the scope of legislation.
458
  But Presidents have long declared a power 
to refuse to enforce unconstitutional elements of legislation.
459
  If we 
believe presidential as well as congressional authorization is needed 
for the state action, then the signing statement should be accorded 
weight under this rationale but not under the rationale that the Pres-
ident can limit the scope of the legislation or the interpretation of 
the legislation.
460
 
As a prudential matter, it is also advisable to allow the federal 
government to authorize state actions, such as sanctions legislation, 
that would otherwise violate the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and 
the dormant Commerce Clause because the federal government’s 
sanctions regime will potentially have a greater impact if it involves 
state procurement markets and divestment requirements which will 
give the federal government more bargaining leverage.  Often sanc-
tions are ineffective unless enforced on a multilateral basis.
461
  Multi-
leveled sanctions within the United States can make up for some of 
the unwillingness of foreign nations to join sanctions regimes, partic-
ularly when one realizes the market size and power of many U.S. 
states in comparison to many foreign nations. 
 
 457 Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, 
43 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1645 (Dec. 31, 2007). 
 458 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, Symposium, The Last Word? The Con-
stitutional Implications of Presidential Signing Statements: The Presidential Signing State-
ments Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11 (2007) (arguing that the concerns 
over the use of presidential signing statements is exaggerated). 
 459 See, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger on Presidential Authority to De-
cline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes to the Honorable Abner Mikva, Counsel 
to the President (November 2, 1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/ 
nonexcut.htm. 
 460 See Marc N. Gurber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpre-
tation of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
363, 378–81 (1987); A.B.A., TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND 
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE RECOMMENDATION (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_recom
mendation-report_7-24-06.pdf. 
 461 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 905, 917–18 (2009); Sean D. Murphy, International Law, the United States, and 
the Non-Military ‘War’ Against Terrorism, 14 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 347, 349 (2003). 
SCHAEFER_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.24.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2011  3:50 PM 
288 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:201 
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that certain foreign 
affairs powers are not only exclusive but sometimes delegable in the 
sense that the federal government can authorize the states to engage 
in them.  Other foreign affairs powers should be considered exclusive 
but non-delegable, such as the Commander-in-Chief power, although 
it is highly unlikely that federal actors would seek to delegate these 
powers in any event. 
VIII. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS THIS CENTURY:  
CROSBY, GARAMENDI, THEIR PROGENY, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
RELYING ON PREEMPTION 
The above analysis indicates that limits on state-level foreign pol-
icy are justified as a policy matter,
462
 that the existence of a dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine is fully justified under a multi-modal interpre-
tation of the U.S. Constitution,
463
 that a purpose-based test under the 
doctrine would better suit the capacity of courts and state-level offi-
cials,
464
 that no market participant exception should be available un-
der the dormant foreign affairs doctrine,
465
 that the dormant Foreign 
Commerce Clause’s additional “one voice” prong should be sub-
sumed within the dormant foreign affairs doctrine,
466
 and that the 
federal government can in many instances authorize state actions 
otherwise violating the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
467
  If state-
level foreign policy is not wise as a matter of policy, however, the 
question remains as to whether a dormant foreign affairs doctrine is 
necessary as a practical matter because the federal government always 
has a readily available constraint through the enactment of preemp-
tive federal legislation or executive branch regulation (perhaps in 
part relying on congressional delegation) if a state-level foreign policy 
is judged to be unwise from the national perspective.
468
  The Supreme 
Court has seemingly shown a preference in its two state foreign affairs 
related cases this past decade, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
469
 
and American Insurance Assoc. v. Garamendi,
470
 to rely on preemption 
 
 462 See supra Part II.A. 
 463 See supra Part III.A–C. 
 464 See supra Part IV.D–E. 
 465 See supra Part V. 
 466 See supra Part VI.A. 
 467 See supra Part VII. 
 468 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1682–88. 
 469 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 470 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
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rather than the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
471
  But it should be 
noted that the Court approvingly cited to Zschernig in its Garamendi 
opinion.
472
  The Court’s choice of preemption has had negative im-
plications for restricting state-level foreign policies.  Moreover, the 
Court’s choice to rely on preemption grounds to the exclusion of 
dormant foreign affairs grounds is not required by the court-created 
rules of judicial restraint, the rules imploring the Court to determine 
cases on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds, 
since the preemption doctrine resolves a constitutional question.  
Further exacerbating the situation, the Court’s analysis in Crosby and 
Garamendi has unnecessarily confused preemption analysis with dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine analysis.  Lower courts applying Crosby 
and Garamendi reflect some of this confusion, but fortunately, in large 
part, these courts do not read the opinions as undermining or elimi-
nating the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
473
  Nevertheless, Supreme 
Court clarification would certainly assist state officials in conscien-
tiously applying the doctrine to proposed actions in advance of litiga-
tion. 
A. Preemption Overview 
The Supreme Court has established the doctrine of preemption 
based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which makes 
federal law the “supreme Law of the Land.”
474
  In preemption analysis, 
the intent or purpose of Congress is the “ultimate touchstone.”
475
  
Preemption analysis can be divided into three sub-types: express, con-
flict, and implied.
476
  The first type, express preemption, occurs if 
Congress expressly declares that it intends to wholly occupy the field 
(i.e., leave no room in the field for the state to operate).
477
  Conflict 
preemption occurs where state law conflicts with federal law, either 
because it is impossible to comply with both (“direct conflict preemp-
tion”) or the state law is an obstacle to achieving the full purposes 
and objectives of the federal policy (“obstacles conflict preemp-
 
 471 See infra notes 583–93 and accompanying text. 
 472 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 398. 
 473 See infra notes 583–93 and accompanying text. 
 474 U.S.  CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.  
 475 Retail Clerk Int’l Ass’n v. Schermehorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). 
 476 I have borrowed the preemption terminology in this paragraph from Eugene 
D. Cross, Preemption of Member States Law in the European Economic Community: A Frame-
work for Analysis, 29 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 447 (1992).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
uses identical or similar terminology.  See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 477–482. 
 477 See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85. 95–100 (1983). 
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tion”).
478
  The last type, implied or field preemption, occurs where 
the federal occupation of the field is so thorough and extensive that 
Congress’s intent to wholly occupy the field can be inferred (“occu-
pation of the field preemption”).
479
  The Court, until recently, gener-
ally applied two additional, and potentially competing, factors in its 
analysis: first, preemption can also be implied where the federal in-
terest in the field is clearly dominant or superior (“dominant interest 
preemption”),
480
 and second, the Court is generally reluctant to infer 
preemption, particularly in fields that the states have traditionally oc-
cupied.
481
  Thus, the Court insists that Congress’s intent to preempt 
must be “clear and manifest.”
482
  Crosby and Garamendi left murky the 
strength of these potentially conflicting presumptions in foreign af-
fairs related cases. 
B. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council involved a challenge to a 
Massachusetts law that imposed a negative ten percent preference 
against companies active in Burma.
483
  In other words, companies that 
found themselves on the restricted list of companies trading with or 
investing in Burma had ten percent added to their bids for state con-
tracts prior to the state determining the lowest bidder.  The Massa-
chusetts law was passed three months before a comprehensive federal 
sanctions law.
484
  The federal law imposed several sanctions against 
Burma.
485
  The federal law eliminated certain bilateral assistance, re-
quired the U.S. Treasury Secretary to instruct the U.S. Executive Di-
rector of each international financial institution to vote against loans 
to Burma, and denied entry visas to the U.S. for Burmese government 
officials except as required by treaty obligations or to staff the Bur-
mese mission, until the President certified to Congress that Burma is 
making measurable and substantial progress in improving human 
 
 478 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141–43 
(1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 479 See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De is Cuesta, 485 U.S. 141, 153 
(1982). 
 480 See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 309 (1983); Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
 481 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 482 Id.; see, e.g., Metro. Life Ins., Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739–40 (1985). 
 483 Crosby v. Nat’l. Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366–88 (2000). 
 484 Id.  
 485 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, § 570 
(1996) (also called the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment (Burma)).  
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rights practice and implementing democratic reforms.
486
  The bill also 
required the President to prohibit U.S. persons from making new in-
vestments in Burma “if the President determines and certifies to 
Congress, that after the date of the enactment of this act, the Gov-
ernment of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for political acts, 
or exiled Daw Aung Suu Kyi [the head of the pro-democracy move-
ment] or has committed large-scale repression of or violence against 
the Democratic opposition.”
487
  President Clinton issued an Executive 
Order on May 20, 1997 making such findings and prohibiting new in-
vestments in Burma.
488
  The statute also granted broad waiver authori-
ty to the President to waive sanctions if he found it in the national in-
terest, and also directed the President to develop a comprehensive 
multilateral strategy with other nations to address the human rights 
problems within Burma.
489
 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, struck the Massa-
chusetts law down under obstacles conflict preemption finding the 
state law an obstacle to achieving the full purposes of the federal act 
in three ways.
490
  First, the state law changed the careful calibration of 
sanctions chosen by the federal government.
491
  Second, it interfered 
with the presidential flexibility desired by Congress in granting broad 
waiver authority to the President.
492
  The President might elect to les-
sen sanctions at the same time states were ramping up sanctions.  
Third, it interfered with the direction to the President to establish a 
comprehensive multilateral strategy because trading partners pre-
ferred to talk about the state law than conditions in Burma.
493
  The 
Court pointed to a WTO dispute settlement case lodged against the 
United States by the European Union and Japan concerning the Mas-
sachusetts law as well as diplomatic protests lodged by these govern-
ments as proof that developing such a strategy was made more diffi-
cult by the state law.
494
  Importantly, the Court expressly declined to 
rule on the additional grounds of the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, which the First 
 
 486 Id. 
 487 Id.  
 488 Exec. Order No. 13047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,299 (May 21, 1997) (Executive Order 
Prohibiting New Investment in Burma). 
 489 Pub. L No. 104-208, § 570(c). 
 490 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000). 
 491 Id. at 380. 
 492 Id. at 376. 
 493 Id. at 390. 
 494 Id. at 382. 
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Circuit had relied upon.
495
  The Court also stated that they found it 
unnecessary to rule on the field preemption claim.
496
  In refusing to 
rule on these additional grounds, the Court relied on the principle, 
expressed in Ashwander v. TVA,
497
 that the Court should decide a case 
based on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds 
if it had the option.
498
  As analyzed more fully in Part X of this Article, 
however, the application of this principle to validate applying the 
preemption doctrine rather than the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine can be criticized because the preemption doctrine is also a con-
stitutional doctrine based on the Supremacy Clause.
499
 
The Court’s choice of preemption grounds had two negative 
consequences.  First, the opinion’s failure to rely upon or approvingly 
cite Zschernig lead some to conclude that maybe the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine was on insecure ground.
500
  Second, because the 
Court relied on the narrowest grounds possible, some state officials 
read the opinion as only preventing Burma sanctions or, at most, 
preempting state sanctions where a specific federal law targeted the 
same foreign country as the state law.
501
  Academics have criticized 
reading the opinion in such narrow fashion.
502
  Additionally, the one 
case decided by lower courts in the post-Crosby and pre-Garamendi 
timeframe—not involving matters eventually resolved in Garamendi—
did in fact indicate that Zschernig was alive and well.
503
 
C. American Insurance Association v. Garamendi 
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi involved a challenge 
by the American Life Insurance Association against the California 
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) that required any in-
surer doing business in the state to disclose information about all pol-
 
 495 Id. at 374. 
 496 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373–74.  
 497 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936). 
 498 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374. 
 499 See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1266–68 (arguing that “the general ap-
proaches the Court employs to resolve preemption issues are more properly re-
garded as interpretations of the Supremacy Clause than as statutory interpretation”); 
see also infra Part X. 
 500 See supra Part IV.C.  
 501 See Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 754 (2000). 
 502 See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1323 (“Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to 
say that Crosby is a dormant foreign affairs case in disguise.”); see also Golove, supra 
note 38, at 156. 
 503 See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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icies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945.
504
  The HVIRA allegedly 
conflicted with the German Foundation Agreement entered into be-
tween the United States and German governments under which 
Germany agreed to establish a 10 billion dollar fund administered by 
the Foundation to compensate all those who suffered at the hands of 
German companies during the Nazi era.
505
  The Foundation agreed to 
work with the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance 
Claims (ICHEIC) to determine outstanding insurance claims.
506
  In its 
agreement with Germany, and similar ones entered into with Austria 
and France, the United States promised to urge its courts and state 
and local governments to respect the foundations as the exclusive 
means for resolving WWII-era claims against private companies.
507
  
The Supreme Court had previously ruled in the 1940’s that presiden-
tial executive agreements could preempt state law if valid just as trea-
ties could.  Defenders of the California law argued that the German 
Foundation agreement was distinguishable from prior agreements 
because it attempted to settle claims against private foreign compa-
nies rather than foreign governments
508
  The Court declared the dif-
ference immaterial and held the agreement valid.
509
 
The Court, however, seemed troubled by the fact that the Ger-
man Foundation Agreement contained no express preemption 
clause.
510
  While this conclusion is contentious, given language in the 
agreement that the executive branch considered the agreement to be 
the “exclusive forum” for resolving Holocaust-era claims, both the pe-
titioners and the U.S. amicus brief acknowledged no express preemp-
tion.
511
  Regardless, the Court did not immediately apply other strands 
of preemption analysis (i.e., field and conflict preemption) or cite to 
familiar cases in those areas.  Interestingly, the Court also did not 
consider whether the executive agreement was self-executing, al-
though it is clear from the Court’s jurisprudence that only self-
executing provisions of treaties preempt state law because non-self-
executing provisions are not a part of the domestic legal system.
512
  
Instead, the Court said that the petitioners left “their claim of 
 
 504 Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003). 
 505 Id. at 405. 
 506 Id. 
 507 Id. 
 508 Id. at 415–16. 
 509 Id. at 416–17. 
 510 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416–17. 
 511 See id. at 417, 422.  
 512 Id. at 413 n.7. 
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preemption to rest on asserted interference with the foreign policy those 
agreements embody.  Reliance is placed on our decision in Zschernig.”
513
  
While the Court acknowledged that both the majority opinion and 
Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Zschernig spoke in terms of 
federal exclusivity in foreign relations, and thus relied on the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine, the Court also gave considerable atten-
tion to Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Zschernig, which ex-
pressed concern with finding state regulation preempted in 
traditional areas that had some modest impact on foreign relations.
514
  
Of course, Zschernig’s dominant threshold-effects test cured Justice 
Harlan’s most significant concern, that field preemption or the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine threatened state actions in traditional 
areas that somehow had an incidental impact on foreign relations.
515
  
The Court then stated, “it is a fair question whether respect for the 
executive foreign relations power require a categorical choice be-
tween contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption evident in 
the Zschernig opinions.”
516
  At this point, however, the Court seems to 
have reduced Zschernig to a field preemption case, which is not the 
truest, or, at a minimum, not the fairest way to read Justice Douglas’ 
opinion.
517
  Returning to Justice Harlan’s concurrence, the Court 
stated that “it would be reasonable to consider the strength of the 
state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, when decid-
ing how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state 
law preempted.”
518
  In short, the Court seems to have applied a pre-
sumption against preemption in areas of traditional legislation, thus 
requiring a stronger showing of conflict in such cases.
519
  Moreover, 
the Court mischaracterizes Zschernig as a field preemption case, and 
turns its threshold-effects test into a balancing test that balances the 
strength of the state interest with the degree of conflict with federal 
policy.
520
  On the other hand, the Court cited approvingly to Zschernig 
 
 513 Id. at 417 (emphasis added).  Additionally, as Professors Denning and Ramsey 
point out, the Executive Agreement did not cover certain countries whose insurers 
might be harmed by the Act anyway.  See Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, 
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Af-
fairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 908 (2004). 
 514 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 418–19. 
 515 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 457–58 (1968). 
 516 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419. 
 517 Id. at 420. 
 518 Id. 
 519 Id. 
 520 See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 513, at 925–26 (“We begin by describing, as 
best we can, the new test articulated by the majority. It apparently balances the 
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and, in footnote eleven of its opinion, the Court acknowledged—in 
contrast to the analysis in its opinion—the presence of a dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine, even though the Court mislabeled it field 
preemption: 
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign pol-
icy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state re-
sponsibility, field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine, 
whether the National Government had acted and, if it had, with-
out reference to the degree of any conflict, the principle having 
been established that the Constitution entrusts foreign policy ex-
clusively to the National Government.
521
 
Ultimately, after mixing the two doctrines, the majority chose to 
rely on conflict preemption, specifically obstacles conflict preemp-
tion, citing approvingly to Crosby.
522
  The Court even relied on several 
factors from Crosby to find obstacles conflict.
523
  Specifically, the Court 
found that the California law was changing the calibration of sanc-
tions decided upon by the federal government, namely the U.S. Pres-
ident.
524
  The Court was untroubled that, unlike in Crosby, the Presi-
dent acted without Congressional authority because the President 
“possesses considerable independent constitutional authority to act 
on behalf of the United States on international issues . . . and conflict 
with the exercise of that authority is a comparably good reason to 
find preemption of the state law.”
525
 
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent stated the following about Zschernig: 
We have not relied on Zschernig since it was decided and I would 
not resurrect that decision here.  The notion of “dormant foreign 
affairs preemption” with which Zschernig is associated resonates 
most audibly when a state action “reflects a state policy critical of 
foreign governments and involves ‘sitting in judgment’ on 
them.” . . . The HVIRA entails no such state action or policy.  It 
takes no position on any contemporary foreign government and 
requires no assessment of any existing foreign regime.  It is di-
rected solely at private insurers doing business in California and it 
requires them solely to disclose information in their or their affil-
 
strength of the state’s interest against the degree of conflict with federal policy. Nei-
ther prong of the new test is adequately explained or easy to apply. . . .”). 
 521 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420, n.11. 
 522 Id. at 414. 
 523 Id. at 424. 
 524 Id. at 423. 
 525 Id. at 424 n.14. 
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iates possession or control.  I would not extend Zschernig into this 
dissimilar domain.
526
 
Thus, even the four justices subscribing to the dissent recognized the 
continuing viability of Zschernig, though they did not believe it would 
invalidate the HVIRA.
527
  The conclusion that the HVIRA does not 
run afoul of Zschernig, when properly understood as a dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine case, is questionable.  Although directly target-
ing private insurance companies, the disclosure law could be read as 
seeking to criticize or change the behavior of the German govern-
ment and other European governments regarding their failure to 
adequately compensate insurance beneficiaries or the failure of those 
governments to require compensation be given by the private insur-
ers or both.  Although the dissent refers to “dormant foreign affairs 
preemption,” and, thus, unnecessarily mixes the labels of the two 
doctrines, the dissent appears to more accurately characterize Zscher-
nig as a dormant foreign affairs doctrine case rather than a field 
preemption case.
528
  The dissent’s treatment of Zschernig also seems to 
support a purpose-based standard under the doctrine, because it fo-
cuses on criticism of foreign governments and sitting in judgment of 
them, rather than the threshold-effects test.
529
 
As to the obstacles conflict claim, which the majority ultimately 
appears to rely upon, the dissent states that executive agreements 
must expressly preempt state law.
530
  It is not clear why other strands 
of preemption would not be applicable to executive agreements if 
they are valid.  The dissent notes that some executive agreements in-
volved in prior decisions of the Court expressly preempted state law, 
but the dissent does not show that all prior executive agreements did 
so.
531
  The dissent also states that if HVIRA-type laws were a threat to 
the operation of the mechanism created in the Executive Agree-
ments, then “one might expect to find some reference to laws like the 
HVIRA in the later-in-time executive agreements.”
532
  The same ar-
gument could be made, however, about any legislation enacted sub-
sequent to state sanctions legislation.  Of course, the Court has never 
required express preemption in cases in which the federal act occurs 
subsequent to the state act.  Moreover, an international agreement is 
 
 526 Id. at 439–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 527 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 528 Id. at 439–40. 
 529 Id. 
 530 Id. at 443–44. 
 531 Id. at 440. 
 532 Id. at 441. 
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less likely to address domestic matters, such as preemption, than leg-
islation. The court dependably applies all strands of preemption 
analysis to federal legislation, regardless of the timing, and Crosby is 
but one example of this.
533
  It is not clear why valid executive agree-
ments should be subject to a different analysis, assuming they are self-
executing and thus part of the U.S. domestic legal system. 
Thus, Garamendi further muddled the situation.  As the following 
analysis of lower court cases indicates, the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Garamendi are generally read by lower courts as confirm-
ing the continued vitality of Zschernig—perhaps even giving some ad-
ditional support for purpose review under Zschernig.
534
  Yet, in light of 
the majority’s seeming mischaracterization of the Zschernig case as a 
field preemption case, its positive comments towards Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in Zschernig, and its ultimate reliance on obstacles con-
flict preemption,
535
 the Court in Garamendi once again did not pro-
vide the degree of clarity desired by state and local actors and lower 
courts.  A few lower courts have suffered from this confusion.
536
  In-
deed, we might summarize the pros and cons for Zschernig and the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine found in the Garamendi opinion as 
follows: 
 
Favorable Elements for Dormant 
Foreign Affairs Doctrine (DFAD) and 
Zschernig 
Unfavorable Elements for the  
Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine 
(DFAD) and Zschernig 
The majority cites to Zschernig and 
placed emphasis on it early in its opi-
nion.
537
 
The majority seems to characterize 
Zschernig as field preemption case.
538
 
Footnote 11 of the opinion recognizes 
DFAD at least in concept, if not by la-
bel.
539
 
The majority cited approvingly to Jus-
tice Harlan’s concurrence from 
Zschernig.
540
 
 
 533 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–74 (2000).  
 534 Lower courts have generally read the case in this manner.  See Hartford Enters. 
v. Coty, 529 F. Supp. 2d 95, 102–03 (D. Me. 2008) (applying both Garamendi and 
Zschernig to review the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act’s effect on Canadian em-
ployees); Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 741 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007) (applying Garamendi and Zschernig, along with explicit purpose-review, to 
review the Illinois Sudan Act).  
 535 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 
2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 79 (2006) (indicating that by choosing obstacles conflict, the 
Court has “gone out of its way not to endorse Zschernig”). 
 536 See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1188 
(C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 537 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417–18. 
 538 See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 513, at 877. 
 539 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11. 
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Favorable Elements for Dormant For-
eign Affairs Doctrine (DFAD) and 
Zschernig 
Unfavorable Elements for the Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Doctrine 
(DFAD) and Zschernig 
The policy reflected in the executive 
agreement was interfered with, not 
the executive agreement itself, and 
since the Court does not examine if 
the executive agreement is self-
executing, our normal understanding 
of preemption, requiring an affirma-
tive federal act with legal effect in the 
U.S. domestic legal system, is not 
present.
541
 
The majority ultimately seems to say 
executive branch policy, as long as it 
is consistent, can preempt state laws 
even without an affirmative federal 
act.  The majority arguably creates a 
new type of preemption or expands 
what we normally consider necessary 
for preemption to occur (i.e., an af-
firmative federal act with legal ef-
fect).
542
 
Four justices in dissent seem to believe 
that the majority relied on Zschernig 
and that the doctrine exists, but that it 
just should not be applied to these 
facts.
543
 
 
 540 Id. at 418–19. 
 541 See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Ap-
proach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUPREME CT. REV. 153, 208–09  
The Garamendi Court did not reject Zschernig.  On the other hand, it al-
so did not extend Zschernig ‘s endorsement of an independent federal 
court power to supervise foreign relations. . . .  
     Thus, the Garamendi Court neatly sidestepped the main criticism of 
Zschernig, which attacked Zschernig’s empowerment of federal courts to 
preempt independently state laws in the complete absence of any input 
from (or indeed in opposition to) the wishes of the President or Con-
gress.  By relying on executive “statements” of national policy, the Ga-
ramendi Court avoided the problem of unchecked federal courts by 
empowering the executive branch to settle future disputes over state 
interference with foreign affairs by issuing statements of national poli-
cy. 
Id. 
 542 See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 513, at 830, 901–02  
The Garamendi decision gives the President the power to decide which 
state laws affecting foreign affairs survive and which do not.  This ex-
ecutive preemption concentrates foreign affairs power in the President 
in a way not countenanced by the Constitution’s text nor contemplated 
by its Framers, who emphasized the importance of separating executive 
power from legislative power.  Previously, if the executive branch 
wished to pursue a foreign policy with which a state law interfered, the 
President usually had to seek the support of Congress (or the Senate 
via a treaty) to override the competing state law through Article VI of 
the Constitution.  This procedure assured that state laws would not 
stand as obstacles to federal foreign policy, as they had under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. 
Id.; see also Todd Steigman, Lowering the Bar: Invalidation of State Laws Affecting Foreign 
Affairs Under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power After American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 465, 477–79 (2004). 
 543 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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Perhaps this merging or muddling of the two doctrines was in-
evitable.  Scholars have increasingly expressed concerns as to the 
“muddling” occurring in preemption cases generally.
544
  In Crosby, the 
Court explicitly stated that the line between field and conflict 
preemption was not a rigid one.
545
  The Court’s threshold-effects test 
under Zschernig, asking if there is more than some incidental or indi-
rect effect on U.S. foreign policy—perhaps even as only expressed in 
an executive branch amicus brief—starts melding into a preemption 
analysis by asking how substantial a conflict there is between the state 
law and a U.S. policy, one that does not, according to Garamendi, 
necessarily have to come in the form of a federal act with legal bind-
ing effect.  For this reason, we have seen a lower court ruling post-
Crosby and post-Garamendi referring to “incidental effect in conflict” 
in its preemption analysis.
546
  This reference was apparently borrowed 
from both Zschernig and Garamendi.
547
  If the Court had more clearly 
adopted a purpose-based test for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine 
in Zschernig, the muddling between it and preemption analysis would 
likely never have occurred. 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s 2008 opinion in Medellin v. Texas
548
 
may suggest that the Court is backtracking from the proposition that 
preemption can occur through executive branch policy statements 
alone.
549
  In Medellin, the Court found that the International Court of 
Justice’s judgment, requiring review and reconsideration of sentences 
 
 544 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000). 
 545 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, n.6 (2000).  
We recognize, of course, that the categories of preemption are not “ri-
gidly distinct.”  Because a variety of state laws and regulations may con-
flict with a federal statute, whether because a private party cannot 
comply with both sets of provisions or because the objectives of the 
federal statute are frustrated, field pre-emption may be understood as a 
species of conflict pre-emption. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 546 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 
2005). 
 547 Id. at 1185–87. 
 548 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (“The Executive’s narrow and 
strictly limited authority to settle international disputes pursuant to an executive 
agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memoran-
dum.”).  
 549 See, e.g., Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 
333–34 (2009); Jeremy K. Schrag, A Federal Framework for Regulating the Growing Inter-
national Presence of the Several States, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 425, 452–57 (2009).  Professor 
Van Alstine argued that Garamendi should not be read in a manner that allows Ex-
ecutive Branch preemption through mere policy statements prior to the Supreme 
Court issuing the Medellin opinion.  See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggran-
dizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 350 (2006). 
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and convictions by judicial bodies of foreign nationals not notified of 
their rights to meet with a consular official at time of arrest, was not 
self-executing and thus did not bind Texas state courts.
550
  The Court 
in Medellin also found that the President’s memorandum, which at-
tempted to implement the ruling into domestic law, and thus 
preempt state procedural default doctrines, was invalid.
551
 
Medellin is welcome in that it helps recreate a solid distinction 
between the dormant foreign affairs and preemption doctrines.  Un-
der Medellin, the preemption doctrine would be based on legally 
binding federal acts having effect in the U.S. domestic legal system, 
and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, with the proper purpose-
based test, would not require courts to pay heed to policy suggestions 
that do not have legal effect domestically.  As discussed earlier, a 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test not only 
avoids the potential muddling of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine 
with the preemption doctrine, but it also respects the non-self-
executing nature of certain international obligations that a threshold-
effects test potentially would not.
552
 
D. The Supreme Court’s (Apparent) Reliance on Preemption Comes 
with Many Drawbacks 
The Court’s apparent preference to rely on preemption rather 
than the dormant foreign affairs doctrine has many downsides.  First, 
there are significant practical problems with relying exclusively on 
the federal government’s ability to preempt unconstructive state-level 
foreign policy measures.  The federal government may be overbur-
dened in serving this policing function.  The legislative calendar is of-
ten too busy to allow Congress to actively police state-level foreign 
policy.  Therefore, a failure to preempt should not necessarily be 
read as implied approval.  At most, one could claim that the state 
measure is not as important or as damaging to the national interests 
as other legislative issues being addressed.  Scholars have argued that 
the executive branch is quite able to police state-level foreign policy 
activities, and this should distinguish the policing problem that justi-
fies the dormant Commerce Clause.
553
  It is clear that the executive 
branch has greater time and resources to police state measures than 
Congress and that the President maintains greater constitutional 
 
 550 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531. 
 551 See id. at 532; see also Reinstein, supra note 549, at 333–34; Schrag, supra note 
549, at 452–57; Van Alstine, supra note 549, at 350. 
 552 See discussion infra Part IV.D.1. 
 553 Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1684. 
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power over foreign affairs generally than interstate or foreign com-
merce.  But Congress could delegate to the President the power to 
preempt state laws that interfere with interstate and foreign com-
merce to eliminate any policing problem under the dormant Com-
merce Clause.
554
  Yet, the dormant Commerce Clause still persists.  
Moreover, it is not clear that the President’s foreign affairs powers, 
combined with existing statutory delegations of power from Con-
gress, are sufficient authority for the President to preempt by execu-
tive order any and all state-level foreign policy activity.
555
  Thus, fur-
ther congressional legislation or delegations of power may be 
necessary in particular instances.  Lastly, even if the President can po-
lice any and all foreign policy actions of the states, politics, particular-
ly in the current environment, may prevent him from doing so.  The 
Constitution may not have left the “resolution of so fundamental a 
constitutional issue” to “the shifting winds” within the executive 
branch.
556
 
Second, congressional intent, the crux or the “ultimate touch-
stone” of any preemption analysis,
557
 is not always so clear.  For exam-
ple, in the case of Baltimore’s divestment requirements targeting 
businesses active in South Africa in the 1980s, Congress sent conflict-
ing signals on its intention regarding preemption.  On the one hand, 
the House of Representatives passed a resolution at the same time it 
passed the law stating it had no intent to preempt state anti-apartheid 
measures.
558
  Of course, the resolution did not have the force of law.  
On the other hand, the so-called D’Amato Amendment, which was 
incorporated into the statute, stated that the federal government 
would not penalize a state by, for example, withdrawing federal funds 
utilized in certain projects as a result of application of state anti-
apartheid procurement laws for ninety days after the entry into force 
of the federal statute.
559
  The Maryland Court of Appeals, in examin-
ing the Baltimore ordinance, concluded that the provision would be 
superfluous if state and local anti-apartheid procurement laws were 
already preempted by the Act.
560
  The court agreed with a memoran-
 
 554 See discussion of Justice Jackson concurrence in Steel Seizure, supra, notes 448–
51. 
 555 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530.  
 556 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 557 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
 558 Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 743 
(Md. 1989). 
 559 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 5116 (1986). 
 560 Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 742.  
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dum prepared by Professor Tribe that the D’Amato Amendment 
“leaves the negative implication that investment decisions are not 
preempted nor are disbursements not using federal funds.”
561
  Yet the 
amendment could be interpreted as providing an exception to the 
preemption that would otherwise occur.  Other parts of the legislative 
history also lead to potentially conflicting views on the intent of Con-
gress with respect to preemption.  For instance, an amendment that 
would have expressly preempted states was withdrawn.
562
  Its suppor-
ters argued that the federal law would already preempt state law and 
thus there was no need to go forward with the amendments.
563
  Other 
Senators believed that the express preemption amendment was with-
drawn due to its poor prospects for passage.
564
  In sum, it may be less 
intellectually honest to find preemption of state laws in situations in 
which there are such widely conflicting views of congressional intent. 
Third, to the extent Garamendi suggests balancing, the degree of 
the state law’s conflict with the federal act or policy against the state’s 
interest, it encourages the very type of analysis state officials would 
find difficult to engage in independently and dispassionately.  State 
actors are likely to underestimate the degree of conflict with federal 
law and are also likely to overestimate the strength of their interest in 
the matter. 
Fourth, while it is true that a broad notion of field preemption 
may be effective at curbing disruptive state foreign policy actions, 
even such an approach has significant downsides.  Courts could claim 
that the federal government has occupied the entire field of foreign 
policy or of foreign policy sanctions by citing to all the presidential 
and congressional acts in the area, including broad delegations by 
Congress to the President to sanction foreign governments in frame-
work statutes, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act.
565
  But this may have adverse consequences for preemption analy-
sis generally.  Courts are reticent to define fields so broadly in field 
preemption cases.
566
  Purpose review under the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine will be more capable of providing guidance to state and 
local officials and lower courts. 
 
 561 Id. 
 562 Id. at 741. 
 563 Id. at 742 n.44. 
 564 Id. at 741. 
 565 See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1292 (discussing a similar argument based on ob-
stacles conflict); see also Golove, supra note 38, at 153. 
 566 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 544, at 227; Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance 
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 623 (2008). 
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Fifth, if state and local officials continue to read Supreme Court 
opinions narrowly, as only preempting state laws when there is a spe-
cific federal law targeting the same country, and if they continue to 
enact sanctions legislation, the federal government may be tempted 
to expressly preempt.  Yet attempting to preempt state action 
through express clauses has its dangers.
567
  In short, the inclusion of 
an express clause can imply that matters beyond the express state-
ment are not preempted, although implied preemption is still possi-
ble even with an express clause.
568
  Thus, there is a significant risk that 
Congress will mistakenly draft an under-inclusive express preemption 
clause.  Additionally, there is some indication that court interpreta-
tions of express clauses lead to unpredictable results.
569
 
E. Litigation in the Lower Federal and State Courts in the Post-Crosby 
and Post-Garamendi Era 
Since state sanctions legislation is the most prominent and prob-
lematic form of state and local foreign policy, it is appropriate to be-
gin an analysis of the impact of Crosby and Garamendi in lower court 
litigation by focusing on that form of state and local foreign policy.  
The third major wave of state and local sanctions legislation, this time 
targeting Sudan, followed on the heels of Crosby and Garamendi and 
numerous federal acts sanctioning Sudan.
570
  Thus, it appears that 
numerous state and local governments read those opinions quite nar-
rowly, suggesting that the Supreme Court’s choice to rely on preemp-
tion grounds did not curb the state and local appetite for targeting 
countries other than Burma.  Additionally, states shifted to divest-
ment and banking measures since Crosby only dealt with a procure-
ment measure.
571
  Part of this shift and reading of Crosby may have 
been created by the executive branch’s amicus brief in Crosby indicat-
 
 567 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530–31 (1992) (holding that 
claims not explicitly contained in the express-preemption clause in the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoke Act of 1969 were not preempted). 
 568 Id.; see also Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289–90 (1993) (noting 
that express clauses do not entirely foreclose any possibility of implied preemption). 
 569 See, e.g., Greg J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully, Express Preemption and Pre-Market 
Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 254–57 
(2004). 
 570 See Bush Signs into Law Sudan Investment Measure, REUTERS, Dec, 31, 2007,  
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINN3156518420071231 (“Some 20 U.S. states have 
initiated divestment efforts because of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region” by the 
end of 2007).  
 571 See, e.g., 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/0.01 (West 2010); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-
110.5 (West 2010). 
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ing that divestment sanctions might be constitutional.
572
  The amicus 
brief hedged on this, claiming it was unnecessary to decide the issue, 
and it also indicated that divestment measures targeting other states 
would be more problematic than those targeting foreign countries.
573
  
The latter statement, of course, conflicts with long-standing Supreme 
Court precedent that those measures affecting foreign commerce are 
subject to greater scrutiny than those affecting interstate com-
merce.
574
  The occurrence of this third major wave of state and local 
sanctions legislation might serve as some evidence that the Court’s 
choice of preemption as the grounds for its rulings, with confusing 
references to Zschernig, was not the best choice. 
Recently, however, businesses acting through the same trade as-
sociation as in the Crosby litigation, the National Foreign Trade 
Council (NFTC), challenged an Illinois law sanctioning Sudan.
575
  
The case is the most prominent post-Crosby and post-Garamendi case, 
and serves as an example of the impact the Supreme Court’s rulings 
in Crosby and Garamendi have had on lower court analysis. 
1. National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulis 
In 2007, the NFTC was one of several plaintiffs to file suit chal-
lenging the Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan 
(“Illinois Act”).
576
  The 2005 Illinois Act prohibited the state from de-
positing state funds in any financial institution that maintained cus-
tomers defined as forbidden entities.
577
  Forbidden entities included 
“[a]ny company who has failed to certify under oath that it does not 
own or control any property or asset located in, have employees or 
facilities located in, provide goods or services to . . . or invest in i) the 
Republic of Sudan; or ii) any company domiciled in the Republic of 
Sudan.”
578
  The Illinois Act also prohibited state and local government 
pension funds from maintaining investments in businesses with Su-
danese ties or contacts.
579
  The federal government had imposed vari-
ous sanctions against Sudan pursuant to an Executive Order and leg-
 
 572 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 28, 
Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 573 See id. at 29 n.24. 
 574 See Japan Line, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979). 
 575 See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (N.D. 
Ill. 2007). 
 576 See id. 
 577 Id. at 733.  
 578 Id. at 734. 
 579 Id. at 733. 
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islation beginning in 1997 and continuing through the time of the 
litigation.
580
  These federal sanctions prohibited most transactions by 
U.S. companies with Sudan, other than humanitarian and medical 
efforts, and ultimately included travel restrictions on Sudanese offi-
cials involved in the genocide in Darfur.
581
  The federal laws also 
granted the President broad waiver authority similar to the Burmese 
sanction law.
582
 
In Giannoulias, the federal district court struck down the Illinois 
Act’s banking provisions on preemption grounds, relying primarily 
on Crosby.
583
  The court highlighted the fact that the Illinois Act con-
tained no exceptions and targeted foreign subsidiaries of U.S. com-
panies that were not covered under the federal act.
584
  Further, the Il-
linois Act applied to companies operating anywhere in the Sudan 
even though the federal sanctions were loosened to exempt certain 
geographic areas in the Sudan.
585
  Thus, similar to Crosby, the Illinois 
Act changed the calibration of sanctions determined to be appropri-
ate by the federal government.
586
  Illinois attempted to rely upon 
Board of Trustees of the Employees Retirement System v. Mayor of Baltimore, 
which upheld divestment legislation aimed at South Africa in the 
mid-1980s, 
587
 to support the law.
588
  But the court rejected the ap-
proach of Board of Trustees because the case was decided prior to Cros-
by, and it believed that Crosby had either strongly questioned or expli-
citly rejected two key elements of the Board of Trustees opinion.
589
  The 
first element the Supreme Court strongly questioned in Crosby was the 
presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state regula-
tion.
590
  Second, the Court explicitly rejected the validity of laws not 
directly targeting a foreign government but merely private companies 
trading with a foreign government.
591
  Nonetheless, the district court 
in Giannoulias ruled that the impact of the divestment provisions was 
too attenuated to be considered an obstacle to achieving the full 
 
 580 Id. at 735. 
 581 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 735. 
 582 Id. at 740. 
 583 Id. at 738. 
 584 Id. at 738. 
 585 Id. 
 586 Id. at 738–39. 
 587 562 A.2d. 720 (Md. 1989). 
 588 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 740. 
 589 Id. 
 590 Id. 
 591 Id. at 740. 
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purposes of the federal act.
592
  The court’s analysis seems to be based 
on conjecture or perhaps a lack of evidence of the impact of the di-
vestment measures.
593
 
The court reached similar conclusions under its dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine analysis.
594
  Interestingly, the court cited both 
Zschernig and Garamendi in this section of its analysis.
595
  It also ulti-
mately adopted the traditional threshold-effects test (i.e., “more than 
an incidental or indirect effect”) as the appropriate test, after earlier 
complaining that neither case clearly laid out what test to apply to de-
termine if a state or local law ran afoul of the federal government’s 
foreign relations powers.
596
  The court found the banking section of 
the act ran afoul of the threshold-effects test because it singled out a 
particular foreign country.
597
  The court also relied on evidence that 
banks had lost $275 million in state deposits for failure to comply 
with the Illinois Act’s requirements, and this loss of business could ul-
timately cause the banks to cease doing business with prohibited enti-
ties.
598
 Thus, the Illinois Act impacted Sudan.
599
  In contrast, the court 
found the divestment measures did not have more than some inci-
dental or indirect effect on Sudan or U.S.-Sudan relations.
600
 
Interestingly, much earlier in its opinion, the court found from 
the Illinois Act’s title, preamble, and legislative history that the pur-
pose of the state law was to criticize or change the behavior of the 
government of Sudan.
601
  While the court did not tie this purpose-
finding back into its dormant foreign affairs doctrine analysis, the 
court probably would have invalidated the banking and divestment 
provisions of the law if it had exclusively employed this Article’s pre-
ferred purpose-based test.  Moreover, it seems likely the court’s analy-
sis gave at least some weight to the Illinois Act’s purpose, otherwise 
 
 592 Id. 
 593 See id. at 742 (“The Court has been presented with no evidence suggesting that 
these pension funds’ inability to purchase the securities of such companies would be 
in any way likely to affect their decision to do business in that country.”). 
 594 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 746. 
 595 Id. at 742. 
 596 Id. at 745 (citing Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st 
Cir. 1999)). 
 597 Id. at 745. 
 598 Id. 
 599 Id. 
 600 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 745.  
 601 Id. at 734. 
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there would have been little reason to delve into such analysis at the 
start of the opinion.
602
 
The Giannoulias case is an example of a lower federal court fol-
lowing the Crosby and Garamendi lead in relying first on obstacles con-
flict preemption grounds.
603
  It is also an example of how a court can 
find wiggle room to uphold, under preemption doctrine, portions of 
state laws singling out a particular foreign nation for criticism, even 
though such laws would not survive under the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine.
604
  Giannoulias also suggests that lower courts will read 
Zschernig as still alive but that a threshold-effects test may also permit 
states to take actions singling out particular foreign countries for crit-
icism.  Importantly, and regrettably, the Giannoulias court did not 
seek to hypothetically aggregate similar actions being enacted by oth-
er states and localities in deciding whether the threshold-effects test 
was met.  The fact that the court struck down the divestment provi-
sions under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause does not minim-
ize the court’s failures under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, 
given that the court came to its finding because the state was direct-
ing local pension funds to divest, and thus, under Seventh Circuit 
case law, acting in a regulatory capacity, not a market participant ca-
pacity.
605
  If the state had merely required divestment of Sudanese 
connected companies by state pension funds, the court might have 
found that the market-participant exception protected the divest-
ment provision from challenge. 
2. More Post-Crosby and Post-Garamendi Lower Court 
Treatment of Zschernig-Based Claims 
The Giannoulias opinion provides an example of the types of 
problems that can arise in a post-Garamendi examination of state 
laws—Zschernig is alive, but not preferred, and a threshold-effects test 
is employed more prominently than a purpose-based test.  But are the 
types of problems present in Giannoulias widespread among lower 
courts? 
Over a dozen other lower court cases, all but one of them feder-
al, have significantly addressed Zschernig claims since Crosby and Ga-
 
 602 See id. at 745. (acknowledging that the very purpose of the Illinois Act was to 
enact economic sanctions on Sudan).  
 603 Id. at 738. 
 604 See id. at 742. 
 605 See id. at 748. 
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ramendi.
606
  The bare majority of these cases (summarized in the chart 
below) indicate that indeed Zschernig is alive, the doctrines of 
preemption and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine can be kept dis-
tinct, and an act’s purpose frequently plays a key role in analyzing 
state measures under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, even if 
fealty is paid to the threshold-effects test.  Nevertheless, many lower 
court cases also indicate some confusion and mixing at times of 
preemption and dormant foreign affairs doctrine claims in the post-
Crosby and post-Garamendi era. 
 
Case Name Law or Action at 
Issue 
Test Under 
DFAD & Order 
of Analysis 
Type of 
Preemption 
Analysis 
Result 
Condon v. In-
ter-Religious 
Foundation for 
Community 
Organization
607
 
Commissioner of city 
school district’s spe-
cial investigation 
into whether travel 
to Cuba by students 
chaperoned by 
school employees 
violated federal law. 
The court used the 
threshold-effects test 
but gave some com-
mentary on the act’s 
purpose as well.  
This was the first and 
only doctrine ana-
lyzed. 
None. 
No violation 
of DFAD. 
ABC Charters, 
Inc. v. Bron-
son
608
 
Additional bonding 
requirements on 
travel agencies ar-
ranging travel to 
Cuba, which created 
two classes of travel 
agencies, those that 
do business with Cu-
ba and other terror-
ist states and those 
that do not. 
The court used the 
threshold-effects test 
but with the act’s 
purpose (“design 
and intent”) consi-
dered as the first 
sub-factor.  This was 
the first doctrine ana-
lyzed (prior to 
preemption). 
The court 
used Crosby-
styled ob-
stacles con-
flict preemp-
tion analysis, 
Hines-styled 
field preemp-
tion analysis, 
and did not 
cite to Gara-
mendi. 
Violation of 
DFAD, 
preempted, 
and a viola-
tion of the 
dormant 
Foreign 
Commerce 
Clause. 
Faculty Senate 
of Florida In-
ternationals 
University v. 
Winn
609
 
Restricted state uni-
versities from spend-
ing both state and 
“non-state” funds on 
activities related to 
The court used the 
threshold effects test, 
but the act’s purpose 
was the first sub-
factor (and the court 
The court 
used a Crosby-
styled ob-
stacles con-
flict preemp-
Violation of 
DFAD and 
preempted. 
 
 606 Additional cases, other than those analyzed in the chart, cite to Zschernig in the 
post-Garmamendi era, but the chart is limited to those cases that involve a significant 
discussion and analysis of Zschernig. 
 607 Condon v. Inter-Religious Found. for Cmty. Org., Inc., 850 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2008).  
 608 ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 609 Faculty Senate of Fla. Intern. Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (S.D. Fla. 
2007). 
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Case Name Law or Action at 
Issue 
Test Under 
DFAD & Order 
of Analysis 
Type of 
Preemption 
Analysis 
Result 
travel to a “terrorist 
state,” as designated 
by the U.S. Depart-
ment of State as a 
state sponsor of ter-
rorism. 
almost seems to dec-
lare the act unconsti-
tutional based on 
purpose alone).  
This was the first doc-
trine analyzed (prior 
to preemption). 
tion analysis. 
Hartford Enter-
prises Inc., v. 
Coty
610
 
Maine Workers’ 
Compensation Act 
applied to Canadian 
employees who came 
into Maine for only 
restricted purposes 
and limited times. 
The court used the 
threshold-effects test 
but the act’s purpose 
was the first sub-
factor.  This was the 
second doctrine applied 
(after preemption). 
The court 
stated that 
Garamendi 
stands for the 
proposition 
that tradi-
tional field 
preemption 
requires 
greater con-
flict. 
No violation 
of DFAD 
and no 
preemption. 
Central Valley 
Chrysler-Jeep v. 
Witherspoon
611
 
California green-
house gas (GHG) 
limits. 
The court mixed 
DFAD and preemp-
tion analysis (Zscher-
nig and Garamendi). 
The court 
mixed DFAD 
and preemp-
tion (Zschernig 
and Garamen-
di). 
No violation. 
Green Moun-
tain Chrysler 
Plymouth Dodge 
Jeep v. Crom-
bie
612
 
Vermont GHG lim-
its. 
The court used the 
“disruption and em-
barrassment” test, 
rather than thre-
shold-effects, but 
hints at purpose-
review.  This was the 
first doctrine analyzed 
(prior to preemp-
tion). 
The court 
used a Gara-
mendi-styled 
analysis but 
required an 
express policy 
(presumably 
in legal meas-
ures such as 
an executive 
agreement). 
No violation 
of DFAD or 
preemption 
doctrine. 
In re Nat’l 
Security Agency 
Telecommunica-
tions Records 
Litigation
613
 
Investigation by state 
officials of telecom-
munications compa-
nies that turned over 
records and informa-
tion to the NSA. 
The purpose-based 
test was applied first, 
but a threshold-
effects test was also 
applied.  This was 
the first doctrine ana-
lyzed (prior to 
preemption). 
None. No violation 
of DFAD. 
Republic of Irac 
v. Beaty
614
 
Suit under the FSIA 
Act against the state 
of Iraq by children 
of Americans impri-
The court seems to 
mix Garamendi and 
Zschernig into a 
The court 
used a Gara-
mendi-styled 
No violation. 
 
 610 Hartford Enters., Inc. v. Coty, 529 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D. Me. 2008). 
 611 Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal. 
2006). 
 612 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 
295 (D. Vt. 2007). 
 613 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007). 
 614 Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S.Ct. 2183 (2009). 
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Case Name Law or Action at 
Issue 
Test Under 
DFAD & Order 
of Analysis 
Type of 
Preemption 
Analysis 
Result 
soned and tortured 
by the former re-
gime for intentional 
infliction of emo-
tional distress under 
tort laws of Oklaho-
ma and Florida. 
preemption analysis 
(although it makes a 
late reference to 
there being no in-
tent to criticize the 
foreign govern-
ment). 
analysis  (not-
ing that since 
tort law is a 
traditional 
area of state 
law, the con-
flict with U.S. 
foreign policy 
would need to 
be signifi-
cant). 
Mujica v. Occi-
dental Petro-
leum Corp.
615
 
Columbian nationals 
sued an oil company 
and a private security 
firm under the Alien 
Tort Statute and 
state law to recover 
for their personal 
injuries and for 
deaths of family 
members caused by 
the bombing of a 
village by the Co-
lumbian military. 
The court largely 
merged preemption 
and DFAD analysis 
(late in the court’s 
opinion it speaks of 
“incidental con-
flict”). 
The court 
used Gara-
mendi but 
gave weight to 
a State De-
partment 
statement of 
interest, ra-
ther than in-
sist on express 
policy (fur-
ther indica-
tion of some 
merging of 
DFAD with 
preemption). 
Violation of 
DFAD. 
Cruz v. United 
States
616
 
Mexican nationals 
who worked in the 
United States during 
and after WWII 
brought action 
against Mexico, Mex-
ican banks, the 
United States, and 
American bank for 
failure to pay wages.  
California enacted a 
statute removing 
statute of limitations 
for actions such as 
the one brought. 
The court applied 
Zschernig, describing 
it as a field preemp-
tion case, although 
the test applied fo-
cused on criticism of 
foreign government 
(close to purpose-
based test).  The court 
analyzed Zschernig 
second (after preemp-
tion). 
The court 
used a Gara-
mendi-styled 
analysis (find-
ing no 
preemption 
based on ex-
ecutive 
agreements 
with Mexico 
since the 
agreements 
seemed to 
envision pos-
sibility of such 
suits). 
No violation 
of DFAD or 
preemption. 
In re Agent 
Orange Product 
Liability Litiga-
tion
617
 
Application of state 
tort law concerning 
products liability in 
ATS by Vietnamese 
non-profit and na-
tionals against man-
ufactures. 
The court cites 
Zschernig focusing on 
minute inquiries and 
criticism concerns in 
the case, and found 
no such risk in ordi-
nary application of 
New York tort law 
The court 
used a Gara-
mendi-styled 
analysis and 
found no 
preemption, 
noting that 
plaintiff’s 
No violation 
of DFAD or 
preemption. 
 
 615 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 616 Cruz v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
 617 Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chemical Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Li-
tig.), 373 F. Supp. 2d. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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Issue 
Test Under 
DFAD & Order 
of Analysis 
Type of 
Preemption 
Analysis 
Result 
were it applicable. domestic law 
claims were 
already 
barred by the 
government 
contractor 
defense. 
Saleh v. Titan 
Corp.
618
 
 
Application of state 
tort law to claims by 
Iraqi nationals of 
abuse by U.S. mili-
tary contractors in 
Iraq. 
The court gives little 
attention to Zschernig 
(only in a string cite 
with other preemp-
tion cases for the 
general proposition 
that states have no 
role in war time pol-
icy making). 
The court 
mixed its 
analysis.  It 
relied on 
Crosby and 
Garamendi as 
obstacles con-
flict-type 
preemption 
(changing the 
calibration of 
sanctions), 
but since 
there was no 
affirmative act 
of the federal 
government 
that 
preempts, the 
case may be 
considered a 
DFAD case.
619
 
Preempted. 
Movsesian v. 
Victoria Versi-
cherung AG
620
 
California Statute 
extending statute of 
limitations for claims 
arising out of life 
insurance policies 
for Armenian geno-
cide victims.
621
 
The court only once 
cited Zschernig (for 
the proposition that 
“courts look past 
superficial legislative 
intent to ascertain 
true legislative in-
tent”). 
The court 
finds Gara-
mendi allows 
preemption 
by executive 
branch state-
ments alone 
(no formal 
affirmative 
legal act is 
required).  
The court 
balanced the 
degree of 
conflict 
against the 
state interest. 
Preempted. 
 
 618 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 619 Indeed, this is what the dissent suspected.  See id. at 17 (Garland, J., dissenting) 
(arguing no precedent to strike down facially neutral generally applicable law under 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine). 
 620 Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 621 See id. at 1054 (internal quotations omitted). 
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Case Name Law or Action at Issue 
Test Under 
DFAD & Order 
of Analysis 
Type of 
Preemption 
Analysis 
Result 
Von Saher v. 
Norton Simon 
Museum of Art 
at Pasadena
622
 
California statute 
extending statute of 
limitations for claims 
seeking recovery of 
Holocaust-era art. 
The court examined 
the purpose (or aim) 
of the law first and 
then examined ef-
fects.
623
 This was the 
second doctrine ana-
lyzed (after preemp-
tion). 
The court 
initially kept 
preemption 
(citing Crosby 
and Garamen-
di first) and 
the dormant 
foreign affairs 
doctrine (cit-
ing Zschernig) 
distinct.  Lat-
er, in its opi-
nion, Gara-
mendi creeps 
into the 
DFAD analy-
sis, and there 
was some mix-
ing of the 
doctrines. 
Not 
preempted 
but conflicts 
with DFAD 
(or more 
specifically 
dormant 
War Powers 
doctrine).
624
 
 
As displayed in the above chart, seven of the thirteen lower court 
opinions analyzing Zschernig-based claims were able keep their dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine analysis separate and distinct from a 
preemption analysis.
625
  Of the seven cases that kept the doctrines dis-
tinct, six placed considerable emphasis on purpose in their dormant 
foreign affairs doctrine analysis.
626
  As also displayed in the above 
chart, however, a large minority of lower courts did not escape the 
 
 622 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 623 See id. at 965 (“California ‘seeks to redress wrongs committed during the 
second World War’—a motive that [is] fatal.”) (citing Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 
F.3d 692, 712 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 624 Id. at 965–66 (“The District Court held that [the California statute] intrudes on 
the power to make and resolve war, a power reserved exclusively for the federal gov-
ernment under the Constitution.  We agree.”). 
 625 The seven cases are the following: Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art 
at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010); Hartford Enters., Inc. v. Coty, 529 F. Supp. 
2d 95 (D. Me. 2008); ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 
2008); Condon v. Inter-Religious Found. for Cmty. Org., Inc., 850 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2008); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892 
(N.D. Cal. 2007); Faculty Senate of Fla. Intern. Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198 
(S.D. Fla. 2007); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. 
Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007). 
 626 These cases include the following: Von Saher, 592 F.3d 954; Hartford Enters., 529 
F. Supp. 2d 95; ABC Charters, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272; Condon, 850 N.Y.S.2d 841; 
Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892; Faculty Senate of Fla. In-
tern. Univ., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198.  
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potential confusion arising out of Garamendi.  Thus, a need exists for 
further clarification by the Supreme Court. 
IX. THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS  
OR IN STATE CAPITOLS? 
U.S. courts cannot be relied upon as the sole, or perhaps not 
even the primary, forum for applying the dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine.  Private parties affected by state-level foreign policy legisla-
tion must weigh the benefits of bringing a successful claim under a 
doctrine with an uncertain test against the risks of bringing a suit, in-
cluding potential consumer boycotts
627
 from those supporting the 
state’s incursion into foreign policy.  Therefore, because of the ambi-
guity of the doctrine, the uncertainty of success, and the risks to pri-
vate parties, the courts cannot serve as a comprehensive forum of 
constraint. 
Accordingly, self-imposed constraint by state legislators and gov-
ernors is necessary, at least to some degree.
628
  State legislators and 
governors have a duty to impose constitutional constraints upon 
themselves.
629
  Both take oaths to uphold and support the U.S. Consti-
tution.
630
  The Constitution, in fact, requires such “oaths or affirma-
tions” by all state government representatives and officials.
631
  Madi-
son opined in the Federalist Papers No. 44 that “the members and 
officers of the State governments . . . will have an essential agency in 
giving effect to the federal Constitution.”
632
  It is part of the “conscien-
tious” state official’s duty to analyze the constitutionality of proposed 
legislation, executive orders, and other formal acts.
633
  Legislators and 
governors, however, do not have complete independence in inter-
preting the U.S. Constitution for purposes of reviewing proposed 
acts.  Legislators and governors are bound to follow, or at least give 
extreme deference to, the decisions of the highest court of the land, 
the U.S. Supreme Court.
634
  The Court has established a dormant for-
 
 627 See Fenton, supra note 34, at 591. 
 628 Thus, while I agree with Professor Fenton that cases will rarely be brought, I 
disagree that judicial invalidation is the only realistic option for correction of the 
problem.  See Fenton, supra note 34, at 592. 
 629 Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 585, 587 (1975). 
 630 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 631 Id. 
 632 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 133 (James Madison) (Roy Fairfield 2d ed., 1981). 
 633 See Brest, supra note 629, at 587. 
 634 In the context of federal legislators, see Brest, supra note 629, at 587.  On the 
debate as to whether non-judicial officials must follow the Constitution as interpreted 
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eign affairs doctrine.
635
  The better reading of Crosby and Garamendi, 
as supported by a multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution and 
lower court opinions in the post-Crosby and post-Garamendi era, con-
firms the vitality of the doctrine and the importance of purpose in 
analyzing state actions under the doctrine.  Thus, state legislators and 
governors should not interpret the Constitution so as to deny the ex-
istence of such a doctrine.
636
  Nevertheless, because the Court has not 
addressed every issue related to the doctrine, for example, the exis-
tence of the market-participant exception, some independent inter-
pretation of the doctrine must occur.  The Court could facilitate and 
ease the difficult interpretational task state legislators and governors 
currently face by clearly adopting a purpose-based doctrinal test and 
rejecting a market-participant exception under the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine.  Clarification by the Court would provide far greater 
guidance to state officials than the current threshold-effects test.  
Such action would also allow lower courts to serve a greater role as a 
forum of constraint since private parties would be less hesitant to 
challenge state measures without the ambiguity over the doctrinal 
test.  However, one might hope that in time the faithful application 
of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test will 
eliminate the need for even infrequent litigation. 
X. MAY THE SUPREME COURT RELY ON  
THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE WHEN  
PREEMPTION COULD ALSO BE RELIED UPON? 
In Crosby, the Court cited Ashwander v. TVA
637
 as a reason why it 
chose not to address the First Circuit’s additional grounds for invali-
dating the Massachusetts Burma law, including the dormant foreign 
affairs doctrine.
638
  Justice Brandeis’ concurrence in Ashwander is fre-
quently cited to as laying out the rules on Supreme Court judicial re-
straint.
639
  The fourth principle in Ashwander relied upon by the Court 
to rule exclusively on preemption grounds in Crosby states: 
 
by the Supreme Court, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 635 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).  
 636 See Matthew Schaefer, Conscientious State Legislators and the Cultures of Compliance 
and Liberalization Relating to International Trade Agreements, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
52, 54 (2001). 
 637 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
 638 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 (2000). 
 639 See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 341.  
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The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although 
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some 
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.  This rule 
has found most varied application.  Thus, if a case can be decided 
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, 
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the 
Court will decide only the latter.
640
 
It is immediately apparent that if the application of preemption doc-
trine is considered to involve a constitutional question—as it rightful-
ly should be, given the doctrine involves interpretation of the Supre-
macy Clause as well as statutory construction to glean congressional 
intent—then Ashwander is not a sufficient reason to chose preemp-
tion grounds over dormant foreign affairs doctrine grounds.
641
  It ap-
pears the Court, prior to Crosby, never before relied on Ashwander to 
rule on preemption grounds over a dormant doctrine (i.e., either 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine or dormant Commerce Clause), so it 
was a novel application of the rule rather than long-standing prac-
tice.
642
  In fact, while Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Zschernig argued 
that the Court should rule on preemption grounds in part based on 
Ashwander,
643
 the six Justices in the majority rejected the argument 
and relied instead on the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
644
  To be 
fair, relying on preemption grounds would have required revisiting 
the interpretation of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Con-
sular Rights between the United States and Germany established ear-
lier in Clark v. Allen, something the majority was unwilling to do.
645
  
Therefore, there was not an explicit rejection by the Zschernig majority 
of the application of the fourth principle of Ashwander in their deci-
sion to rely on dormant foreign affairs doctrine grounds rather than 
preemption grounds. 
The strength of Ashwander’s fourth principle, however, as ap-
plied to situations involving a choice between preemption grounds or 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine grounds is further lessened when its 
 
 640 Id. at 347. 
 641 See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1265-68; see also Garrick Pursley, The Structure of 
Preemption Decisions, 85 NEB. L. REV. 912, 957 (2007) (“Preemption issues should be 
treated like any other constitutional issues for purposes of Pullman abstention and 
the rule that courts, where possible, should decide issues in the order that avoids 
constitutional questions.”). 
 642 The court, however, chose preemption grounds over other constitutional doc-
trines, such as the Equal Protection Clause in certain cases.  See Pursley, supra note 
641, at 913. 
 643 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 444 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 644 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432; see also Schaefer, supra note 4, at 47. 
 645 See supra Part IV.B. 
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origins are considered.  In laying out the fourth principle, Justice 
Brandeis cited to two cases: Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.
646
 
and Light v. United States
647
.
648
  Neither of these involved a decision to 
rely on preemption grounds over a dormant doctrine.  Indeed, the 
cases involved a choice between local law and federal constitutional 
doctrines to resolve the case at hand.
649
  Moreover, neither Siler nor 
Light speaks in terms of any obligation that a court must, or indeed 
certainty that a court would prefer, to resolve questions on a local law 
basis, rather than a federal constitutional question.  In Siler, the Court 
stated that it can “if it deem[s] it proper, decide the local questions 
only, and omit to decide the Federal questions.”
650
  In Light, the court, 
citing to Siler, stated that “where [a] case in this court can be decided 
without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution 
that course is usually pursued, and is not departed from without im-
portant reasons.”
651
  Thus, it appears that in certain situations, the 
presumption against deciding on constitutional grounds can be over-
come.  Eliminating unnecessary confusion and uncertainty over a 
significant constitutional doctrine might be sufficient grounds to 
overcome the normal rule of judicial restraint, even assuming that it 
applies in the context of choosing between two constitutional doc-
trines: preemption and dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
U.S. state involvement in foreign affairs continues.  Sanctions 
legislation for foreign-policy purposes, namely to change or criticize 
the behavior of foreign governments, is perhaps the most significant 
and problematic manifestation of this increased involvement.  Yet the 
existence of a dormant foreign affairs doctrine that invalidates cer-
tain state actions in foreign affairs, even when such actions have not 
been preempted by federal enactments, is increasingly criticized and 
questioned.
652
  The plenary preemptive powers of the federal gov-
ernment over foreign affairs, it is argued by many scholars, are suffi-
 
 646 213 U.S. 175 (1909). 
 647 220 U.S. 523 (1911). 
 648 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (citing Siler v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538 
(1911)). 
 649 See Siler, 213 U.S. at 191; Light, 220 U.S. at 538. 
 650 Siler, 213 U.S. at 191. 
 651 Light, 220 U.S. at 538 (citing Siler, 213 U.S. at 193). 
 652 See supra note 12. 
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cient to eliminate any negative effects of state-level foreign policies.
653
  
Yet sole reliance on preemption analysis does not allow the federal 
government to pursue quiet diplomacy with respect to a foreign-
policy matter.  Moreover, there will always be questions of congres-
sional intent to preempt when uncertainty over the existence and 
scope of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine persists.  For example, 
congressional representatives believing that such a doctrine exists 
may not explicitly preempt state sanctions activity in a federal sanc-
tions law because they believe such state activity is already prohibited 
by the Constitution. 
The existence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is sup-
ported by a multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution.  While 
there are conflicting signals of the appropriate test to be utilized un-
der the doctrine in the Court’s 1968 Zschernig opinion, purpose re-
view is the most appropriate standard.  Specifically, the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine should prohibit state actions that have a foreign 
policy purpose.  A foreign policy purpose is evident when the primary 
purpose of the state action is to criticize or change a policy of a for-
eign government.  Such a test best suits the competence of the courts, 
can be more consistently applied by courts, prevents the executive 
branch or—even worse—foreign governments from serving as the de 
facto judges of the validity of state legislation, and provides the great-
est degree of guidance to state government officials. 
Importantly, purpose review also respects traditional areas of 
state regulation and federal government views on whether certain in-
ternational agreements are self-executing to a much greater degree 
than a threshold-effects test.  Such review also will not prevent many 
activities states currently engage in that some broader definitions of 
foreign policy may include.  For instance, state trade missions and 
overseas investment offices do not, as a general matter, violate the 
dormant foreign affairs doctrine since their primary purpose is not to 
change foreign government policies but rather to facilitate private 
business contacts and private investment.  Similarly, state activities 
that create foreign controversies such as imposition of the death pe-
nalty will not violate a purpose-review-based dormant foreign affairs 
doctrine.  States do not take such actions with the primary purpose of 
changing foreign government policies.  A purpose-review test further 
refined, such that it is both limited to measures with legal effect and 
respectful of prior precedent, might be preferred.  It would allow 
state governments to voice their views on foreign policy matters to the 
 
 653 See discussion supra Part VIII.A. 
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federal government, just as a state can on any other federal matter, 
through non-binding resolutions and allow states to maintain reci-
procity-inspired legislation.  Additionally, a market participant excep-
tion should not be available under the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine, and the additional “one voice” prong of analysis under the 
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause should be eliminated because 
the concerns that led to the creation of the “one voice” prong are 
cured through faithful application of the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine. 
While the Court’s decisions in the early 2000s in Crosby and Ga-
ramendi have arguably created some confusion over the status of, and 
test to be used under, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, a majori-
ty—bare as it may be—of lower courts continue to treat the doctrine 
as alive and well, and place significant emphasis on purpose in their 
analysis.  Yet, because state officials must engage in a review of their 
actions even in the absence of litigation, it would be preferable for 
the Court to eliminate any confusion it has created.  The Court ap-
pears to have the flexibility to do so in a future case, given its own 
rules on judicial restraint do not absolutely require otherwise.  Even if 
the Court elects not to do so, state officials have plenty of reasons to 
independently apply a dormant foreign affairs doctrine with purpose 
review playing a key role as they assess the constitutionality of their 
own actions. 
 
